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Summary of Thesis 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to contribute towards the understanding of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, now British Petroleum) practices in Iran and 
thereby providing a clear picture of how nationalisation evolved on 1
st
 May 1951 and 
how it was perceived by the stock market. Nationalisation brought into sharp focus 
issues affecting key AIOC stakeholder groups, including Iranian employees, Iranian 
government and UK investors which became the subject of claim and counter-claim 
from the AIOC board and Iranian nationalist opinion. As a consequence of these 
disputed claims, a propaganda battle became a crucial ingredient of the crisis, not 
least because a key objective of the AIOC management was to maintain investor 
confidence in the face of a major threat to its asset base but also reflecting the 
AIOC‟s ability to defend itself from the claims made by the Iranian government 
about unfairness in the sharing of proceeds, and discrimination against Iranians. In 
fact, this was crucial in absolving the company from any blame for the international 
crisis.  
As a result, in considering the above effects, by using AIOC as a case study, 
contrasts are drawn between the AIOC‟s management‟s public view of the crisis and 
the actual events as documented in the literature, official papers, and financial 
records. It is worth noting that this research will examine the extent to which the 
company exploited and manifested Iranian rights by drawing on evidence from major 
neglected documents. Furthermore, this research will examine the degree to which 
imperialism has been applied to the Iranian society.  
The study shows that the AIOC was not prepared to give up any of its control over 
the Iranian oil resources nor to improve the concession for the Iranians. With that 
rationale, the AIOC failed to fulfil its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
obligations towards the Iranian employees and the company‟s treatment of Iran was 
unfair in terms of profit sharing. The study also highlights that the AIOC 
management did a good job in maintaining the investors‟ confidence and in 
defending the company from the Iranian claims at a time of the nationalisation crisis.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The oil industry was vital to the British Empire after the Great War. By the 1950s 
no single raw material was as important to the global economy as oil. Britain was 
extremely conscious of its limited oil resources and was dependent on finding it in 
remote parts of the world. From the time of the Navy‟s first experiments with oil, 
Admiralty planners were concerned about securing oil reserves and maintaining 
foreign control of oil supplies
1. Therefore, the British government‟s willingness to 
maintain control became more necessary and British firms were looking overseas and 
in particular to the Middle East.  
Since oil was important for Britain in order to satisfy the whole range of consumer 
requirements and to generate a considerable source of government revenue, the 
Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)
2
 was considered a suitable company upon which 
Britain could rely because it had significant political, strategic and economic power 
in Iran in the 20
th
 century. The expansion of AIOC was influenced by the British 
government‟s desire to use oil in its vessels instead of coal3. More so than coal, the 
oil industry had been associated with government intervention, due to its importance 
in providing intermediate inputs to the modern economy. In 1914, British interests 
influenced the Iranian deposits according to its own requirements, where the British 
government controlled oil for its navy and acquired a majority shareholding (51%) 
stake in the AIOC
4
. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the AIOC had been heavily 
implicated in the political economy of the Middle East, and in particular, Iran. The 
company‟s operations in Iran had a significant impact on the Iranian economy 
developing important consequences for British and U.S foreign policy in the 1950s. 
Nationalism and democracy had become new features of the Iranian political 
                                                 
1
 Jones, The State and the emergence of the British oil industry, 86. 
2
 Originally the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in deference to the Shah it became the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company in 1935 and in 1954 took on the name of its former marketing subsidiary, British Petroleum; 
Elm, Oil Power and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 36; Chandler, Scale and 
Scope, 303. For consistency „Iran‟ as in AIOC, rather than „Persia‟, is used throughout, except in 
direct quotations. 
3
 Jones, The State and the emergence of the British oil industry, 7. 
4
 Chandler, Scale and Scope, 300; Millward, Business and the State, 543. 
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landscape. At the top of the agenda for nationalist politicians was the renegotiation of 
previous concessions made by the Shah on better terms for Iran. Notwithstanding the 
economic and military importance of Iran, British politicians and the senior 
management of AIOC have been accused of arrogance in their dealings with 
successive Iranian governments
5
. A series of unsuccessful negotiations culminated in 
the assassination of one Prime Minister in March 1951 and the subsequent 
ratification of nationalisation of AIOC‟s Iranian assets by the Shah on 1st May 1951. 
The repercussions were serious, not just for the company, which lost a significant 
proportion of its assets, but for wider regional and indeed global geopolitics. The 
nationalisation therefore had major consequences for Anglo-Iranian relations and 
represented a blow to British imperial power which did not fully recover even after 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored coup to remove Musaddiq in 1953. 
Different phases and aspects of the dispute have been researched extensively, 
including Anglo-American relations, British and American foreign policies 
international law, covert operations, Iranian nationalism, the development of the 
Iranian oil industry, and the impact on international oil companies, including the 
AIOC.  
Whilst the Iranian Prime Minister Mohamed Musaddiq
6
  was conscious of  the 
strategic importance of Iranian oil to the AIOC and the British government, his 
political priorities were to address the poverty of the people by securing  control over 
their natural resources and the right to greater revenues. In addition to taxation, the 
Iranian government became concerned about discrimination against Iranian 
employees and misadministration. The nationalisation crisis brought anti-Iranian 
discrimination and unfairness in the distribution of profits from oil production into 
sharp focus, and they became the subject of claim and counter-claim from the AIOC 
board and Iranian nationalist opinion. As a result, in considering the above effects, 
by using AIOC as a case study, contrasts are drawn between the AIOC‟s 
management‟s public view of the crisis and the actual events as documented in the 
literature, official papers, and financial records. Furthermore, the role of Sir William 
                                                 
5
 Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath; Heiss, Empire and 
Nationhood. 
6
Mohamed Musaddiq (1882-1967), led the National Front coalition from its formation in 1949 and 
became Prime Minister in April 1951; Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, pp. 
605-6. For biographical details of other important figures, see appendix 2. 
 
 3 
M. Fraser (1888-1970), the AIOC‟s chairman (1941-1956) is examined in detail 
because his actions had important consequences for key AIOC stakeholder groups, 
including domestic investors and Iranian employees and society. In these respects, 
consideration is also given to how AIOC‟s management attempted to influence the 
lobbying process and news agenda to counter the accusations of the Iranian 
nationalists.  
Although a great deal has been written about the nationalisation crisis
7
, there are 
nonetheless important gaps, and three of these are addressed by this research. First, 
there are unresolved questions about the extent to which the AIOC engaged with the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda, particularly with regard to the 
treatment of its Iranian employees. Second, the Iranian shares in oil revenues have 
not been fully investigated, notwithstanding their importance in the dispute between 
the AIOC and Iranian nationalist politicians. Third, the relative bargaining power of 
the AIOC‟s management and Musaddiq‟s government has not been assessed with 
reference to the stock market reaction to the nationalisation and other important 
political events. To address all gaps, the research uses accounting and financial 
evidence that has been ignored or only partially utilised by previous studies.   
This chapter introduces the thesis, its research aims and the rationale for British 
imperialism managerial disclosure during the nationalisation crisis of AIOC. The 
chapter consists of six sections. Section 1.2 presents the background of the research 
by considering previous interpretations of the history of the company. Section 1.3 
presents the research problem and the research questions associated with 
nationalisation of the company and its impact on the British and Iranian economies. 
Section 1.4 presents the research objectives in relation to the research gaps which the 
thesis endeavours to fill. Section 1.5 presents the motivation for undertaking this 
study. Section 1.6 addresses the conceptual framework used in the thesis. Section 1.7 
                                                 
7
 Different phases and aspects of the dispute have been researched extensively, including Anglo-
American relations, British and American foreign policies, international law, covert operations, 
Iranian nationalism, the development of the Iranian oil industry, and the impact on international oil 
companies, including the AIOC. For Anglo-American relations see Marsh, Anglo-American Relations 
and Cold War Oil. For American and British foreign policies see Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and 
the shah; Louis, The British empire in the Middle East. For covert operations see Gasiorowski, and 
Bryne, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq; Marsh, The US, Iran and Operation Ajax: 1-38; Roosevelt, 
Countercoup. For the impact on Iran see Bill and Louis, eds. Musaddiq, Iranian nationalism, and oil; 
Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath. For the company 
perspective, see Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company; Engler, The Politics of oil; 
Stern, Who won the Oil wars. 
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explains the methodology adopted in this research. Finally, section 1.8 outlines the 
structure of the thesis and the chapters that follow.  
1.2 Background of the research 
The British having political hegemony in the Persian Gulf would have preferred to 
reserve the exploitation of oil in to British companies. Exploitation has been defined 
as a position in which a country, firm, individual, receives more income or product 
than the lowest possible amount it would be willing to accept in the circumstances
8
. 
AIOC‟s concern for continuing exploitation was to be an important issue which 
preoccupied the country. There is no doubt that British oil companies sought 
diplomatic support, fuel oil contracts and even finance from their government
9
. The 
AIOC had imperial connections and powerful national as well as strategic 
importance to Britain‟s economic situation and overseas interests10. The AIOC was 
Iran‟s main source of income because it had the world‟s largest refinery (Abadan), 
the second largest exporter of crude petroleum, and the third largest oil reserves. In a 
similar vein, AIOC was regarded to all intents and purposes as an arm of the British 
admiralty and of British strategic policy which was important to Britain‟s economic 
situation and prestige. There was cooperation and joint decision making between the 
company and the British authorities at home and abroad through the government‟s 
shareholding in the company. In fact, the government accepted because they were 
keen on having control and maintain disciplinary actions undertaken by the Iranian 
government. The overseas operations of the British oil companies actually produce a 
net credit in the British balance of payment current accounts which in turn reduced 
the overall deficit when account is taken of oil imports
11
.  
In 1933, a new concession was ratified by the Majlis (Iranian parliament), which 
extended the life of the original D‟Arcy concession by thirty-two years. The key 
features of the 1933 Agreement between Iran and the AIOC were an increase in the 
                                                 
8
 Penrose, Profit sharing between producing countries and oil companies in the Middle East. 
9
 Jones, The State and the emergence of the British oil industry, 8. 
10
 Marsh, Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951-
1953.  
11
 Penrose, The large International firm in developing countries. This can be explained by the fact that 
oil is purchased for Sterling from British companies which means that the actual foreign exchange 
cost will noticeably be lower than the price paid for imports whilst domestic prices would be held up 
by taxation in order to protect the coal industry when competing with fuel oil, 81. 
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royalty paid to Iran
12
 comprising a fixed sum of 4s per ton, a guaranteed 20 per cent 
of worldwide profits above a fixed level and a minimum annual payment of 
£750,000.
13
 At the same time it was agreed that Iranianisation should be 
implemented. Literally, the 1933 Agreement offered Iran a share in AIOC‟s overall 
profits around the world equivalent to 20 percent of dividends distributed among 
holders of common stock in excess of £671,250
14
. However, this was not the case 
because the company used to increase its taxes to decrease its net profits and thus 
decreasing Iran‟s 20 percent share in dividends and general reserves15. Obviously, 
Iran was receiving crumbs from its resources because it was left at the mercy of the 
British government. But, Britain was claiming that they built and operated in Iran a 
flourishing company (AIOC) which they hoped to hand over intact to the Iranian 
nation at the end of the concession.  
Iran wanted economic and political independence but the company had the 
attitude that Iran could not afford to do it on its own and resisted any demands for a 
change. Despite the nature of the concession as a commercial contract, attitudes 
towards the Iranians remained that they should be thankful to the AIOC for its 
achievements
16
. Hence, a series of unsuccessful negotiations have been initiated 
between the Iranian and British governments which resulted in the ratification of 
nationalisation of AIOC‟s Iranian assets by the Iranian Prime Minister (Mohammed 
Musaddiq) on 1st May 1951. The consequences were serious for the company 
because it lost a significant proportion of its assets including the world‟s largest 
refinery in Abadan. It is worth noting that the Abadan refinery was located in 
Southern Iran and was the oldest in the region with an estimated crude oil input 
capacity of 500,000 barrels a day and a cracking capacity of 116,000 barrels a day
17
. 
The refinery used to manufacture a wide range of products including aviation 
gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas and lubricating oil
18
.  
As mentioned earlier, the role of Fraser is worthy of further scrutiny and will be 
examined in full detail in this thesis. Fraser did not like to be told what to do by the 
government. “He had contempt for civil servants and on occasion tried to intimidate 
                                                 
12
 Esfahani and Pesaran, Iranian Economy in the Twentieth Century. 
13
 Yergin, The Prize, 271. 
14
 AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, 1950. 
15
 Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 37. 
16
 Johnson,  British multinationals, culture and empire in the early Twentieth century, 206. 
17
 Issawi and Yeganeh, The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil, 13. 
18
 Ibid, 15. 
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them into doing what he wanted”19. People within the AIOC considered Fraser “a 
mean Scotsman who had no flexibility at all”20. The nationalisation crisis brought the 
managerial role into focus which became the subject of claims and counter-claims 
from the AIOC board and Iranian nationalist opinion. In this research, the dispute 
between the AIOC and Iranian government over control of the oil fields that 
culminated in the nationalisation of 1951 is re-examined using new evidence with 
particular reference to the position of Fraser. Also, the background to the 
negotiations is presented, together with the historiography of the Iranianisation 
debate. 
1.3 Research Problem and Research Questions 
It is essential to understand the political and social attitude of the AIOC towards 
the Iranian Government and Iranian employees to understand how the politics of the 
company culminated in the nationalisation of 1951. Most historians remain interested 
and enthusiastic in the search for explanations for continuities and explanations for 
changes which occur over long periods to help in identifying major vital turning 
points
21. Walker explains crisis as “times of acute disturbance which may impact at 
the global, national, organisational or personal level”22. Therefore, my desire went 
back to a time in the 1950‟s to re-examine the evidence surrounding the events 
leading up to and immediately following the nationalisation of the Anglo Iranian Oil 
Company‟s assets in May 1951. Iranian accusations were numerous so this research 
seeks to examine the evidence of British imperialism in Iran through anti-Iranian 
discrimination and inequality in profit allocation in favour of the British. Meanwhile, 
this research aims to investigate the role of Fraser in maintaining the shareholders‟ 
confidence during the nationalisation crisis. Thus, this research has identified the 
following research questions that involve further investigation.  
a) Were Iranian workers treated fairly by the AIOC? 
b) Were AIOC profits evenly distributed among the British and the Iranians? 
c) How was nationalisation perceived by the stock market? How did Fraser 
maintain shareholders‟ confidence and relations with the UK investors?   
                                                 
19
 Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 66. 
20
 Ibid, 103. 
21
 Walker, Accounting in crises, 5.
  
 
22
 Ibid. 
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1.4 Research objectives 
As noted earlier, three major issues have dominated the historiography of the 
AIOC and are therefore worthy of further investigation. Consequently, this research 
has various challenges. The first is to research the nexus between the nationalisation 
of the AIOC and imperialism to investigate the relations among different 
governmental British authorities, as well as relations with the local communities and 
Iranians to ascertain the policies of inequality and differentiation. The second is to 
discuss Iranian accusations of unfairness in the distribution of profits from oil 
production and their dissatisfaction regarding the royalties and policies adopted by 
the British government in limiting their dividends. The final and perhaps the most 
important challenge, is to evaluate the managerial response to the nationalisation 
crisis and examine the tactical methods adopted by the AIOC management, including 
the management of information. A conceptual framework is defined later to explain 
Fraser‟s motivation in maintaining shareholders‟ confidence and his desire in serving 
his managerial economic self-interests. It is important to note that the research 
objectives originated from the literature and became important elements of the 
abortive pre-nationalisation negotiations and failure to reach a settlement amongst 
both parties.  
The main objectives of this study are summarised as follows: 
Objective 1: To examine the CSR policies adopted by the AIOC in the period 
prior to nationalisation using new evidence on anti-Iranian discrimination. 
The first objective draws particular attention to the AIOC‟s programme of CSR 
(Iranianisation), which originated in the terms of the 1933 drilling rights concession 
and became an important element of the abortive pre-nationalisation negotiations. It 
draws on a wide range of archival evidence contrasting the pronouncements of the 
AIOC in public documents such as the annual reports with private views reflected in 
correspondence and third party evidence. All sources are examined to explain how 
the AIOC annual reports were used as part of a propaganda battle, where private 
views were different from public views. Finally, this provides further evidence 
concerning the Iranian claims that they were not treated fairly nor regarded as 
genuine stakeholders.  
 8 
Objective 2: To evaluate the Iranian accusations of unfairness in the 
distribution of profits from the oil production in Iran and the policy of dividend 
limitation. 
The AIOC was powerful and dominant by having the support of international law. 
Thus, the second objective will contribute towards reviewing the Iranian accusations 
against the AIOC for their unfairness in the distribution of profits, using selected key 
documents which have been hitherto neglected. In reviewing these neglected 
documents, the justification of the claims made by both sides will be assessed by 
comparing the assertions of the AIOC annual reports with the private views which 
were reflected in correspondence, the latter providing supporting evidence about the 
motive and extent of the AIOC‟s adopted methods for profit distribution. These 
documents include the Memorandum, the private and public correspondence of 
AIOC executives and diplomats, and also published statements in the press and 
annual reports, obtained primarily from the BP archives. 
Objective 3: To examine the reaction of the AIOC share price to 
nationalisation.  
The third objective uses stock market evidence to explain how the AIOC defended 
its status in the stock market and illustrates how the nationalisation of AIOC and the 
publication of the company‟s Annual Report in 1951 were perceived by the London 
stock market. Moreover, the role of the Chairman is reviewed to highlight his 
successful influence in maintaining the shareholders‟ confidence. 
1.5 Motivation of the study 
The study is of significant interest to academics and the business community 
alike, since historical studies offer an opportunity to consider changes in the levels of 
disclosures in terms of both quantity and quality through the analysis of reactions to 
social change and regulation. The contextualization of the development of 
accounting by reference to major key points and periods of crisis assist in the search 
for the origins of a debacle and try to arrive at conclusions which generate historical 
evidence.  
The nationalisation of the AIOC on 1
st
 May 1951 by the Iranian Prime Minister 
Musaddiq angered the British and seemed part of a growing pattern of pressure on 
their interests culminating in wresting Musaddiq from the control of the oil industry. 
From this the whole question of British influence in the Middle East was raised. An 
 9 
unclear relationship between Iran and the British government had been established 
because of the British attempts to exercise imperial power. Iranians resented the 
imperial intentions of the British and this influenced their attitude towards the 
company. Iranians held the general opinion that British policy in Iran was aimed at 
safeguarding their interests in relation to the exploitation of oil and ignoring Iranian 
rights
23
. Iranians believed that oil was the most important issue to hold the nation‟s 
attention because Iran had great natural resources
24
. Iranian people wanted to take for 
themselves the maximum profits from their resources and make every effort to 
provide for the welfare of the disadvantaged elements in their own population
25
. 
Therefore, since 1951, the British had been considering another option which was 
to remove Musaddiq by force and through covert political action. To this end they 
received assistance from America. As previously mentioned, different phases of the 
dispute have been researched by other scholars over the years but there remains a 
substantial gap in the historical literature, with business historians tending to omit the 
imperial aspect and instead focussing on the role of the industry at a macro level for 
social, political and economic analysis. As a consequence, this research will put 
considerable emphasis on the impact of British imperialism and discrimination 
against the Iranians by providing useful insights into the Iranian perspective. 
 Imperialism can be defined as the maintenance of an unequal economic, political 
and cultural relationship between states based on domination and the physical 
presence of an entity as formal and informal Empire. „Formal Empire‟ describes a 
formal colony developed by an empire to influence a region or country and achieve 
its strategic or military interests, whereas „informal Empire‟ describes an informal 
colony developed by an empire to influence a region or country and achieve its 
commercial or military interests in an indirect way. The management of AIOC was 
therefore dominated by a prominent imperialist who acted as a chairman and lobbied 
hard to counter the Iranian accusations. Thus, this research will examine the 
importance of propaganda for shaping and establishing the company‟s hegemony 
through an analysis of annual reports, the press and other major archival documents. 
                                                 
23
 BP 126349, Reference No. 522, Northcroft to Rice on 12
th
 December 1950, 4. 
24
 BP 080924, Gist of Tudeh pamphlet distribute among Depot labour on 1
st
 August 1949, 1. 
25
 The Times, September 26, 1952; pg. 4; Issue 52427; col C. 
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The oil industry, and its importance to the British Empire, has long been a major 
subject of study. Thus, the motivation for this research is inevitably driven by the 
need to research the history of the company to provide a considerable body of 
evidence about British imperialism. In doing so, it will clarify how the AIOC‟s 
management attempted to influence the lobbying process and news agenda to counter 
the accusations of Iranian nationalists. The incentive for choosing the AIOC lies in 
the fact that it is one of the largest oil companies in the world and had a unique 
competitive advantage, being the first mover in developing the oil reserves of the 
Middle East. The AIOC was politically more sensitive and visible in the public eye 
and more closely watched by government agencies mainly during its nationalisation 
and the overthrow of Musaddiq. Meanwhile, the case study of a single company has 
the advantage that disclosures can be placed along with the major events in the 
company‟s financial performance, and the parties interested in disclosure such as 
shareholders, management and others can be easily recognized
26
. Moreover, case 
studies provide practitioners with a deeper and richer understanding of the social 
context in which they work and may facilitate the construction of testable 
hypotheses.  
1.6 Conceptual framework 
 In the literature and historiography of the AIOC and other nationalisations, there 
are some important and contrasting views of strategies for retention of asset control 
in the face of a nationalisation threat. These can be characterized as (i) political and 
covert mechanisms, (ii) market based, resource access controls, and (iii) corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programmes. 
 The first area has attracted considerable attention from political and diplomatic 
historians
27
. Gray et al. define political economy as the “social, political and 
                                                 
26
 Maltby, Hadfields Ltd: its annual general meetings 1903-1939 and their relevance for 
contemporary corporate social reporting.  
27
 Different phases and aspects of the dispute have been researched extensively, including Anglo-
American relations, British and American foreign policies, international law, covert operations, 
Iranian nationalism, the development of the Iranian oil industry, and the impact on international oil 
companies, including the AIOC. For Anglo-American relations see Marsh, “Anglo-American Crude 
Diplomacy.” For American and British foreign policies see Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and the 
Shah; The Politics of oil; Stern, Who won the Oil wars; Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East. 
For covert operations see Gasiorowski and Bryne, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq; Marsh, “The United 
States, Iran and Operation Ajax.”; Roosevelt, Countercoup. For the impact on Iran see Bill and Louis, 
eds. Musaddiq, Iranian nationalism and oil; Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle. For the company 
perspective see Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company.  
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economic framework within which human life takes place”28. Unerman also 
emphasized that the political economy theory does not assume that business 
organisations operate within “a harmonious social, economic and political 
environment and introduces into the analysis structural conflict between different 
parts of the system”29. According to Marsh30, in the Iranian case, the British 
government used the AIOC as an instrument of foreign policy
31
 addressing wider 
concerns of fighting communism and advancing the Anglo-American special 
relationship. The AIOC “was so dominant within the Iranian economy that it was 
effectively a state within a state and regarded to all intents and purposes as an arm of 
the British Admiralty and the British strategic policy”32. For other scholars, the 
AIOC was a spillover of “British imperialism” because British officials believed that 
British firms should dominate the oil market to protect the home country‟s uncertain 
balance of payments
33
. Bill & Louis conclude that “the company was mainly owned 
by the British government, its power was in the end that of Britain”.34 As White 
suggests “nationalisation appeared a distinct possibility in a number of Britain‟s 
decolonizing territories because many anti-colonial movements taking shape by the 
1950s espoused some form of socialism”35. Finally, Bostock and Jones argued that 
virulent Iranian economic nationalism “can‟t be treated solely as an endogenous 
factor to British business. Iranian policies were a reaction to the close relations 
between British business in Iran and the British government”36. For the British, the 
Iranian crisis created a crucial precedent which was “If Musaddiq‟s view had 
                                                 
28
 Gray et al., Accounting and Accountability:Changes and challenges in Corporate Social and 
environmental reporting, 47. 
29
 Unerman, An investigation into the development of accounting for social, environmental and ethical 
accountability: a century of corporate social disclosures at Shell, 31. 
30
 Marsh, HMG, AIOC and the Anglo- Iranian Oil Crisis, 143. 
31
 Ferrier has argued the Iranian nationalists were aware of the fact that “AIOC was acting as an agent 
of the British government in depriving the Iranian government of the revenues to which it was 
entitled” and the AIOC executives blamed the Treasury in London for being inflexible in royalty and 
dividend payments to Iran which resulted in the company‟s nationalisation; see Ferrier, The Anglo 
Iranian oil dispute, 170. 
32
 Cited in Marsh, Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy, 28. 
33
 Marsh has argued that the Abadan oil refinery was the largest in the world and was considered a 
source of national pride to Britain; Marsh, The United States, Iran and operation Ajax, 9; Tignor, 
Capitalism and nationalism at the end of Empire; Bostock and  Jones, British business in Iran, 1860s- 
1970s. 
34
 Bill and Louis, Musaddiq, Iranian nationalism, and oil, pp. 329-30. 
35
 White, The Business and the politics of decolonization, 551. 
36
 Bostock  and Jones, British business in Iran, 1860s- 1970s, 66. 
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prevailed then nationalists throughout the world might abrogate British 
concessions”37. 
The second strand of literature uses market control explanations to interpret 
nationalisation events. For Kobrin, and others, the oil companies‟ control of key parts 
of the value chain after nationalisation, in particular refining and distribution 
capacity, made embargoes an effective mechanism for undermining governments
38
 
as in the Mexican (1938) and Iranian (1951) cases. Similarly, as suggested by Farge 
and Wells, market access was a crucial determinant of bargaining power in these and 
similar cases
39
. According to Bucheli, companies investing in mining or oil are more 
likely to be targets of political violence and are more vulnerable to nationalist 
policies than those operating in the manufacturing or service sector due to their 
vertically integrated structure which affects local polities
40
. 
The final strand of the literature, associated with CSR and labour relations, 
constitutes a further, less extensively researched dimension of multi-national 
activity
41
. CSR addresses the commitment of companies to align their activities with 
the needs of various stakeholder groups and account for their social, environmental 
and ethical performance. Maurer, in a case study of Mexican oil nationalisation, 
shows that oil company concessions to an increasingly powerful trade union on 
health insurance, paid holidays and rising real wages, motivated the Mexican 
government to nationalize the remains of an uncompetitive declining industry
42
. 
Elsewhere, CSR programmes aimed to include local populations, in networks of 
social capital
43
. In Turkey and India, Unilever retained control by increasing the 
involvement of local employees in the management of the company
44
. In Venezuela, 
the development of new towns by the oil companies created structured lifestyles for 
                                                 
37
 Louis and Robinson, The Imperialism of Decolonization, 476. 
38
 Kobrin, Diffusion as an explanation of oil nationalisation ; see also Vernon, State- owned 
Enterprises in Latin American Exports; and the discussion in Bucheli, Major Trends in the 
Historiography of the Latin American Oil Industry, p.360 for similar Latin American cases. 
39
 Farge and Wells, Bargaining power of multi-nationals and host governments. 
40
  Bucheli, Multinational corporations, 436; see also Decker, Corporate Legitimacy and advertising. 
Who argues that manufacturing was also vulnerable, particularly in the 1960s. 
41
 AIOC‟s linkages with the local economy were few and the company was widely disliked; Bostock 
and Jones, British business in Iran, 1860s- 1970s, 46. 
42
 Maurer, The empire struck back ; O‟Brien, The Revolutionary Mission, 301. 
43
 Verhoef, Nationalism, social capital and economic empowerment. 
44
 For an example of how the firm‟s CSR agenda was more negatively influenced by state policies and 
local circumstances see Forbes, Multinational Enterprise, ‘Corporate Responsibility’ and the Nazi 
Dictatorship.; see also Jones, Multi-national strategies. 
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local employees thereby assimilating them into corporate culture
45
. In Africa, 
government requirements that an industry limit the employment of foreigners to a 
designated number were referred to as “Africanisation”46. Similarly, in the Iranian 
case, the AIOC was pressured to engage in “Iranianisation”, essentially the increased 
employment by AIOC of Iranian workers and a CSR programme aimed at giving 
Iranian employees increased status and access to the benefits of employment, 
housing and education
47
. There are disagreements amongst historians about the 
motivation, extent and success of these policies. In the official corporate history, the 
AIOC‟s achievements in providing housing, education, social benefits and greater 
seniority for its Iranian employees are presented as substantial
48
. An alternative view 
promulgated typically but not exclusively by Iranian historians, was that the AIOC 
was “an untouchable foreign enclave”, “a state within a state” or economic power in 
its own right whose dominance of Iran resulted in discrimination and political 
repression,
49
 which only paid only lip service to the Iranianisation process, and that 
its obstinacy fuelled the subsequent political crisis
50
.  
To examine the robustness of these contrasting views, this research will 
examine how AIOC management used CSR to respond to the challenges outlined in 
each of these strands of the literature. Using a new conceptualization of CSR, the 
research identifies managerial strategies with respect to three corresponding interest 
groups: politicians and diplomats, shareholders, and local employees. This allows 
managerial attitudes to political, market, and social control to be contrasted with 
reference to evidence from political negotiations, communications with shareholders 
in annual reports and the attitudes of corporate officials to the Iranian workforce.  
The notion of CSR is regarded as a relatively recent phenomenon, and as such is 
rarely analyzed historically in the business management and ethics literatures. CSR is 
regarded as something that is imposed on business by society, for example in social 
contract, legitimacy based models, or as a benign and inclusive redefinition of 
corporate objectives, as in the stakeholder model, that can be readily accommodated 
                                                 
45
 Tinker-Salas, The enduring Legacy, chapter 6.  
46
 Rood, Nationalisation and Indigenisation in Africa. 
47
 Bostock and Jones, British business in Iran, 1860s-1970s. 
48
 Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, pp.361-74; Ferrier, The History of the 
British Petroleum Company. 
49
 Keddie, The Iranian power structure, 11; Abrahamian, The 1953 coup in Iran. 
50
 For example, Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle; Abrahamian, Iran Between two revolutions.    
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into economic theory derived models of strategy making
51
. CSR has not been 
generally viewed as a means of corporations exercising social control
52
.
 
This research 
offers such a standpoint as a new perspective on CSR. 
Greenwood provides a useful taxonomy of the moral treatment of stakeholders in 
terms of stakeholder agency the number and breadth of stakeholder groups in whose 
interest the company acts, and stakeholder engagement,
53
 defined as the number of 
processes of communication, dialog and consultation. As Greenwood suggests, it is 
only cases where both agency and engagement are high that have exercised the CSR 
literature. Although these variables are to some extent useful for the purposes of 
testing historical evidence, they do not directly address the issue of managerial 
motivation, which when faced with significant external threats should be strongly 
influenced by control. The social capital literature suggests that the purpose of 
inclusion or exclusion from networks of business activity is social control, 
particularly through observance of norms
54
. As Coleman argues, social capital 
develops through social engineering, which replaces earlier forms of control, based 
on primordial ties, with material-based status incentives.
55
 The implication of this 
view is that CSR, through increasing social provision in a post colonial setting using 
housing schemes, employment and benefit packages and access to education, 
provides corporate management with mechanisms to enforce norms and create 
stakeholder engagement. Viewing CSR in this light allows us to create a taxonomy 
of control as a series of options available to corporate management. These are set out 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 For Legitimacy theory see Dowling and Pfeffer, Organisational legitimacy. For Stakeholder model 
see Donaldson and Preston, The stakeholder theory of the modern corporation, as extensions of 
corporate strategy Porter and Kramer, Strategy and Society. 
52
 For some exceptions in the accounting history literature, see for example Neimark, the Hidden 
Dimensions of Annual Reports; Maltby, Showing a strong front; Maltby and Tsamenyi, Narrative 
accounting disclosure. 
53
 Greenwood, Stakeholder Engagement, pp. 321-22. 
54
 Portes, Social Capital, p.8. For a review of recent applications of social capital in business history 
contexts, see Laird, Putting social capital to work.  
55
 Coleman, The rational reconstruction of society. 
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Figure 1: CSR Control Strategies and Stakeholder Management in Multi-national 
Firms Facing Asset Expropriation Threats  
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programmes. Each element of control therefore implies a different mechanism of 
communication with a different range of stakeholders (corresponding to stakeholder 
engagement and agency in Greenwood‟s framework)56. The model predicts 
significant differences between communications on the same subject depending on 
the recipient stakeholder group. These are tested empirically in the following 
chapters. 
1.7 Methodology  
This section discusses the research approach and highlights the different 
methodologies employed in the thesis to test the hypotheses laid in the following 
chapters. A triangulation approach will be adopted in this thesis to examine the 
events leading up to nationalisation and assess the performance of the company 
during this political crisis. Qualitative analysis is a crucial complement to the 
quantitative process so the company‟s published annual reports along with other 
major archival documents are used in this research to supplement each other. For 
instance, press analysis, company meetings, political correspondence and publication 
of annual reports were used in conjunction with quantitative empirical testing. The 
triangulation method shares the notion that qualitative and quantitative methods 
should be viewed as complementary and offers the advantage of increasing the 
strength of the research. Triangulation is defined by Denzin
57
 as “the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”. Denzin emphasized the 
importance of using triangulation in research to cross validate the results and 
compare the data using different approaches. Campbell and Fiske
58
 developed the 
idea of “multiple operationism” and were the first to use triangulation. They asserted 
that the use of different methods is important in the validation process. Moreover, 
Bouchard
59
 argued that the conformity and agreement of using different methods 
“enhances our belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact”. The 
usefulness of triangulation lies in the fact that the weaknesses in using each method 
will be overcome by the counter-balancing strengths of another because triangulation 
                                                 
56
 Recent evidence from a study of oil company behaviour suggests important differences of 
engagement of domestic and local stakeholders see Toms and Hasseldine, Asymmetric Response: 
Explaining corporate social disclosure.  
57 Denzin, The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods, 291. 
58 Campbell and Fiske, Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix, 
81. 
59 Bouchard, Unobtrusive measures: An inventory of uses, 268.  
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purports to exploit the advantages of mixed methods rather than sharing the same 
potential for bias
60
.  
Methodological triangulation is the most discussed type of triangulation which 
refers to the use of multiple methods to examine a social phenomenon. Denzin
61
 
classified methodological triangulation into two methods which are the within-
method and the between (or) across method. Firstly, within-method involves 
employing at least two data-collection procedures from the same design approaches. 
Secondly, between (or) across method employs both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection methods in the same study. In this research, the second approach is used 
because both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods will be used to 
provide a rich and complete picture of the impact of nationalisation on the 
performance of AIOC. 
Triangulation helps to enhance the validity of research findings. Triangulation is 
used with the assumption that the weakness of one approach is complemented by the 
strength of another. Overall, the use of multimethods “Triangulation” has several 
advantages. First, it can lead to an enhanced explanation of the research problem and 
encourages productive research. Second, it provides the researcher with the 
opportunity to use ingenious methods and obtain reliable results. Moreover, 
triangulation plays a constructive role through the integration of different theories 
and utilisation of different methods in a complementary fashion. Additionally, 
triangulation enables the researcher to be close to the situation, which allows greater 
sensitivity to the multiple sources of data
62
. Finally, triangulation entails 
inventiveness in collecting the data and instinctive interpretation of the results 
through the user‟s creativity. 
To sum up, documentary evidence, whether in the form of narratives or 
accounting numbers, is important in the formulation of hypotheses and helps in 
sustaining accuracy and research judgements. In this context, different qualitative 
and quantitative data collection methods are adopted to examine the same dimension 
of a research problem and investigate different sorts of data with the same 
phenomenon. 
                                                 
60
 Jick, Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: triangulation in action, 604. 
61
 Denzin, The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods. 
62
 Jick, Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: triangulation in action, 604. 
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1.7.1 The use of secondary data and archival sources in historical analysis 
Facts are selected and evidence is assembled from the secondary literature and 
historical archival documents. Firstly, evidence is gathered from the official 
corporate history literature of the industry which was written by prior historians
63
. 
The secondary literature is important because it represents the sources of data that 
have been collected by others and not specifically collected for the research 
questions
64
. Secondary sources include a wide range of documents such as public 
reports of companies, internal documents produced by organisations and documents 
appearing in the press and other media
65
. The secondary literature suggests that the 
data have some currency and contemporary relevance which enables the researcher 
to link different perspectives of the research with the relevant theories.  
Secondly, evidence is collected from various archival documents. A historical fact 
“is something that happened in history and can be verified as such through the traces 
history has left behind”66. The main role of the historian involves taking historical 
facts and subjecting them to the most thorough scrutiny to ascertain the truth and 
determine whether these facts represent credible evidence for an argument or a 
theory
67
. Archival data are self-evidently useful because “the methodological worries 
that mark sociology‟s discussions of secondary analysis are very simple countered by 
the rejoinder that there is no alternative data available”68. The archival documents 
provide new insights for analysis which go beyond the existing literature.  
1.7.2 The use of empirical evidence in historical analysis 
In relation to the official corporate history and archival documents, that 
undoubtedly enhance our understanding of the AIOC, further evidence is gathered in 
light of the analysis of annual reports and stock market data. Analysis of the annual 
reports includes the accounting analysis of the financial statements and content 
analysis of the narratives of the Chairman‟s statement. Capital market data are 
compiled from the FT30 index and analysed using event methodology to study the 
impact of specific events on the security prices of the AIOC.  
                                                 
63
 Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company; Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s oil 
nationalisation and its aftermath. 
64
 Harris, Content analysis of secondary data: a study of courage in managerial decision making.  
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Evans, In defense of history. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
Fielding, Getting the most from archived qualitative data: epistemological, practical and 
professional obstacles, 104. 
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This research is undertaken in the belief that an understanding of the way in which 
the Chairman discloses information in the annual reports depends upon a more 
detailed knowledge of how accounting data are used by the AIOC and how it was 
placed within the wider context of the company. Aerts
69
 argued that Chairman‟s 
statements might be a way to produce “systematically biased” information and to 
issue narrative that can be „coloured‟ to manage news disclosure in the company‟s 
favour. Moreover, Aerts
70
 argued that the Chairman can influence the stakeholders in 
respect of a particular interpretation of events and used the term “self-serving 
attributional bias” to describe the impression resulting from management efforts in 
manipulating the stakeholders. Therefore, the analysis is aimed at widening the scope 
of the evidence available with the company and providing new insights by adding a 
relevant quantitative empirical body of evidence. 
First of all, data is collected from the AIOC Annual Accounts and Reports which 
are assembled together with evidence from other sources
71
. Accounting evidence in 
this research is used to reveal the truth because sometimes senior managers and 
especially the chairmen used their statements to gain competitive advantage. 
Managers may exercise judgement in preparing financial statements in an 
opportunistic or efficient manner to maintain stakeholders‟ confidence. Therefore, 
this research aims to explain the true picture of managerial behaviour within the 
AIOC, including their disclosures to different stakeholder groups.  
The widespread use of annual reports plays an important role because they are the 
main form of corporate communication which can be attributed to an increase in the 
control of shareholders and may well reflect the company‟s appreciation of a genuine 
responsibility to a wider public than its own shareholders
72
. Annual reports are 
regarded as a medium for communicating both quantitative and qualitative corporate 
information to different potential users. They can also be seen as strategic documents 
as they reflect impressions about a firm‟s activities73. Annual reports are an 
important mediating document between various stakeholder groups which include 
                                                 
69
Aerts, On the use of accounting logic as an explanatory category in narrative accounting 
disclosures, 341. 
70
Aerts, Picking up the pieces: impression management in the retrospective attributional framing of 
accounting outcomes. 
71
 BP 101099, Mr. Addison‟s Persian file, Memorandum, 1946- 1949: Gidel Memorandum. 
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 Penrose, The large International firm in developing countries, 29. 
73
 Buhr, Environmental performance, legislation and annual report disclosure: the case of acid rain 
and Falconbridge.  
 20 
investors, creditors, employees and the government. Accounting information is 
typically valuable as a source of information in industrial organisations because it 
supplies managers with timely and sensibly accurate information which in turn helps 
them to apply their decisions within the organisation‟s goals74. The accounting 
analysis enhances efficiency, and credibility which enables the investor to determine 
opportunities with less error. Accounting analysis will provide the researcher with 
the opportunity to measure different relationships and changes occurring among 
different numbers in the financial statements. Not only can profitability be expressed 
and computed but it is also possible to identify changing trends and abnormalities 
and subsequently draw conclusions.  
Accounting researchers have neglected the Chairman‟s statement despite its 
demonstrable utility and its voluntarily unaudited nature
75
. Consequently, there is a 
call for methodological and empirical studies to advance research into accounting 
narratives in the light of acknowledged areas of weakness and gaps in the accounting 
literature
76. The Chairman‟s statement comprises essential and corresponding 
information sources to complement the numerical financial statements and have 
incremental information value to different users, because narrative accounting 
information is useful for decision-making purposes. The Chairman‟s narrative 
regularly contains non-quantifiable information of the economic and industry-
specific factors and references to current action, future strategies and intended 
policies
77
. Smith and Taffler
78
 reinforced the argument that chairman‟s statements 
are unaudited managerial disclosures which contain important information associated 
with the future of the company and are not just reporting on past performance.  
The main methods for analysing the annual report narratives have been 
summarised by Beattie et al.
79
 which include analyst ratings; disclosure index; 
content analysis; readability studies and linguistic analyses. Content analysis is 
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defined by Krippendorff
80
 as “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data according to their context”. It is also defined by Bowman81 as 
an “enquiry process which does not rely on casual reading but on rather explicit 
counting and coding of particular lines of prose, of word usage and of disclosure”. 
Additionally, Abbott and Monsen
82
 defined content analysis as “a technique for 
gathering data that consists of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and 
literary form into categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of 
complexity”. Finally, Beattie and Thomson83 asserted that “content analysis has 
become a widely used method of analysis in financial accounting research”. 
Content analysis enables the researcher to plan, communicate and evaluate a 
research design independently of its results
84
. At first, content analysis was quite 
basic and relied on a count of basic words or sentences, which is considered to be a 
more objective approach. Subsequently, advanced studies tried to develop the 
application of content analysis with thematic and impression management style 
studies, which is considered to be a more subjective approach. Early research 
highlighted the concerns over the quantity and quality of disclosure. For instance, 
Marston and Shrives
85
 and Unerman
86
 raised issues concerning data quantity versus 
quality of disclosure, emphasising the problem concerning the importance of 
disclosures compared to their volume and the invalid hypothesis of quantity of 
disclosure as an indication of the quality of disclosure. Moreover, a major limitation 
of a researcher-conducted content analysis is that it is “so labour intensive that it is 
feasible only for small samples”87. This research highlights the importance of and 
addresses the call for more dynamic and innovative methodological approaches to be 
used in coding within various discourse studies.  
Within the above context, DICTION software will be used to analyse the content 
of the Chairman statements of the AIOC. DICTION is a computerised content 
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analysis programme and a dictionary-based package that examines a text for its 
verbal tone. The software has been utilised in evaluating semantics in a variety of 
social discourse areas such as politics and communication, strategic management 
research and business ethics research
88
.  
As a method of analysing semantic content, DICTION is well established in the 
applied linguistics literature and has been attested by independent research
89
. Its 
automated nature for coding and quantification renders it attractive as a research 
instrument, which increases its validity and reliability. As a form-oriented method of 
content analysis, it requires no intervention on the part of the researcher. Morris
90
 
identified the following advantages of computerized content analysis over human-
coded content analysis. First of all, computerized content analysis makes it easy to 
create word-frequency counts, keywords in context listings and concordances. 
Second, the computerized software provides perfect coder reliability and stability of 
the coding scheme. Moreover, explicit coding rules are developed to provide 
comparable results and are thus free from criticisms of researcher subjectivity and 
bias that might be levied against human coding
91
. Also, the programme is designed to 
identify subtle aspects of written language that even the trained human eye might not 
readily perceive
92
. Finally, the software allows the processing of large volumes of 
text passages where results can easily be replicated and researcher subjectivity is 
eliminated
93
. In a nutshell, the benefits are obvious in using the software (DICTION) 
as it permits the investigation of a large body of text in comparison to more 
interpretive explanations reached through human-coded content analysis and 
reproduces the text being analysed alongside its statistical results for convenient 
checking.  
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Additionally, the event study method was developed to measure the effect of an 
unanticipated event on stock prices. An assessment of AIOC‟s performance is of 
particular importance to a number of interested groups which include shareholders 
who have an interest in identifying the performance of the company in which they 
invest their wealth. Using event analysis enables the researcher to assess the extent to 
which security price performance around the time of the event has been abnormal
94
. 
McWilliams and Siegel
95
 argued that the event study method is a useful tool which 
can help researchers assess the financial impact of changes in corporate policy and 
examine the information content of disclosures
96
. The event study method has 
become popular because it reflects the need to analyse stock prices to reflect the true 
value of firms by incorporating all relevant information. The immediate impact of an 
event on security prices can be constructed using security prices over a short period 
of time
97
.  
In summary, the aim of this research is to shed light on the potential for a more 
widespread use of different methods of analysis to discover the messages being 
conveyed by the AIOC to its stakeholders. These messages may be convincing at one 
level, but when analysed, they give the reader the true meaning and attitude behind 
the company‟s communication, which may be particularly significant in times of 
crisis to convey clarity of message and lack of panic.  
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises six chapters, with chapters three, four and five containing 
the empirical results.  
Chapter 1 introduces the background to the research, the research questions and 
the thesis area of focus. Research objectives are formulated and the motivation for 
the study is presented. Meanwhile, the methods used to answer the research 
questions are discussed by explaining the importance of adopting different 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. Also, the contribution to knowledge is 
highlighted. The chapter ends by outlining the structure of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 outlines the full historiographical overview of the AIOC‟s 
performance in maintaining control over the Iranian oil resources (by addressing the 
prior literature). This in turn will highlight the AIOC‟s political actions within an 
imperialistic framework, particularly its exploitation of Iran‟s oil resources. The 
chapter also illustrates the debates and various opinions regarding the role of senior 
management in AIOC. Furthermore, the chapter addresses Musaddiq‟s motivations 
for nationalisation of the AIOC in May 1951. 
Chapter 3 aims to perform a critical analysis of the company‟s relations with Iran 
to illustrate the claims of antagonism by the Iranians against the AIOC and counter 
claims with reference to historical evidence. This chapter will also investigate the 
relations between different governmental British authorities, as well as relations with 
the local communities and with the Iranian themselves, to understand their policies of 
inequality and differentiation. The main reason for this is to focus on the company‟s 
treatment of Iranian employees and provides further evidence concerning Iranian 
claims that they were viewed as inferior and were never treated as genuine 
stakeholders. Moreover, an analysis of the AIOC‟s annual reports in 1950 and 1951 
will be conducted to investigate the managerial response of Fraser towards the 
Iranian employees during nationalisation. All these different sources will be used to 
provide answers to the proposed research questions. 
Chapter 4 tests the validity of the Iranian accusations of unfairness in the 
distribution of profits and their dissatisfaction regarding the royalties and policies 
adopted by the British government in limiting the dividend for 1947. It is important 
to review the evidence on the above accusations using selected key documents such 
as Gidel‟s Memorandum, which has been hitherto neglected. To provide further 
evidence concerning these claims, a financial analysis of the AIOC‟s annual reports 
for 1948-1950 is conducted to assess the division of profits from the oil industry 
between the AIOC, the British and Iranian Governments.  
Chapter 5 examines how two key events associated with the nationalisation were 
perceived by the London stock market. These were the nationalisation itself on 1st 
May 1951 which was a major theme running over a longer course in the 1950‟s and 
the publication of the AIOC annual report on 16
th
 November 1951 which influenced 
shareholders‟ confidence regarding their investment in the company. The chapter 
also presents the writer‟s hypotheses and the variables used to test these hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the chapter examines the relationship between the Chairman and the 
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UK investors to find out the importance of the Chairman‟s statement to the 
stockholders in maintaining the value of their investment. 
Chapter 6 will draw together the key points of each chapter and summarises the 
findings of this study and the main conclusions of the thesis. The contributions of the 
study are again highlighted. Policy and theoretical implications of the research 
findings are identified. A discussion is based around the limitations of the study and 
how these limitations were addressed. Finally, suggestions for further research are 
made. 
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Chapter 2: AIOC History, oil and Iranian politics (History 
and Debates) 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the prior literature in regard to the establishment of AIOC 
practices in Iran, thus contributing towards an understanding of how different and 
subsequent events in Iran led to the nationalisation of the company‟s assets including 
the refinery of Abadan in May 1951. Iranian accusations mainly arose from the anti-
Iranian discrimination, reflected in the AIOC‟s employment policies and from the 
unfairness shown in the distribution of profits from oil production. The chapter also 
aims to identify the gaps in literature on these aspects, and focus on areas where 
further research can be extended. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 looks at the sources concerned 
mainly with the importance of oil and the evolution of the AIOC in Iran in the 
middle of the Twentieth Century. Section 2.3 commences with an overview of the 
literature which focuses on the AIOC‟s domination of oil exploitation in Iran at that 
time, including an explanation of the 1933 Agreement and the Supplemental 
Agreement proposed by the company. Section 2.4 examines accounts of the key 
events that led to the company‟s nationalisation in 1951 and also highlights the 
motivations for Musaddiq to nationalise the company in 1951. This section also 
examines Fraser‟s role, to improve our understanding of his managerial behaviour 
and his motives in voluntarily providing additional information. Section 2.5 reviews 
the negotiations requested by the British government and the AIOC to settle the 
dispute and reach a lasting agreement with the Iranian government. This section also 
examines the sources which explain the initiation of the coup in 1953 and the 
establishment of the National Iranian Oil Company. Finally, section 2.6 summarises 
the contribution to the literature. 
2.2 The establishment of the AIOC 
The literature on the AIOC emanates from a number of very different sources
98
. In 
the post war years, the development of the Iranian oil industry was considered to be 
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an important event that had occurred during the previous fifty years
99. Iran‟s 
participation in the world economy has been greatly emphasised by its strategic 
location and by its prized oil resources
100
. Indeed, Iran‟s oil reserves accounted for 
the greater part of the total assets of the petroleum industry of the Middle East and 
the country became a major supplier of oil to Britain following the initial oil 
exploration by the AIOC. The AIOC had the world‟s largest refinery in Abadan so 
the company continued to expand its oil production from this major oil installation. 
Iran, via the AIOC‟s activities consequently became the second largest exporter of 
crude petroleum, having the third largest oil reserves during that period. 
In the following section, the importance of oil is discussed and the evolution of 
the AIOC in Iran is reviewed. 
2.2.1 The importance of oil 
Oil was important to the global economy because it had advantages over coal 
which became apparent in the 1950s. Products of the oil industry “had a greater 
impact than those of any other industry on the way people lived their lives during the 
20
th
 century as oil products became an essential element in many industrial 
processes, consumer products and different modes of transport”101. Oil had the 
advantages of being pumped rather than manhandled and when burnt properly it 
enabled a complete absence of smoke which was one of the Admiralty‟s crucial 
requirements for a fuel
102
. Crude oil was one of the major commodities in the world 
trade arena, transferred between a range of international firms
103
. Obviously, oil was 
important for both producing and consuming nations because it generated major 
revenue (taxation and royalties) and satisfied a whole range of consumer 
requirements
104
. For Iran, oil played an important role in facilitating its ability to 
engage in global markets and giving it the opportunity to become more involved in 
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oil production for exports
105
. In a wider sense, oil had come to be synonymous with 
maintaining imperial integrity
106
. As oil became more important, British willingness 
to maintain control became more necessary
107
. Iranian oil supplies were “a major 
source of soft currency generation and tax revenue for the British government”108. 
Iranian oil was essential to Britain‟s balance of payments and “the Abadan oil 
refinery was the largest in the world and a source of national pride”109. In fact, Iran 
was not militarily strong but its geo-strategic location made it invaluable
110
. Iran 
remained the jewel in the crown of the AIOC because of its unlimited oil supply
111
. 
Iran was the oldest oil producing country in the Middle East region accounting for 
74.2 per cent of the net income of the oil industry in the period 1913-47
112
.  Those 
writing about the period, and whose accounts have been consulted for this thesis, are 
clearly in unison over the importance of Iranian oil in terms of its potential for 
economic growth in Iran. 
2.2.2 The D’Arcy concession 
In 1901, William Knox D‟Arcy, the son of an Irish solicitor and a millionaire 
London socialite was the real founder of the AIOC
113
. He used his fortune to finance 
oil exploration in Iran
114
. On 28
th
 of May 1901, an exclusive concession was granted 
to D‟Arcy for 60 years for the exploration of natural gas and petroleum throughout 
Iran which covered 500,000 square miles of territory
115
. Later in 1905, D‟Arcy ran 
into financial difficulties before oil in commercial quantities was discovered and the 
Burmah Oil Company was brought in to come to D‟Arcy‟s assistance by taking 
shares in the company to explore for oil in Burmah and India
116
. Fortunately, in 
1908, a great oil-field had been discovered by D‟Arcy and Burmah Oil which partly 
financed the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC), allowing it to become a leading 
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contender in international oil markets
117
. After the discovery of oil in 1908, a 
pipeline was built from the oilfields to the coast and a refinery was constructed at 
Abadan
118
. This discovery was to alter radically the face of the world oil industry
119
. 
D‟Arcy was given a million pounds‟ worth of shares but Burmah Oil Company 
continued to be the leading shareholders contributing to the APOC
120
. In 1914, the 
first Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was keen to see the Navy change its 
ships from coal to oil power. He had an interest in the oil reserves of Iran to 
guarantee a continuous oil supply and to ease the strain on Britain‟s hard-pressed 
coal supplies at a time of economic reconstruction. In fact, Churchill viewed the 
APOC with increasing interest, as it had a promising future with its various oilfields 
in the Middle East
121
. As a result, after prolonged negotiations, Churchill bought 
51% of the APOC with the aim of establishing a new kind of industrial animal
122
. 
The British navy converted from coal to oil which was an attraction in the emergence 
of the British oil industry and was the main reason for the growth of the British 
government‟s interest in the affairs of the oil companies123. Oil demand expanded in 
the post-war period, relying extensively on imports of petroleum from Iran because 
of the conversion from coal to oil and owing to Britain‟s negligible local 
production
124
. Churchill‟s interest in the Iranian oil reserves reflected increasing 
British dependence on Iranian oil and the reorientation of the peacetime economy 
away from coal. In summary, more than coal, the oil industry has been associated 
with government intervention due to its importance in providing intermediate inputs 
to the British economy. 
2.3 AIOC’s domination in Iran 
Based on a review of the AIOC historiography, there are various debates about the 
dominant influence of the AIOC in Iran and the motivations for Musaddiq to 
nationalise the oil industry. To examine these debates, this section draws upon the 
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secondary literature to reflect the opinions of other scholars towards the AIOC‟s 
existence in Iran and the agreements that it made with Iran. 
British Petroleum began its activities in Iran under the name of the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company (APOC) which had changed at the beginning of the Twentieth Century 
to Anglo Iranian Oil Company or (AIOC) with the support of the British 
government. Up to the Second World War, Iraq and Iran provided the only oil 
sources for the AIOC, although the company was undertaking explorations in 
different parts of the world
125
. As mentioned earlier, the AIOC discovered oil in 
Persia in 1908 and pioneered oil prospecting in oil-rich Iran. The discovery of oil in 
Iran not only marked the successful beginning of the modern oil industry in the 
Middle East but the AIOC‟s plan was to become the only one of the seven sisters126 
to be wholly British-owned
127
. Bostock and Jones argued that the AIOC had become 
“the most important British interest in Iran by the mid 1920s”128. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the British government acquired a 51% stake and became a major 
stakeholder in Iran and had the right to nominate two government directors and a 
contract to supply fuel oil to the Royal Navy
129
. However, government directors on 
the Board looked at the company from a wider strategic viewpoint and only retained 
a Board veto to safeguard their interests.  
The company was seen as British because the majority of the shares were held by 
the British government. The AIOC had the most noticeable and strongest British 
government connections because it was dealing with a strategic asset in a strategic 
area. Moreover, the AIOC had imperial connections and powerful national as well as 
strategic importance to Britain‟s economic situation and overseas interests130. Bill 
and Louis were not alone in observing that the AIOC was a dominant power in Iran 
since “the company was mainly owned by the British government, its power was in 
the end that of Britain”131. The British government sought to marry the protection of 
AIOC interests in Iran with wider concerns for fighting communism and advancing 
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the Anglo-American special relationship
132
. This explains why the AIOC was 
observed and widely reported in the literature as an arm of imperial strategy under 
strong British government influence where the Iranian oil deposits were concerned. 
As Odell pointed out, the ultimate goal being, as was widely believed, to maintain 
control and serve its own interests
133
.  
There is no doubt that the great political power of the British government gave the 
AIOC more strength to confront Iranian demands and maintain its imperialism. The 
AIOC had a notion to ally itself in Iran to British ideals and carry on with its political 
and economic exploitation to maintain its imperial identity. The AIOC was a 
dominant player within the Iranian economy and was effectively the backbone of the 
British Empire. As Marsh indicated, the AIOC was “a state within a state and 
regarded to all intents and purposes as an arm of the British Admiralty and British 
Strategic policy”134. The AIOC‟s operations in Iran were extremely important to 
Britain‟s economic situation and prestige135. The AIOC was Iran‟s main source of 
income because it had in Iran “Abadan” which is the world‟s largest refinery136. 
Abadan was “…truly impressive for its scale and scope and its vast yet orderly 
design, covered 400 acres in addition to its tank-farms and housing estates”137. In 
1951, the AIOC had a score of producing wells, various field equipment, an 
industrial area with important stores and workshops and it contained its own hospital 
so it was a major source of employment. 
The relationship between the company and the Iranian government was very 
strange, given their mutual dependency, and the fact that they seemed to wish it 
otherwise. The company was not prepared to give up any of its control and share its 
power with the Iranians. Although the total profits of the AIOC constituted a 
formidable sum in the Iranian economy, the share of the Iranian government in the 
profits was relatively small
138
. As a consequence, in 1928, there had been 
negotiations between the Iranian government and the Anglo Persian Oil Company to 
                                                 
132
 Marsh, HMG, AIOC and the Anglo- Iranian Oil Crisis, 143. 
133
 Odell, The significance of oil. 
134
 Cited in Marsh,  Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil Crisis, 
1951-1953, 28. 
135
 For the people of Great Britain, AIOC has opened up a rich supply of petroleum products which 
have come to be crucial for national progress and also for national safety; Marsh, Anglo-American 
Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951-1953, 28. 
136
 Abrahamian, The 1953 coup in Iran.  
137
 Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, 151. 
138
 Karshenas, Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran, 80. 
 32 
replace the 1901 concession with a new one because the Iranians were dissatisfied 
with the terms of the old concession and were keen to improve the royalty terms. 
Friction developed between the two parties and various disputes increased gradually 
over a number of issues. For instance, Iran complained about the fact of selling oil to 
AIOC subsidiaries and the British Navy at discounted prices and charging investment 
expenditures outside Iran as costs of oil operations.  By this manoeuvre Iran was 
deprived of sharing in the profits of companies formed by the AIOC operating 
outside Iran
139
. The company requested an extension of the concession period to 
recoup their investment and refused to pay the Iranian income tax introduced in 
1930, claiming tax exemption under its concession agreement
140
. According to Jones, 
securing the concession “was a case of the British government and the oil interests 
using each other to their mutual benefit and to the possible disadvantage of the 
Persians"
141
. It is clear that the AIOC was eager to secure a good deal from Iran by 
extending its concession to maintain its control over the Iranian oil resources. 
2.3.1 1933 Agreement 
The 1933 Concessionary Agreement defined several rights and obligations for the 
AIOC and the Iranian government, to guarantee the continuation of the company‟s 
operations. The concession included determining the duration of the contract; 
defining the area under concession; excluding the operation of other companies 
within the allocated area and offering rights of exploration and production within a 
stipulated period. The terms also covered refining and marketing
142
. This meant that 
the AIOC had a number of commitments towards the Iranian government. These 
included payment of taxes, royalties
143
, rent to the Iranian government, provisions for 
employment, training of local workers and technicians, supply of petroleum to the 
Iranian market at reasonable prices and means of dispute resolution through 
arbitration rather than local courts
144
.  
The 1933 concession, ratified by the Majlis and Reza Shah (Iranian Prime 
Minister, 1923-1925) obviously extended the life of the D‟Arcy concession by thirty-
two years. By granting this extension, the Shah deprived the Iranians of the 
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possibility of controlling and operating their oil industry. The 1933 Agreement 
between Iran and the AIOC stipulated that the company should supply oil products 
for internal consumption in Iran and to warrant the Iranian government a discount of 
25 per cent from the basic price to supply its own needs. It stipulated that other 
consumers in Iran warranted a 10 per cent discount
145
. However, the AIOC had at 
times encountered difficulties with the Iranian government over the payments made 
to the government for the oil produced
146
. Furthermore, with the 1933 Agreement, 
Iran had a share in the AIOC‟s overall profits around the world equivalent to 20 
percent of dividends distributed among holders of common stock in excess of 
£671,250
147
. This shows that the British government had the right to increase its 
taxes, but Iran‟s taxes on AIOC revenue were frozen for a period of thirty years148. 
Evidently, Iran was left at the mercy of the British government because the company 
practice was to pay higher taxes in order to decrease its net profits. Less was then 
paid to the Iranian government which was well aware of the fact the company was 
making large profits from their oil industry in which the former saw themselves as 
having no real share or adequate reward. Moreover, with the 1933 Agreement, there 
was slow progress in replacing the British employees with Persian nationals and the 
“General Plan” to aid the progressive reduction of non Persians never came into 
practice. Iranian social and psychological grievances stemmed from the 
comprehensive discrimination against them “not only in pay but even in the bus 
which took them to work in comparison with British workers in the fields”149.  
In 1945 there was a proposal by the Soviet Union to give Iran equal shares in 
profits and management in return for having a concession in the Northern provinces. 
Thus, in 1946, an agreement was reached by the Iranian Premier that a Soviet-Iranian 
Oil Company would be formed for the exploitation of Northern Persian oil
150
. Under 
this agreement, Iran would supply the oil resources and receive 49 per cent of the 
shares and the Russians would hold 51 per cent of the company‟s shares for the first 
25 years
151
. After this period, profits would be divided proportionately in return for 
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maintaining all the necessary capital, equipment and staff
152
. Unfortunately, this 
agreement led to resentment among the tribal and settled public in south Persia and 
they demanded a break up of relations with Russia 
153
. Not only that, but Communist 
ministers were dismissed from Iran and the agreement was rejected
154
. In short, the 
Iranian fear of communist expansion from the north of Persia helped to damage 
relations with Russia but furthered British interests in maintaining control over all of 
the Iranian oil resources. 
2.3.2 1947 negotiations and the Supplemental Agreement 
Attempts to resolve the disagreements between the Iranian government and the 
company failed and the company was renamed the Anglo Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC). The Iranian government itself wished to undertake the exploration of oil in 
its territory and consequently was not willing to grant any concession to foreigners, 
for the exploitation of oil. The Iranian government proclaimed the 1933 Agreement 
to be null and void and announced that “no concession would be granted to any 
foreigner whatsoever to regain the Iranian national rights in respect of the country‟s 
natural resources whether underground or otherwise and necessary steps should be 
taken in order to restore Iranian national rights”155. The Iranian government believed 
that the previous concession was ratified by the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) 
during a despotic regime and the deputies at the time possessed no powers of free 
debate or of expressing the public will and the benefits granted to the company were 
sold too cheaply
156
. 
These factors gave momentum to nationalist demands for increased shares of the 
profits. In October 1947, the Majlis reconsidered the way oil should be exploited by 
Britain and started negotiations with the British government to re-examine the oil 
concession granted to the AIOC in 1933
157
. The Iranian government‟s dissatisfaction 
was to some extent the result of the British Government‟s insistence on dividend 
limitations, since Iranian royalties depended in part on the level of profit 
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distribution
158
. Furthermore, there was “sharp inflation experienced by the Middle 
East during the war, which resulted in an increase in the price of petroleum between 
1939 and 1948.  This in turn greatly reduced the real value of payments to the Iranian 
government since payments to the government continued to be made on a fixed 
royalty basis”159. The Iranians felt that the company‟s wealth had been amassed on 
their soil, but they had no share in its wider advantages. 
In 1948, the Iranian government reconsidered the way oil should be exploited by 
the AIOC and initiated negotiations with the British government for a better 
concession. As part of the negotiations, a fifty-page Memorandum was issued by 
Gilbert Gidel, a French Law Professor, to revise the 1933 Agreement and to discuss 
specific points with the AIOC, in the hope of starting a new chapter in the 
relationship between the government and the company
160
. The full version of the 
Memorandum initially occupied fifty pages which seemed to astonish Gass, the 
AIOC negotiator, who immediately asked to postpone the meeting so that the full 
text could be translated and studied
161
. The Memorandum made a number of 
essential points. Firstly, it claimed that the AIOC deprived Iran of the profits of its 
operations overseas. Secondly, by considering the gold guarantee
162
, it was found 
that the royalty figure represented would be less in 1947
163
. Also, the Memorandum 
highlighted that the company had consistently resisted Iran‟s demands to inspect its 
books in order to ascertain whether the Iranian government received its proper 
royalties
164
. Finally, the Memorandum pointed out that the AIOC had not improved 
the working conditions of the Iranian work force and they remained in unskilled jobs. 
We can clearly infer from the latter that that the AIOC was not willing to let Iranians 
hold technical jobs, fearing that they might become more skilled in the technical 
aspects of oil operations
165
.  
As a consequence of these Iranian disagreements, the AIOC provisionally agreed 
a Supplemental Oil Agreement with the Iranian government which was handed by 
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Fraser on May 1949 to Mohammad Sa‟ed (Iranian Prime Minister 1948-50)166. On 
17 July 1949, when the Supplemental Agreement reached the floor of the Majlis, it 
was not ratified because it was successfully opposed by Musaddiq‟s National Front 
party
167
. Following the failure of ratification of the Supplemental Agreement, the 
Shah and the British needed a prime minister with a strong enough determination to 
face down Musaddiq and the National Front and force the Majlis to approve the 
Supplemental Agreement
168
. As a result, Razmara became the Iranian Prime Minister 
(1950-51) because he was seen as an “intelligent and well trained general, an able 
and sophisticated political tactician and a skilful diplomatic negotiator”169. Razmara 
argued that he could win approval for the Supplemental Agreement provided the 
AIOC opened its books to Iranian auditors. There were two other requests contained 
in the Supplemental Agreement: more training of Iranians for managerial jobs and to 
make some advance payment of royalties. As these other two points were implicitly 
accommodated in past agreements and subsequent behaviour, it can only have been 
the Iranian request for open accountability that stirred Shepherd to reject Razmara‟s 
proposals - to the accompaniment of another undiplomatic outburst
170
. Following a 
great deal of discussion, the Supplemental Agreement was modified on 1
st
 of October 
1950 because the Shah had taken the opportunity to put pressure on Razmara to 
make a move regarding the oil question. The Iranian government afterwards 
demanded a fifty-fifty division of the company‟s total profits, but the proposal was 
rejected as a result of the AIOC‟s insistence that only Iranian profits should be 
divided
171. Fraser therefore rejected the Iranian government‟s demand and asserted 
that the Supplemental Agreement was “eminently reasonable to both parties” and 
rejected the request for an increase in the payment to Iran
172
.  
Early in 1951, the U.S government, as a precaution, urged on the British the 
wisdom of conceding the fifty-fifty share in the company‟s profits to the Iranian 
government
173
. In this context, the Foreign Office informed Francis Shepherd, British 
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Ambassador to Iran (1950-2), to disclose to the Iranian government their willingness 
to accept a fifty-fifty agreement, but not under the threat of nationalisation
174
. Thus, 
the AIOC tried to meet the mounting opposition and, in February 1951, was finally 
prepared to accept an agreement for equal sharing of profits
175
. Razmara maintained 
the closest secrecy regarding the Fifty-Fifty Agreement because his objective was to 
avoid a conflict with the British. He held the genuine belief that the present time was 
not opportune for securing the ratification of the Supplemental Agreement and he 
feared that the Majlis would not carry the ratification because public opinion was not 
in favour of anything less than nationalisation
176
. However, Razmara‟s royalist 
political objective was not achieved because the AIOC‟s activities had stirred 
nationalist sentiment to an extent unparalleled in any other Middle Eastern country. 
Although a great deal has been written by non-Iranian historians about the Iranian 
and AIOC dispute, there are still important gaps which will be addressed in this 
research. For instance, there are unresolved questions about AIOC treatment of its 
Iranian employees. Furthermore, the sharing of oil proceeds with the Iranian 
government has not been fully investigated, notwithstanding their importance in the 
dispute between the AIOC and Iranian nationalist politicians. Moreover, the relative 
bargaining power of the AIOC‟s management and Musaddiq‟s government has not 
been assessed with reference to nationalisation and other major political events.  
2.4 Nationalisation in 1951 
As mentioned earlier, the problem between the Iranian government and the AIOC 
mainly arose in 1931 because of the decline in prices and again in 1948 because of 
dividend limitations which effectively reduced the payments made to the Iranian 
government. Not only that, but the question of evaluation of the price of gold and the 
limiting of production presented two common problems which needed to be 
addressed. As a result, the mood of the Iranian Majlis became increasingly 
nationalistic and the resentments became greater
177
. The AIOC was therefore 
obviously faced with a rising tide of nationalism and growing resentment by the 
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Iranians towards the company‟s existence in Iran because of the company‟s 
resistance to change. Thus, a conflict arose between the Iranian government and the 
AIOC because the Iranians were seeking their political and economic independence. 
Iranians shared a common perception of the evil of British imperialism and a sense 
of facing an insensitive imperial power. Iranian nationalists brought to bear an 
emotional anti-imperialism and “carried with them a moral sense of righteousness 
that appealed to Iranians of all social and economic classes”178. Taking a negative 
view, we can say with some confidence that the wave of economic nationalism and 
exploitation of oil in Iran by the AIOC demonstrated Britain which was willing to 
receive the benefits of another country by exploiting its resources. 
Important events relating to the nationalisation crisis are set out in Table (1). An 
important reason for these events and shifts in the political landscape, aside from 
wider cold war and Middle East geo-political considerations, was the perceived 
unfairness associated with the AIOC‟s operations, in terms of the share of oil wealth 
received by Iran and of the discrimination by the AIOC against Iranians. It is 
important to know the AIOC and British government officials involved during this 
time period. First, the AIOC officials included Ernest G. Northcroft (1896-1976), the 
AIOC‟s Chief Representative in Tehran, 1945-51, and Basil R. Jackson (1892-1957), 
Deputy Chairman. Second, the British government officials included the Lord Privy 
Seal, Richard R. Stokes (1897-1956). These officials dealt with a succession of 
Iranian Prime Ministers, beginning with Ali Razmara (1901-1951) June 1950 – 7th 
March 1951, Mirza H.K. Ala (1882-1964), 8
th
 March – 28th April, and most 
significantly, from 28
th
 April, the leader of the National Front coalition, Muhammad 
Musaddiq (1882-1967).
179
 In the US, the Truman administration increasingly became 
drawn into negotiations from a relatively neutral position, wishing above all to 
reinforce Iranian governments of whatever nationalist hue against the Soviet Union. 
W. Averell Harriman (1891-1986) was appointed by Truman as his special envoy to 
Iran in the August 1951 diplomatic round, and subsequent negotiations involved 
Truman himself and Secretary of State Dean, Acheson (1893-1971)
180
.  
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Table (1) below illustrates that the years preceding nationalisation witnessed a 
series of failed proposals on the one hand, and a succession of Iranian governments 
and institutional changes on the other, reflecting the increasing influence of political 
organisations opposed to the AIOC. Clearly, with the collapse of the authoritarian 
regime of Reza Shah, the post-war period witnessed fundamental changes in the 
international economy and nationalisation of the oil industry became a central issue 
on the political agenda. 
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Table 1: Timeline of key events, May 1933 November 1951 
Date Event Commentary and related events 
a) Background events 
29th May 
1933 
Concession Agreement receives 
Iranian assent 
Agreement regulating AIOC‟s operations in Iran concluded 
between AIOC and the Iranian Government.  
22nd Oct. 
1947 
Single Article Law Iranian government committed to renegotiate the Concession. 
17th July 
1949 
Supplemental Oil Agreement 
(SOA) signed subject to the 
approval of the Majlis 
In 1948 the AIOC entered into negotiations with the Persian 
Government for a revision of some of the terms of the 1933 
Concession. SOA signed by an AIOC representative and the 
Iranian Minister of Finance. 
Jun 1950 Elections to Majlis Increased National Front representation on Majlis Oil 
Committee (MOC) 
b) Events concurrent with Fraser’s 1951 Chairman’s Statement, 1 Dec 1950-19th November 1951 
1st Jan  Saudi fifty-fifty (50:50) Agreement  Signed between Saudi Government and Arabian American Oil 
Company (Aramco). 
11th Jan  SOA Bill rejected by the Majlis Followed MOC conclusion that the agreement did not safeguard 
Iranian interests. 
10th Feb. Negotiations between Northcroft 
and Razmara  
Northcroft for the AIOC offers £25m and fifty-fifty (50:50) 
share of Iranian profits.  
19th Feb  Musaddiq proposes nationalisation 
to the MOC 
Political dispute between Razmara and Musaddiq over 
nationalisation 
7th March  Assassination of the Prime Minister 
Razmara 
Succeeded by Ala. 
8th March  MOC passes resolution for 
nationalisation 
 
15th March  Single Article Bill on 
nationalisation approved by the 
Majlis 
 
20th March  Single Article Bill approved by 
Senate 
AIOC management in Khuzistan imposes wage and allowance 
reductions, resulting in strikes and anti-British violence. Three 
AIOC staff killed. British Govt takes over responsibility for 
negotiations. 
26th April  MOC promulgates “Nine Point 
Law”. 
Mixed board of senators and deputies to implement 
nationalisation. British government proposes setting up new 
AIOC subsidiary with some Iranian directors. 
29th April  Musaddiq appointed Prime 
Minister. 
Resignation of Ala following failure of negotiations with 
Britain. Nine point law approved by Senate and received assent 
on 1st May 
19th  June  Jackson Mission to Tehran AIOC delegation offer, including acceptance of the principle of 
nationalisation, money for present needs and a practical 
foundation for future partnerships.  
5th July Ruling of the International Court of 
Justice  
Granted the British request for interim measures of protection 
4th August  Lord Stokes Mission with 
Harriman to Tehran 
British and US government 8-Point proposals subsequently 
withdrawn. British staff withdrawn from Abadan. 
28th Sept Iranian Government orders all 
British staff to leave Abadan 
In response the British government refers the dispute to the UN 
security council; submits Memorial to International Court of 
Justice 
22nd 
October 
Musaddiq holds talks with Truman 
and Acheson 
Joint proposals developed. 
8th Nov Eden rejects joint proposals.  
Sources: Compiled from Cmd 8425, „Explanatory Memorandum‟ Correspondence between His Majesty’s 
Government; AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, 1950, 11-22; Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum 
Company, chapters 15-18. 
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As illustrated above, in Table (1), the political landscape had changed 
considerably and new nationalisms started to emerge in May 1951 because Iran 
wanted to develop policies with which the country could earn higher returns from its 
oil production. As we have already noted, this kind of ambition naturally generated 
conflict with the British government which had its own regime. However, the way 
the conflict evolved and the kind of actions the Iranian government took were 
determined by each type of regime. Reza Shah was the commander-in-chief of the 
newly created national army and exerted his authority throughout Iran
181
. The Shah 
reminded the Iranians of his dictatorial father and his dependence on America for 
military advisers, hardware and economic aid for his Seven Year Plan
182
. Iranians did 
not enjoy economic prosperity during the era of the Reza Shah because of his 
bureaucracy and administration. During the reign of Reza Shah, “the landlords 
relinquished total control over the state machinery to the Shah and the government 
did not intervene to control such actions”183. Reza Shah managed to replace the 
parliamentary majority of the conservative forces “who increasingly opposed his 
policies and challenged the consolidation of his political power by a working 
majority of his supporters”184. Economic policy during Reza Shah‟s era was 
characterised by a trial and error approach rather than systematic economic 
calculations
185
. It was during the Shah‟s administration that Britain maintained 
control over the Iranian oil industry and became dominant oil producers and this was 
clearly because of a weak government and also because of Reza Shah. The Shah‟s 
regime was deficient and was driven largely by the Iranian nationalist view of 
dealing with institutional and economic concerns that seemed urgent such as 
establishing order and promoting education, health care and infrastructure
186
. As a 
consequence, Reza Shah was forced to resign and Iran reached its peak in nationalist 
policies after the opposition of the Reza Shah‟s rule and the overthrow of his regime.  
After Reza Shah‟s rule came to an end, there were no more talks about land 
reform which had been an important aspect of political discourse during his era, 
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which enhanced power for Britain to intervene in the Iranian economy
187
. The 
departure of Reza Shah created a variety of groups willing to participate in the 
political process to attain independence and halt the process of exploitation and 
imperialism of AIOC
188
. Therefore, a chorus of different opposition voices arose, 
ranging from the Communists (Tudeh) who opposed the economic treatment of 
Iranian employees by the AIOC
189
 and the secular nationalists (National Front Party), 
ultimately led by Musaddiq, who favoured a fairer share of oil resources for the 
Iranian people. Thus, in the growing Iranian sentiment towards nationalisation, 
political conditions had changed considerably and new nationalist movements started 
to emerge. This happened because the Iranian government wanted to develop 
policies with which the country could earn higher returns from its oil production. 
Musaddiq believed that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves because 
the Supplemental Agreement was of marginal benefit to the Iranians. Musaddiq 
“stressed that no oil concessions should be given to foreigners either during or after 
war”190. Therefore, Musaddiq submitted a bill calling for nationalisation in February 
1951 but it was refused by the Shah for one and half months
191
. Following the refusal 
of the Shah, there were strikes and anti-British violence in Iran and the Majlis elected 
Musaddiq as the Iranian Prime Minister
192
.  
Amid the growing demands for nationalisation, the Foreign Office acted to try and 
avert the event and held a meeting on 20 March 1951 to argue the need to intervene 
in AIOC‟s relations with Iran and to arrange for talks with the US to build unity and 
avoid nationalisation from taking place
193
. Meanwhile, on 7 March 1951, Razmara‟s 
broadcast to the Iranians, seemed to be telling the nation to support AIOC operations 
in their country and continue to produce handicrafts rather than trying to run an oil 
industry
194
. After arguing against nationalisation to the Majlis Oil Committee and 
following a call from Ayatollah Kashani “to all sincere Muslims and patriotic 
citizens to fight against the enemies of Islam and Iran and join the nationalisation 
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struggle”, Razmara was assassinated on 7th March 1951 amid an upsurge of 
nationalist sentiment
195
. It was against this backdrop that Musaddiq succeeded as 
Prime Minister and pushed forward the bill for nationalisation. 
The Nationalisation Law was approved by the Iranian Parliament on 30 April and 
signed by the Shah the next day
196
. On 1st of May 1951, against a national 
background of strong anti-British sentiment, the Iranian Prime Minister nationalised 
all of Iranian assets of the AIOC with the promise of restoring Iran‟s honour and 
dignity by eliminating the AIOC concession
197
. Obviously, nationalisation did not 
emerge overnight but the company was seen as a British sphere of influence which 
had helped to bolster the autocratic rule of Reza Shah who had enabled the company 
to undertake exploration throughout the period. Given the above, it was clear that the 
historiography of the industry dominated Iranian culture which was tightly bound up 
with the imperialistic British Empire
198
. The company appeared to the Iranians to be 
imperialistic because it was both British-owned and managed despite the use of Iran 
in its name. The AIOC was seen as a symbol of informal British Empire that 
remained mostly resistant to change and unwilling to improve the Iranian 
concessions. Therefore, resentment against the AIOC grew because of its British 
sovereignty.  More than this, Iranians felt desperate about the company‟s exploitation 
of their oil resources claiming that the company was not safeguarding Iranian rights 
and that the Iranian government should nationalise the oil industry. Bucheli
199
 
described companies investing in mining or oil as targets of political violence 
pointing out that they are more vulnerable to nationalist policies than those operating 
in the manufacturing or service sector. This is due to their vertically integrated 
structure which affects local polities. In similar vein, White asserted that 
“nationalisation appeared a distinct possibility in a number of Britain‟s decolonizing 
territories because many of the anti-colonial movements taking shape by the 1950s 
espoused some form of socialism”200. More to the point, Bostock and Jones stated 
that the virulent Iranian economic nationalism “cannot be treated solely as an 
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endogenous factor to British business. Iranian policies were a reaction to the close 
relations between British business in Iran and the British government”201. Ferrier was 
more explicit in his statement that the Iranian nationalists were aware that “AIOC 
was acting as an agent of the British government in depriving the Iranian government 
of the revenues to which it was entitled”.202 However, in contradiction, AIOC 
executives blamed the Treasury in London for being inflexible in royalty and 
dividend payments to Iran which was the main trigger for the company‟s 
nationalisation. From a broader perspective, the dependency theory explains that the 
world consists of a “core” of dominant nations and a “periphery” of dependent 
ones
203
. Friedmann and Wayne argued that the main relationship between societies 
has been an exploitative one because wealth is created at one of its poles and poverty 
is created at the other
204
. Thus, this may explain how rich and powerful countries 
have monopolistic power and how they are allowed to exploit weak and poor 
countries through economic and political methods, resulting in unfairness in income 
distribution, discrimination and political repression
205
. Given this hypothesis it was 
predictable that major British businesses were founded on the basis of monopoly 
concessions, secured at a time when British political power was strong and Iranian 
political power weak
206
.  Within this context, Iranian nationalists were well aware of 
the fact that the AIOC‟s strategy was shaped not only by the policies of the company, 
but also by the prevailing political economy of the British government. The AIOC 
was “acting as an agent of the British government in depriving the Iranian 
government of the revenues to which it was entitled”207. Accordingly, the AIOC was 
seen as a prime example of domination in its economic power over Iran, resulting in 
unfairness in income distribution, as well as discrimination and political repression. 
To return to the direct question of nationalisation, we shall now examine its 
implications for the performance of the AIOC. The main implication of the Iranian 
government‟s nationalisation of the oil resources was to prevent foreign oil 
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exploitation on its territory
208
. Nationalisation was considered to be the first 
movement which emerged out of Iran‟s expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company‟s interests in 1951209. Nationalisation of the AIOC angered the British and 
affected their imperial power because it led to the loss of the company‟s entire status, 
rights, and assets in the territory. Following the nationalisation of the AIOC by 
Musaddiq, an unclear relationship between Iran and the British government was 
established because of British attempts to exercise imperial power. The serious 
nature of the dispute between Iran and the AIOC in the 1950s was mostly due to 
Musaddiq‟s persuasion that the problem was more one of principle and politics than 
of money
210
. Tignor reinforces this view with the assertion that “Political economies, 
like all human constructions, emerge through the visions of usually powerfully 
placed individuals”211. Thus, Musaddiq‟s nationalisation made Britain lose its 
previous advantages of maintaining control because the Iranians consolidated their 
power and were eager to change former policies and agreements. 
It is clear that the promulgation of nationalisation represented the culmination of a 
rising tide of nationalism that overwhelmed the efforts of the AIOC to negotiate a 
new concession. The British government feared that the existing political situation in 
Iran would negatively affect the production and exports of the AIOC. Obviously, the 
Iranians refused to export oil under the terms of the old agreement and refused to 
allow British tankers to ship their oil from their refinery. That meant that the flow of 
crude oil would come to an end and the refinery forced to close
212
.  
Nationalisation was therefore considered by the British government as a potential 
threat from several points of view, not least commercial, and the government 
therefore aimed to fight for the control of Iran without destroying its industry. To this 
end the AIOC undertook “advocacy advertising” during the nationalisation crisis 
which took place in 1951 to present a point of view about a major public issue in a 
way that is favourable to the sponsor (i.e. the AIOC), thus making otherwise one-
sided viewpoints appear more objective. Indeed generally, since Musaddiq‟s 
nationalisation, the company had become more aggressive in buying advertising 
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space (as shown in The Times, The Manchester Guardian and The Daily Mirror) to 
respond to the crisis. This activity was felt to be crucial to the image presented of the 
company‟s performance and was also used to counter sources of public and political 
concern (other than making a profit) of an ethical nature
213
. Simply, the reasons that 
the AIOC undertook advocacy advertising were firstly to widely disseminate a public 
message and to clearly set the agenda for its preferred policies. 
To sum up, the events that took place in Iran in 1951 were dramatic because 
Musaddiq nationalised the AIOC‟s assets, including the largest refinery in Abadan. 
Musaddiq promoted nationalisation in order to secure more profits and rewards for 
his own country. Musaddiq was not a radical but a reformist because he was keen to 
fight against the imperial power of the AIOC which was dominating Iran. To achieve 
his aims he saw that it was necessary to first attain political independence for his 
country
214
. Musaddiq criticised the existence of the company because it had not done 
enough to advance and promote Iranians in its employment. Musaddiq believed that 
the company had contributed insufficiently to Iran‟s economic and social progress 
and was aware of the fact that the AIOC had profited greatly from Iranian oil and had 
thereby dominated Iranian economic life. Iran‟s loss of sovereignty and the desire to 
defeat British imperialistic power were the main motives for nationalisation, and also 
because there was no sense that the AIOC was in a quest for equality. From the 
foregoing it is easy to see how the growth of nationalism was driven by historic anti-
Iranian prejudices which were born out by the manner of the AIOC‟s operations in 
Iran. On the other hand British officials believed that British firms should dominate 
external transactions to protect the home country‟s uncertain balance of payments215, 
since Iranian oil supplies were “a major source of soft currency generation and tax 
revenue for the British government”216. Not surprisingly, for the British themselves, 
the company was seen as a model of commercial behaviour and an example of 
ethical qualities lacking in the Iranian national life. 
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As illustrated above, various scholars have different views and interpretations of 
AIOC operations in Iran and the nationalisation by Musaddiq. For example, Bamberg 
has studied Iranian nationalism and the development of the AIOC in Iran and 
explained that the AIOC contributed to the Iranian economy through its exploration 
activities in Iran and the discovery of oil resources
217
. However, Elm had the view 
that the AIOC did not contribute fairly to the Iranian economy because non-Iranian 
subsidiaries were not consolidated by the AIOC thereby depriving the Iranian 
government of profits generating from overseas operations
218
. Furthermore, he 
explained that the AIOC should not contend the Iranian claims that the AIOC‟s 
worldwide business “had been built up on Persian oil”219. In fact Elm‟s view 
supports Keddie‟s suggestion that the company was an untouchable foreign enclave 
within Iran which exploited the Iranian resources to contribute a significant amount 
of royalty to the British government
220
. As discussed above, much has been written 
on the AIOC by various scholars in the secondary literature about the role of the 
AIOC at a macro level. Notwithstanding the differing views on the above issues, the 
literature has not examined the attitudes of senior AIOC management to their Iranian 
employees, how the profits of the company were divided between the main 
stakeholders, or whether Musaddiq and Iranian nationalism represented a serious 
political threat to the wealth of AIOC investors. These issues are crucial for a 
detailed understanding of the events before and after nationalisation, which had such 
important long term impact on Middle Eastern politics and will be explored further in 
the empirical chapters that follow.  
2.4.1 Musaddiq’s motivations for nationalisation 
After the Second World War, oil played an important role in world economics and 
Iranian people wanted the AIOC to adopt the same attitude to Iran as the oil 
companies in the world showed towards those who had granted them concessions. 
Iranians were doomed to be poor, in spite of their vast underground resources, since 
their share of the oil profits served to satisfy the AIOC instead of being used for 
public welfare.  
                                                 
217
 Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company; Bamberg, British petroleum and global 
oil, 1950-1975; 
218
 Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 53. 
219
 Ibid, 107. 
220
 Keddie, The Iranian power structure and social change 1800-1969: an overview, 11. 
 48 
As important as Iran receiving fair revenue for Iranian oil, the British government 
was often seen as an instrument of British policy toward Iran and the Middle East. 
This could be achieved through being the majority shareholder in the AIOC. Britain 
had occupied Iran in World War II in order to have access and to maintain control 
over Iran‟s oil after the war, through the AIOC221. It is important to emphasise that 
all of the AIOC‟s oil came from Iran and the loss of Iranian oil in 1951 dispossessed 
Britain of a significant percentage of its oil needs
222
. The AIOC claimed to be an 
important arm of the British Empire and continued to promote itself therefore as an 
imperial company with strong British status. This was reinforced by the fact that, in a 
military sense, the strength and union of empires were based largely on naval and air 
supremacy, and that supremacy, at that time, was based on oil
223
. The inter-war 
period created the possibility, and saw the growth of horizontal mass political 
organisations in Iran, which included the rapid growth of an Iranian communist party 
(Tudeh Party) along with a national movement led by the National Front Party. Both 
new parties had the effect of cutting through traditional political allegiances
224
. The 
Tudeh Party had the motivation to pursue economic growth since economic 
development was viewed as top priority for the Iranian economy 
Musaddiq was a nationalist politician and the spokesman for the tide of public 
opinion demanding a change to the relationship between the UK and the state of Iran. 
Musaddiq was eager to improve the terms of the concessions offered, in Iran‟s 
favour. In 1944, Musaddiq was elected in the Majlis and expressed his aims as 
follows. His first aim was to end Iran‟s subjection to foreign powers. He believed 
that the existence of the AIOC had provided a vested interest for Britain in the 
Iranian political economy, exposing the country‟s domestic and foreign political 
relations to covert British interference and manipulation
225
. Thus, he wanted to be 
permanently rid of the foreign-dominated enclave as a route to achieving real 
national sovereignty and independence
226
. His second aim was to establish 
parliamentary rule in a way that representatives of Iranians would control the affairs 
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of the state
227
. For Musaddiq, the past behaviour of the AIOC and its long record of 
profit extraction was the major source of injustice.
228
 Downplaying the economic 
significance of oil, Musaddiq said that „Persia must at all cost maintain her 
independence and that he would be content to sell no more than 10 million tons a 
year which he thought would be enough to balance the budget,‟229 and that 
henceforth „we value independence more than economics.‟230 
Musaddiq explained that the real purpose of nationalisation was “to transfer all the 
company‟s assets and the installations of the former concession folder to the Persian 
government as well as the control of the production and exploitation of the 
oilfields…..The Persian government has at its disposal the necessary means to ensure 
oil production and the technical and financial management of the oil industry in 
Persia and is confident that there will be no interruption or reduction in 
production”231. He was concerned with maintaining political control over Iranian oil 
resources. Because of the oil question, Musaddiq had acquired strong nationalist 
dimensions which rendered a liberal compromise with the AIOC impossible
232
.  
To understand Musaddiq, it is worth digressing a little into his personal 
background: he was an eccentric European-educated lawyer from a rich landowning 
family “whose father was a bureaucrat and whose mother descended from Persian 
kings”233. Musaddiq in particular was a controversial figure. His strengths and 
weaknesses have been much debated, although it is agreed that he appealed to and 
operated in diverse constituencies
234
. Not all commentators on his character have 
been kind. Bamberg summarises British opinion of the Iranian leader as “demagogic 
agitator and lunatic extremist”235. To the British public and the press, Musaddiq was 
seen as “the old man wearing pyjamas and perpetually weeping, appeared so 
ridiculous, so fanatical and unashamedly emotional, that he represented the defiance 
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of all reason”236. Such were the highly polarised views of the person that confronted 
Fraser as the chief threat to the value of the AIOC‟s very substantial Iranian 
investments.  
Nonetheless, George McGhee, the US Assistant Secretary, liked Musaddiq “as a 
man and admired his patriotism and courage in standing up for what he believed best 
for his country”237. Meanwhile, McGhee criticized the AIOC for “subordinating 
broader political considerations to purely commercial interests” and added that “the 
British government had failed to exercise sufficient control over the company‟s 
policy”238. Interestingly, when Musaddiq visited America to argue his case to 
Acheson, U.N. Security Council, he “struck up a kind of comic friendship with the 
emotional old man, fascinated by his pixie quality and his bird-like movements”239. 
Musaddiq perceived the nationalist mood because he was the nucleus of the 
National Front which successfully blocked the adoption of the Supplemental 
Agreement. He was appointed as the Chairman of the Committee on Iranian Oil 
Policy and rejected the existing concession since it did not safeguard Iranian 
interests. Thus, Musaddiq considered the 1933 Agreement to be void because it was 
endorsed during a dictatorship when Iranians were conceded no authority. 
Meanwhile, the aim of the Supplemental Agreement was to reinforce what was 
earlier pronounced as a null agreement, so that for the next forty-three years the 
nation would be burdened with a disgrace which could not easily be eradicated
240
.  
Nationalisation by Musaddiq did not gave the opportunity to AIOC to choose or 
reject the process, and this explains why he was seen by Britain as an anti-colonial 
figure. Musaddiq was aware that Iranian rights had been violated by the oil 
concession granted to the AIOC and this was the main reason for asking for better 
terms. Iran struggled to improve its concession but secured nationalisation. It is 
worth noting that 1951 marked the start of a difficult period for the AIOC in Iran: not 
only were its investments affected by the storms of great economic depression but, 
also, by the populist nationalist movements led by Musaddiq. The latter gained 
momentum in much of the region, demanding that the AIOC should make more 
generous concessions to the Iranian labour force and provide better conditions for the 
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locals. Musaddiq insisted that Iran should have the right to regulate the performance 
of subsidiaries and reach a settlement with regards to the amount of taxes paid to the 
Iranian government. 
After Musaddiq nationalised the assets of the AIOC, he said “our biggest national 
resource has come back to the nation”241 and asserted that if these resources were 
properly used then Iran “can in future live comfortably and fulfil its duty to world 
civilization shoulder to shoulder with other nations”242. Furthermore, he demanded 
that the Iranian workers should “maintain order and not afford any excuse to our 
foes” because any disturbance or enmity would result in the loss of the efforts of the 
Iranian people
243
. The change of government in Persia and the sharpening of its oil 
policy “seem bound to usher in a new period of anxiety”244. Musaddiq was willing to 
give the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) full control of operations under the 
following management structure: four Iranian directors and eight experts from 
“neutral” countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Holland245. Musaddiq‟s 
governmental action angered the British because it seemed part of a growing pattern 
of pressure on their interests (by wresting control of the oil industry) and raised the 
whole question of British influence in the Middle East. Musaddiq‟s challenge, 
therefore, to the position of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and British interests was 
regarded as a crucial test of British nerve
246
. 
Musaddiq criticised the AIOC for not contributing sufficiently to the Iranian 
economy “as might be inferred from the fact that Iranian oil workers lived in 
hovels”247. He accused the British government of using imperialism to suit their 
cause through their access to politicians and government officials at the highest level. 
Moreover, he accused Britain of “interfering in Iran‟s internal affairs and the AIOC 
of treating Iranian employees like animals while manipulating Iranian governments 
in order to have a free hand in plundering Iran”248. As a result, no settlement was 
reached. 
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In December 1951, Musaddiq gave a clear statement of his political objective to 
the Majlis: „we should assume that like Afghanistan and the European countries we 
do not have oil, we should reduce our spending and increase our revenues, the nation 
should tolerate the burden of hard times in order to free itself from the yoke of 
slavery‟249. Musaddiq believed that Iranian oil resources should be developed by 
Iranians themselves because the company had expanded its operations by reducing 
Iran‟s share in oil revenues. For Musaddiq, the past behaviour of the AIOC and its 
long record of profit extraction were the major sources of injustice
250
. The AIOC was 
exploiting the Iranian resources and making trifling payments in return. “AIOC had 
become the personification of the exploitative imperialism of the British Empire and 
the source of social and economic injustice”251.  
Musaddiq was hailed as a hero for his fiery speeches on the evils of British 
control of Iran‟s oil industry252. Obviously, Musaddiq‟s anti-British position was an 
important reason for his increasing and enduring political power as the crisis 
unfolded. His government was democratic, popular, and with a broad base of 
support
253
. Nevertheless, Musaddiq‟s role in history will remain under dispute 
because some would consider him an embarrassing phenomenon who bankrupted his 
country and looked foolish to the world
254
. However, others would view him as a 
kind of national hero because of his push towards nationalism in response to the 
perceived excesses of the British. 
2.4.2 Senior Management (Fraser) 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the AIOC had no clear founder-chairmen or 
founding family because William Knox D‟Arcy financed the exploration in Persia 
but never visited the country himself (which was, even then, quite unusual). After oil 
was discovered, D‟Arcy traded his rights and remained mostly unimportant to the 
company‟s further development, regardless of becoming a non-executive director of 
the Anglo Persian Oil Company. Since power was retained at the top, the Chairman 
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was certainly of key importance in the company. Thus, the Chairman‟s statement 
provided in the annual report gives an indication of the internal perception of the 
company and reflects the objectives and attitudes that the company was seen publicly 
to espouse. Despite his relative power, he never acted in isolation but had to enlist 
support from the members of the Board of Directors when taking national and 
imperial interests into consideration. 
Sir William M. Fraser (1888-1970) took over from Cadman as Chairman of the 
AIOC from 1941 to 1956. He was a man with few doubts about the national role of 
his company
255
. Fraser had been born into oil because he inherited from his father the 
largest company in the Scottish oil-shale industry which was merged with other six 
companies into the AIOC to provide them with Scottish outlets
256
. Later on, Fraser 
joined the Board of Directors and helped to negotiate the 1933 Agreement. It is 
worth noting that he lacked Cadman‟s breadth of outlook257. Fraser had no flexibility 
at all and did not like to be told what to do by the government. He alone wished to 
determine both the AIOC‟s and Britain‟s policies with regard to Iranian oil. “He had 
contempt for civil servants and on occasion tried to intimidate them into doing what 
he wanted”258. Fraser‟s chief asset was his commercial insight, and his chief 
weakness was his lack of political insight.
259
 According to Sir Edward Bridges, 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Fraser was narrow-minded, lacked political 
insight and should be removed
260
. People within the AIOC considered Fraser “a 
silent, craggy Scotsman, with an intimidating Glasgow accent and a bleak sense of 
humour”261. Fraser “did not think politics concerned him at all and had all the 
contempt of a Glasgow accountant for anything [which] could not be shown on a 
balance sheet”262. Eden described Fraser as living in “cloud-cuckoo land”263. 
After World War II, there was significant friction between His Majesty‟s 
Government and the autocratic Sir William Fraser, because the Government began to 
see Fraser and the company‟s Board as the real problem behind British difficulties in 
Iran. Kenneth Younger, a British Labour politician who served during the Attlee 
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government, described Fraser as a thoroughly second-rate intellect and personality 
which is incompatible with the position of Chairman of a company like the AIOC 
operating in so complex and unsettled area as the Middle East
264
. In similar vein, Sir 
Frederic Leggett, the company‟s labour adviser, suggested that the company required 
a fresh start on the basis of equal partnership because the AIOC‟s management was 
considered to be blind and unaware
265
. Bamberg sums up Fraser as a competent 
practical oilman but poor diplomat
266
.  
From the U.S perspective, George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, agreed 
that the continual ineptitude of the company had helped Musaddiq‟s cause.267 
McGhee met Fraser at a meeting characterized by tenseness and sparring comments 
when McGhee tried to persuade the latter to consider current realities in Iran and be 
more forthcoming. Fraser, unfortunately, was adamant, saying that McGhee‟s 
understanding of the situation was wrong and that there was no need to give Iran any 
concessions
268
. Indeed, Acheson, Secretary of State Dean, and many Americans had 
for some time been annoyed by Fraser because of “his parochial arguments about 
commercial feasibility, and by the apparent failure of the British government to 
control company policy”269. Moreover, William Harriman, President Truman‟s 
special envoy to the Iranian government, believed that Fraser was completely out of 
touch with reality and his men were trying to impose archaic policies on the British 
government
270
. The Washington Post reported that American officials were 
“convinced the company must abandon the stiff-necked policies followed for many 
years by its president, Sir William Fraser”271. Both the Labour government and the 
U.S State Department urged that Fraser had to be replaced by someone with “a broad 
outlook and statesmanlike qualities” or at least the Foreign Office should not allow 
him to dictate British policy
272
. In short, as far as U.S negotiators were concerned, 
after several rounds of diplomacy it was clear that either Fraser or Musaddiq would 
need to be removed if matters were to be progressed and they did not care either way. 
It is easy to see that this was the correct conclusion: Musaddiq was concerned with 
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politics and ignored commerce, but Fraser ignored politics and applied only 
commercial logic. 
Britain was aware of the Iranian claims that were upheld and as a result they 
urged the United States to support her, but Fraser felt that no support from other 
countries was needed. He believed that the Iranians would soon yield in desperation 
and said: “When they (Iranians) need money they will come crawling to us on their 
bellies”273. He was resolute in not paying any attention to such warnings and was 
confident that Musaddiq would collapse and that the Iranians would be forced to 
negotiate
274
. Fraser had calculated that oil, being by far Iran‟s biggest export would 
mean that the withdrawal of tankers by AIOC and other major companies would 
bring Iran‟s oil exports to a halt, thus making Iranian workers idle and “would be 
fruitful material for stirring up trouble”275.  
Fraser was convinced that the AIOC should maintain its monopoly of Iranian oil 
and squeeze out of Iran as much as it could. His blatant short-sightedness in running 
this empire made his position and by extension that of the AIOC potentially 
vulnerable, because the forces ranged against the AIOC were very powerful. These 
forces, once unleashed, eventually led to the biggest political upheaval in the history 
of oil
276
. Members of the British government believed that the Supplemental Oil 
Agreement was a reasonable proposal to the Iranians but they heavily criticised 
Fraser who drew it up in a manner which made it seem less favourable than the 
Aramco Agreement in Saudi Arabia
277
. Consequently, after several rounds of 
diplomacy, it was clear that there was a vigorous and ever growing sense of 
autonomy and nationalisation, fuelled by Prime Minister Musaddiq.  
The AIOC was of strategic importance because it captured a large market share in 
the economy and was highly visible in the public eye. There were many internal and 
external factors that influenced Fraser to disclose information during the company‟s 
nationalisation. Fraser lobbied against protecting Iran from communism and was 
thereby able to further exploit Iranian resources. He disclosed in the Times that “the 
recent disturbances in the Abadan area, which the Iranian government were obliged 
to repress with a firm hand, were undoubtedly of communist inspiration and are a 
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timely reminder of their ability to fish in troubled waters”278. The AIOC believed that 
the essence of the dilemma in nationalisation would “help nobody except the 
communists who alone have an interest in the impoverishment and disturbance of the 
Middle East”279.  
Fraser disclosed information in his chairman statement as a company requirement 
but also to influence the attitudes of various stakeholders and further the company‟s 
own interests and goals. His actions had important consequences for key AIOC 
stakeholder groups, including domestic investors and Iranian employees and society. 
For instance, Fraser enjoyed incredible lobbying power in Iran in relation to the fair 
treatment of the Iranian labour force and also in determining the company‟s 
performance. The nationalisation crisis brought these into sharp focus, and they 
became the subject of claim and counter-claim from the AIOC board and Iranian 
nationalist opinion. In general, contrasts were made between a well managed 
company playing a progressive and developmental role in Iran on the one hand, and 
on the other a rapacious exploitative representative of British imperialism. To the 
extent that the latter is true, the AIOC‟s policies are implicated in the nationalisation 
and the resulting international crisis, particularly if Iranian claims about the unfair 
distribution of the proceeds of oil production, discrimination against Iranian 
employees and misadministration, are upheld
280
. As a consequence, several issues are 
worthy of further investigation. First, did the company mislead the Iranians and 
others about shares of the oil revenues? Second, did the company discriminate 
against the Iranian employees? Third, how well did Fraser succeed in defending the 
interests of AIOC shareholders and maintain the confidence of its investors? In 
particular, how did Fraser explain his performance to shareholders in the year in 
which three quarters of the firm‟s assets were lost through nationalisation? In short, 
was the company the chief architect of its own downfall? To investigate these 
questions, contrasts are drawn between the AIOC‟s management‟s public view of the 
crisis and the actual events as documented in the literature, official papers, and 
financial records. In these respects, consideration is also given to how AIOC‟s 
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management attempted to influence the lobbying process and news agenda to counter 
the accusations of the Iranian nationalists.  
2.5 Negotiations to reach a settlement after AIOC’s nationalisation 
The AIOC was one of the largest companies quoted on the Stock Exchange and 
Britain feared that Iran might use its oil as a political weapon. Therefore Britain was 
looking to reach a settlement and to receiving compensation for the loss of future 
profits or having at least a new oil concession. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company sent 
a communication to the Iranian Prime Minister claiming a breach of agreement 
between the Iranian government and the company
281
. The company representative 
stated that the principles of mutual goodwill and good faith should not be altered by 
any legislative, administrative or executive acts and it should be remembered by the 
Iranian Prime Minister that the company had worked for 18 years to develop the oil 
industry in Iran and had assisted the Iranians in their economic progress
282
. Further, 
the company representative emphasised the importance of the AIOC to Britain by 
saying “not only because of its magnitude as an element of our balance of 
payments…but also because of the power it gave us to control the movement of raw 
materials and as a bargaining weapon” and stressed the importance of Iranian oil to 
Britain‟s defence and the effect of losing it283. He explained that the Royal Navy was 
dependent on Iranian oil and that 85% of its furnace oil requirements came from 
Abadan, so this was Britain‟s motive for wanting to maintain control over Persian 
oil
284
. This heavy dependency was also voiced by the Foreign Office when it 
admitted that, since 1923, “the company‟s worldwide business had been built on 
Persian oil”285. The AIOC was aware that replacing the crude oil would not be a big 
problem, but replacing the refined products would be quite difficult “in which the 
Ministry of Fuel has confirmed to cost an annual additional amount of $350 
million”286. Reinforcing the drastic effects of nationalisation and loss to the British, it 
was stated by the British Prime Minister in the Times that Britain was really affected 
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by the act of nationalisation: we were out of Iran; we had lost Abadan; our authority 
throughout the Middle East had been violently shaken
287
.  
The British government referred the nationalisation issue to the International 
Court and awaited its decision. Meanwhile, they warned the Iranian Government that 
if they persisted in driving out the AIOC then “they will be killing the goose that lays 
the golden eggs, they will be cutting off their principal source of income and they 
will be signing their own death warrant”288. Britain and the United States were 
jointly concerned about nationalisation and at the possible loss of oil and thus were 
jointly interested in the possible repercussion of events in Persia on neighbouring oil-
bearing countries
289
. In the light of these concerns the British government sought to 
highlight two important facts for Musaddiq, to make him aware that he must 
negotiate with the company. One was that, except for the revenues from the AIOC, 
the Iranian government had no reliable income. The second was that, without British 
staff and services of the company to produce and market the oil, the company would 
have no revenue
290
. 
Most officials in the Foreign Office believed that it would be impossible to work 
the oilfields without the support of the Iranians, and surrounded by a hostile 
country
291
. The AIOC was aware of the fact that the Iranians would fail to obtain 
effective control of the oil industry because much of the world‟s processing and 
distributing facilities were in the hands of the major companies who would refuse to 
handle the expropriated oil. The AIOC threatened legal action against anyone who 
did so
292
. The AIOC argued that they had made an enormous investment in Iran in 
terms not only of money but of scarce materials, technical skills and the employment 
of thousands of Iranians so the calculation of benefits to Iran could not therefore be 
measured in terms of money alone
293
. To sum up, Iran‟s strong resentment and 
mistrust of the AIOC led to deep bitterness towards imperialism. These sentiments, 
carried to their ultimate conclusion, (that is, the cancellation of the oil concession and 
creation of a National Oil Company) would result in Iran facing the bleak prospect of 
being permanently left out of the world oil market. 
                                                 
287
 The Times  Friday, Jan15, 1960; pg. 4; Issue 54669; Col B. 
288
 House of Commons, Parliamentary debates 30 July 1951, 1039. 
289
 The Times, April 30, 1951, 5(B), Issue 51988. 
290
 The Times, May 1st, 1951, 4(E), Issue 51989. 
291
 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the world they made, p.119. 
292
 Penrose, The large International firm in developing countries, p.67. 
293
 The Times, May 2
nd
, 1951, 6(A), Issue 51990. 
 59 
2.5.1 The Stokes mission 
Britain was concerned that Iran might use its oil as a political weapon in order to 
claim a share in the company‟s worldwide profits under the terms of the 1933 
concession. Britain feared Iran would also demand compensation for the loss of 
future profits. Therefore, Britain employed the strategy of reaching a settlement via a 
series of legal manoeuvres. Firstly, the International Court of Justice proposed the 
idea that the AIOC would market Iran‟s oil on a fifty-fifty profit sharing basis 
(although it was too late to avert Musaddiq‟s nationalisation)294. Next, Richard 
Stokes led a mission that was slightly different from that of the International Court of 
Justice, proposing to give Iran half of its shareholdings in the company and putting 
Iranian Government directors on the AIOC Board
295
. Stokes‟s proposal was, 
however, opposed by Musaddiq so the former was completely aware that his 
proposals would be rejected
296
.  
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The American press also was critical of the Stokes mission and the Washington 
Post dismissed this British negotiating strategy. It published the following:  
Does the Stokes plan actually recognise nationalisation or is 
it just a masquerade for the old system? If it does recognize 
nationalisation, how does it explain the repeated insistence that 
company control must extend to the wells and pipelines covering 
the area one-sixth of the total size of Iran?....Does not 
maintenance of such control constitute an explicit denial of 
nationalisation and an invitation to the political interference that 
the Iranians insist on shaking off?.. If the present tactic is to 
force the Iranians to their knees, might they not bow to the 
Communists instead of to the company?
297
  
Stokes had discussions with the Iranian delegation and explained the difficulties 
that would face Iran in running its oil industry without the help of British 
technicians
298
. In response, the Iranians handed Stokes a Memorandum which was 
composed of the following points. First, British proposals did not attest to their 
acceptance of the nationalisation issue, but merely revitalised the AIOC in a new 
form, in full control of oil operations. Second, Iran did not plan to sell oil to Britain 
at a 50 percent discount as had been claimed. The third point made was that the 
Iranian government was willing to compensate the company but only after 
negotiating the claims of both parties
299
.  
In fact, Musaddiq offered to compensate the AIOC and had always been prepared 
to negotiate within the limits of legal principles for the settlement and solution of the 
oil problem. Regardless of Musaddiq‟s offer to compensate the AIOC shareholders, 
Britain rejected the idea of nationalisation and “the failure to achieve any result up to 
this time has been due to the fact that the British government have desired to retain 
the influence of the former company under other titles in the same shape and form as 
before, in violation of the laws and of the rights and desires of the Iranian nation”300. 
The failure of Richard Stokes‟s mission dashed hopes of a negotiated settlement. 
Consequently, Britain found it impossible to make a deal with Musaddiq and “all 
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efforts to reach a friendly settlement having proved abortive”301. From the British 
point of view, there seemed no immediate prospect of reaching agreement with the 
Iranian government for the assessment and payment of compensation to the 
company. 
2.5.2 Undermining Musaddiq 
After the failure of the Stokes mission, British policy made it abundantly clear 
that their desire was to get rid of Iran‟s popular, nationalist government under 
Musaddiq as soon as possible because the cessation of Iranian oil supplies negatively 
affected British revenue. More seriously, Britain feared the loss of the company‟s 
position in Iran. Britain therefore accused Musaddiq of violating the company‟s legal 
rights through the following audacious plan. British strategy was to undermine 
Musaddiq‟s support base by imposing economic sanctions on Iran and also by 
carrying out military manoeuvres in the region.  They also brought about a 
production slowdown where tankers were prevented from loading oil at Abadan and 
this in turn affected their main source of income
302
. The second line of attack was the 
imposition of financial restrictions, approved by the British Cabinet (along with 
additional sanctions). The British government approved the blocking of Iran‟s 
sterling balances held in London and forced ships carrying commodities such as 
sugar and steel to change their destination
303
. Furthermore, a boycott on Iranian oil 
was put in place, which threatened to jeopardize western economic reconstruction 
because of its dependence on oil sources. In order to police the boycott, a threat of 
legal action was made against any and all purchasers of Iran crude oil or refined 
products or against any oil company breaking the boycott, starving the Iranian 
economy of $200 million of oil revenue annually. Special financial and trading 
privileges previously accorded to Iran were also naturally withdrawn.  
Besides the oil boycott, Shepherd, British Ambassador in Iran, suggested stopping 
foreign technicians from coming to Iran and arranging the withdrawal of the 
company‟s British staff, in order to make a strong impact on the Iranians and show 
them Britain‟s firmness304. President Truman was concerned about Britain‟s stubborn 
attitude and warned them of the dangers of using force. He had tried to mediate 
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through a visit by Harriman to Tehran but it was unsuccessful
305
. Harriman had 
advised the British ministers that “Dr. Musaddiq is not the man the British have 
depicted to the World”306 and also pointed out that economic sanctions were not the 
best reaction because it would stiffen the Persians‟ resolve307. Acheson, too, was 
sympathetic with Musaddiq because he thought that the AIOC bureaucracy had 
poisoned the judgment of the British government which was committed to rule or 
ruin
308
. 
In March 1951, there were further developments. Herbert Morrison replaced the 
British foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and proposed to post British troops near the 
Iranian oil fields to intervene when necessary. By 25 May 1951, Britain was ready 
for direct military intervention, mainly around Abadan‟s oil refinery, with 4,000 
British paratroopers carrying full fighting equipment (despite the US‟s opposition to 
the use of military force)
309
. The Defence Minister, Emanuel Shinwell, argued 
strongly for securing Abadan for the sake of upholding British Prestige in the Middle 
East and for preventing other countries like Egypt from being tempted to nationalise 
the Suez Canal. He proclaimed: “we (Britain) must be prepared to show that our tail 
could not be twisted interminably”310. To sum up, the British were in no mood to 
accept the principle of oil nationalisation and so their immediate aim was to bring 
about the collapse Musaddiq‟s government. 
2.5.3 Coup in 1953 and NIOC 
The years preceding nationalisation witnessed a series of failed proposals on the 
one hand, and a succession of Iranian governments and institutional changes on the 
other, reflecting the increasing influence of political organisations opposed to the 
AIOC. These were years of dual sovereignty in Iranian politics from which the 
country did not fully recover even after the end of the CIA sponsored coup to remove 
Musaddiq in 1953 and the return to power of the Shah. This period was marked by 
political instability due to a complex set of factors related to both internal social 
changes which had taken place in Iranian society and external interventions
311
. The 
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strong nationalist sentiment in Iran against the British monopoly over Iran‟s oil 
resources coincided with the United States‟ desire to reorganise the geographic 
distribution of world oil markets. The British plan was to allocate designated Middle 
East exports among various oil exporting countries and not to restructure the oil 
industry towards increased concessionary access for US oil companies
312
. Even 
during the British oil embargo of 1952-53 when all foreign revenues to Iran 
originated from non-oil exports, trade remained in surplus. Interestingly, while the 
British government encouraged non-oil exports during the embargo, it was only 
concerned about weathering the temporary foreign exchange shortages and did not 
pursue it as a long term strategy. 
Turning once again to Musaddiq, British observers believed that if he remained in 
power it would eventually lead to a communist takeover and not necessarily through 
British intervention. As Musaddiq himself suggested it would be through 
intervention by a country other than Britain. We may gather, then, that there were 
behind-the-scenes mysterious forces working in Iran with many anti-Musaddiq 
elements who received their support, including cash, from Britain, and it was these 
elements which helped to bring Musaddiq down
313
. In the end, the US government, 
with British support, organised a well-structured coup, a task which was passed on to 
the CIA in Washington with the aim of forcing Musaddiq out of office and restoring 
the Shah to power
314
.  
In the aftermath of the 1953 coup, oil revenues recovered and imports sharply 
increased to the extent that Iran developed a large trade deficit and started borrowing 
from abroad
315
. Oil production increased, with the result that the AIOC‟s crude 
production recovered more rapidly from the Iranian crisis than did its refinery runs. 
Meanwhile, greater reliance needed to be placed on processing contracts with other 
companies
316
. The policy of the AIOC in exporting crude oil was more flexible now 
that it did not depend on refining a large proportion of the output within the area
317
. 
One of the most important functions of any firm is the coordination of various 
activities encompassing all stages of production from exploration to the delivery of 
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the end products
318
. The fact that Iran could export its oil in crude form made it more 
attractive to different consumers who preferred to have the refining done at home for 
political, financial and economic reasons
319
.  
Much was learned from the nationalisation crisis. First, from a political 
perspective, the nationalisation crisis showed that it was much easier for certain 
countries to develop alternative markets for crude oil than to build new refineries
320
. 
Second, from a financial and economic perspective, most consuming countries 
sought to reduce their foreign exchange disbursements on petroleum by refining at 
home, which would in turn open new opportunities for domestic investment and 
create new jobs for the nationals
321
. It is worth bearing in mind however that oil 
companies continued to concentrate their exploration activities around the Persian 
Gulf so that they could keep their transport costs to a minimum by the construction 
of shorter pipelines to the sea terminals
322
. So we see that vertical integration
323
 in 
the AIOC was a major issue for its efficient operation and performance. This was 
achievable because the company was closely associated, through the joint ownership 
of affiliates, in the exploration and production of crude oil, in refining and sometimes 
in marketing and distribution of finished product to the final consumer
324
. Vertical 
integration was profitable to the AIOC because various advantages would be offered, 
such as assured outlets for crude, secure and efficient operation of refineries, 
maintaining efficient output and avoiding change in prices which would raise costs to 
both producers and customers
325
. Similar to many other oil companies, AIOC was 
vertically integrated but it still produced more oil than it refined
326
. 
It should be mentioned at this point that the defeat of nationalisation and the CIA-
initiated coup of 1953 led to the formation of a new international consortium in 1954. 
On 20 December 1954, the AIOC, which was formed at the beginning of the century 
to exploit the oil resources of Persia was renamed British Petroleum with a market 
capitalisation of £480m. It was a stock market leader then and has been, ever 
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since
327
. Fraser was eventually reconciled to the fact that the AIOC could no longer 
retain the monopoly of Iranian oil which the British had enjoyed for forty years 
because the future security of Iran then rested more in American hands - through 
diplomacy
328
. The consortium was set up after protracted negotiations and severe 
political damage to ensure that the Iranian government received half of the net profits 
attributed to its crude oil production
329
. Further the Iranian government had pressed 
the consortium of oil companies to restore Iran‟s traditional position and to increase 
the capacity of crude oil production
330
. The agreement covered almost all the areas 
previously under the concession of the AIOC whilst applying the principle of 
nationalisation and turning over the assets of the AIOC in Iran to the NIOC
331
. As 
previously mentioned, the company was renamed British Petroleum (BP) and it now 
held 40% of its previously exclusive concession. BP‟s demands for compensation 
were satisfied and the company would be paid directly from the Iranians and 
indirectly through other consortium members
332
. In this respect, Iran agreed to pay a 
sum of £76 million, of which £51 million was paid in cash and the balance of £25 
million was to be paid in ten yearly installments of £2.5 million each. This was 
meant as compensation for the company‟s assets in Iran and also to settle the claims 
and counter claims of both parties
333
. The Iranian Government refused, however, to 
consider the company‟s suggestion to set up a company with mixed Iranian and 
British directors to operate in Iran on behalf of NIOC. The NIOC offered 
employment to British staff but this was not accepted. The Prime Minister of Iran 
also insisted on his Anti-Sabotage Bill as a measure designed to convict the British in 
case of any misadventure in future at Abadan
334
. Subsequently, the NIOC, faced with 
an increasing demand for oil in Iran, embarked on the construction of a network of 
pipelines from the southern refineries to the northern centres of oil consumption to 
market its oil products
335
. In theory, the NIOC was in charge, but the consortium of 
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foreign companies managing oil production rapidly took control of production and 
distribution of Iranian oil, passing 50 percent of the profits to Iran.  
2.6 Summary 
The AIOC‟s actions merely represented the workings of capitalism which 
necessarily implies inequality and power difference and thus were the precursor to 
the May 1951 Bill approving nationalisation of the company‟s holdings. This was a 
serious conflict between Iran and Britain and the magnitude of the expropriation 
made this event particularly important. The events that led to nationalisation did not 
evolve overnight. Arising from the 1933 concession and the Supplemental 
Agreement, Iran had experienced unfairness associated with the distribution of 
wealth. The British exploitation had also brought with it discrimination against the 
Iranian workers, regarding them as mere cheap labour. It is therefore important to 
review the evidence on profit distribution, anti-Iranian discrimination and CSR 
during this period to examine and assess the justifications of the claims made by both 
sides. Furthermore, it is important to examine whether the AIOC managed, in respect 
of share prices and also national prestige, to overcome the negative consequences of 
nationalisation. The success or failure of Iran‟s nationalisation could provide a model 
for other countries which were closely watching the events and were planning to 
follow the same trend and undertake nationalisation. 
The Iranian demands for economic planning and development of oil revenues, 
along with their desire for national control over their major economic resource, were 
vital aspects of politics during 1951 and were major motives behind Musaddiq‟s 
nationalisation. Musaddiq desired independence and was not satisfied with any of the 
British concessions. He believed that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil 
reserves because the Supplemental Agreement proved virtually impossible for the 
AIOC to allocate profits on a fair basis. Resentment against the AIOC grew because 
of British domination and Iranians felt desperate about the company‟s exploitation of 
their oil resources. This aroused anti British sentiment which led to the company‟s 
nationalisation by the Iranian prime Minister in 1951. 
As a consequence, the history of the AIOC in Iran reveals a number of distinctive 
features. The first is the dominant role played by the company in creating the modern 
economic sector in Iran. A second important feature is the close relationship between 
the company and the British government which could be seen as a centre of 
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diplomatic rivalry. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Iran‟s historical legacy 
and the dominant position held in the economy by the AIOC led to severe and 
acrimonious conflicts between British commerce and the Iranian government
336
.  
In summary, we can say that out of the brief period of nationalisation of oil in Iran 
and its immediate aftermath, there arose some long term, largely beneficial effects, 
felt both locally and internationally. For instance, the bargaining power of the Iranian 
government increased during nationalisation and culminated in total control of its oil 
industry by the mid 1970s. Several important developments subsequently took shape, 
such as the establishment of the NIOC, which created greater autonomy for the 
government in petroleum matters. There also came into being the 1956 Petroleum 
Act which established the basis for the formation of joint ventures with independent 
oil companies. Finally the oil producing community witnessed in the 1960s the 
creation of The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an 
influential international cartel concerned with oil production and price control for a 
large number of oil producing states. 
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Chapter 3: Employee relations and Iranianisation 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the employee relations and Iranianisation process 
within the AIOC to examine evidence of British imperialism in Iran through social, 
economic, political domination and practices of discrimination and inequality in 
favour of the British. As previously mentioned in chapter (2), the AIOC became a 
large British multinational at the beginning of the Twentieth Century and considered 
Iran as its own country. During the Shah‟s administration Britain maintained control 
over the Iranian oil industry and became dominant oil producers. The AIOC was 
keen to increase its access to the oil to ensure a profitable business and maintain its 
political influence by ignoring the rights of the local population: Keddie attributes 
this to greater exploitation under Western impact
337
. Thus, AIOC actions carried a 
special attitude towards the Iranian employees, considered by the Iranians as being, 
in some sense, “Imperial”, or at least extremely autocratic since the company was 
able to employ whom they liked and to run the company as they wished. The result 
was the creation of an enclave community. 
Since the 1933 concession, Iran had suffered from significant discrimination 
because Iranian workers were always viewed as cheap labour. The AIOC was aware 
of the fact that its operations in Iran were damaging to the interests of Iranians 
because of the lack of participation of their skilled labour force in the exploration and 
production process. In defence of their position, the company always claimed that the 
locals were unfamiliar with the machinery and modern industrial techniques. The 
company also maintained that most of the non-British workmen entering the oil 
industry were illiterate throughout their service so they should remain as cheap 
labour. British staff in Iran were generally of the opinion that without them, “no one 
would be able to run the central heating in AIOC‟s offices”338. Quite clearly, Iranian 
employees were treated as racial inferiors and remained, largely, at the bottom of the 
management hierarchy, disadvantaged, on the grounds of their nationality. The 
attitude of the company to its Iranian employees was influenced by the fact that the 
locals were not British and this was reinforced by the differences in languages, 
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customs and traditions, where the British and the Iranians were, in many respects, 
worlds apart. 
The relationship between the Iranian government and the company was revealed 
with the passing of Article 16 by the Majlis on 1933 to re-examine the oil concession 
granted to the AIOC in 1933. The aim was to implement „„Iranianisation‟‟ to reduce 
the employment of foreigners to a designated figure. In a similar vein, a fifty-page 
Memorandum was issued by Gilbert Gidel, a French Law Professor, who made a 
number of essential points, amongst which that the AIOC had not improved the 
working conditions of the Iranian work force and consequently they were destined to 
remain in unskilled jobs
339
. An important moral argument from the Iranian point of 
view was that the company was seen as a typical colonial power in the way that it 
appointed and removed governors and Majlis deputies and also in the way that it 
considered Iran as its own sovereign territory where clubs and stores discriminated 
against the natives
340
. Nonetheless, regardless of the importance of Iranianisation, 
Article 16 and the Memorandum seemed to worry the British because they feared 
they would be driven out of business. As a consequence, Fraser, AIOC‟s chairman 
(1941-56), along with major British authorities, adopted a stance in which they 
intended to defend their position in the eyes of the public and maintain the 
confidence of their stakeholders mainly during the AIOC‟s nationalisation. 
Although much has been written on the AIOC, there remains a substantial gap in 
the historical literature, with business historians tending to omit the imperial aspect 
and tending to focus on the role of the industry at a macro level for political and 
economic analysis, at the expense of noting its influence on the local population. In 
its official corporate history, the AIOC appeared to fulfil its Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) commitment towards the Iranian employees by contributing 
significantly through housing, education, health and social benefits. An alternative 
view was offered by other historians explaining that the AIOC paid little attention to 
Iranianisation and the charges of discrimination against Iranian employees was seen 
as a major precursor to the nationalisation of the AIOC‟s Iranian assets by the 
Musaddiq government in 1951. Therefore, this chapter aims to give a critical analysis 
of the company‟s relations with Iran, to examine the claims of antagonism by the 
Iranians against the AIOC, and counter claims, with reference to historical evidence. 
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Furthermore, this chapter will investigate the relations among different British 
governmental bodies, as well as relations with the local communities and Iranians, to 
ascertain the policies of inequality and differentiation. The main focus will be on the 
company‟s treatment of Iranian employees and to examine further evidence 
concerning the Iranian claims that they were viewed as inferior and were never 
treated as genuine stakeholders. In addition to the archival evidence, this chapter 
includes an analysis of the AIOC‟s annual reports in 1950 and 1951 to investigate the 
managerial response of Fraser towards the Iranian employees during nationalisation. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 presents the historiography of 
the Iranianisation debate including a presentation of the negotiations involving both 
the Iranian government and the British authorities which helps to set the scene for the 
subsequent analysis. In section 1.3 the archival historical evidence is reviewed with 
reference to British discrimination which was manipulated and influenced by 
attitudes of the company and interactions with the Iranians. Section 1.4 presents the 
public and private view of the AIOC senior management in order to understand its 
attitudes towards the Iranian staff and to understand the company‟s policies and 
motives behind its employment and social policy. Finally, section 1.5 summarises 
and concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Iranianisation: Claims and Counter Claims 
With the 1933 Agreement, there were new employment rules specified to the 
recruitment of the artisans, technical and commercial staff from Iranian nationals. 
The AIOC, aware of the expanding needs of the oil industry in Iran, called for ever-
increasing numbers of employees possessing a high degree of proficiency and 
skill
341
. However, there was slow progress in replacing the British employees with 
Iranian nationals and the progressive reduction of non-Iranians never came into 
practice. The Iranian government‟s reports indicated that past performance by the 
company had fallen short of what it should have been; the plan of annual and 
progressive reduction of foreigners was too specific to allow of any ambiguity. 
Implicit in the wording was that the company should include in its plan a programme 
of housing, training, education, medical and social amenities. Moreover, the reports 
indicated that the company should bear the capital cost and upkeep of all schools in 
                                                 
341
 Gidel Memorandum. 
 71 
Khuzistan and improvement of much the infrastructure in such towns as Abadan 
which existed solely for the oil industry
342
. It is worth noting here that Northcroft, the 
AIOC‟s Chief Representative in Tehran (1945-51), was aware of the importance of 
training to the Iranians so he suggested that a strong effect might be produced (in 
view of the Iranians‟ allegations made in the Majlis against the company‟s training 
policy) by offering to spend a little more under the heading of training to “be a very 
useful weapon in our [AIOC] armoury”343.  
In 1948, the AIOC entered into negotiations with the Iranian Government for a 
revision of the terms of the 1933 Concession and introduced Memorandum to 
increase investments in health, housing, education, and the implementation of 
Iranianisation through the substitution of foreigners, with the aim that all posts in 
Iran except very top management ones should be held by Iranians. To sum up, the 
Iranianisation strategy aimed to underpin the long term engagement of Iranians. 
3.2.1 Iranianisation and Article 16 
The AIOC was clearly engaged to some extent with its social programme under 
the terms of the 1933 Agreement. After 1945 the company recognised the housing 
problems in Abadan and embarked upon an emergency accommodation programme. 
An International Labour Organisation (ILO) observer commented in 1950 that the 
company had been able to provide a vast number of modern houses in a short period 
of time and hospital and healthcare spending attracted similarly favorable 
comment
344
. Meanwhile, the AIOC made investments in education, such as Tehran 
University and other schools, and also provided extensive educational and training 
schemes
345
. Writing in the 1948 company‟s annual report and accounts, Fraser 
commented that 2038 houses and 79 ancillary buildings such as canteens, schools, 
medical clinics, shops, clubs were completed during the year at a cost of nearly £6m. 
He also pointed out that there were now 2000 students on various categories of 
training schemes, including 84 in Britain
346
. Addressing the differential wage issue, 
Fraser asserted that “Iranians received the same pay as British staff in similar 
posts”347. 
                                                 
342
 BP 126407, Report on visit to Tehran 31
st
 August to 26
th
 October 1948, 34. 
343
 BP 126347, Reference number 425, Northcroft to Rice, 19
th
 October 1950, 3. 
 
344
Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 375. 
345
 Ibid, 361-3. 
346
 AIOC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1948,19. 
347
 AIOC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1950, 22. 
 72 
However, there are contrasting claims and considerable evidence that there was 
little engagement by the AIOC with its social responsibilities under the terms of the 
1933 Agreement. The Iranian government therefore embarked upon Article (16) 
designed to improve the Iranian terms. Article (16) clearly signalled that Iranian 
employees genuinely disliked their confinement to lower levels of the company and 
the criticism was frequently heard, sometimes in violent terms, that individual 
Iranians who had worked with British staff have met with discourteous and unjust 
treatment from them
348
. Article 16 (iii) discusses Iranianisation and increasing 
employment opportunities for Iranians at the expense of foreign employees, with the 
aim that all posts in Iran except very top management ones should be held by 
Iranians. The Article reads as follows: 
 The parties declare themselves in agreement to study and 
prepare a general plan of yearly and progressive reduction of the 
non-Persian employees with a view to replacing them in the 
shortest possible time and progressively by Persian nationals
349
.   
Obviously, the AIOC was aware of the Iranian rights and the importance of 
Article (16) to the Iranians because, nearly 15 years since the signing of the 
concession, the number of non-Iranians employed was much greater than it was in 
1933 or in 1936 which creates a case for the Iranian government to ask for 
arbitration
350
. The AIOC was aware of their unfairness towards the Iranians and Gass 
(Managing director of the AIOC and AIOC negotiator 1939-1956) made it clear that 
Iranians had the right to claim better terms for Iran by saying: 
We attached great importance to reaching an early settlement 
on the General Plan as it was a subject on which the government 
had strong and genuine feelings, and we had no wish to lay 
ourselves open to a charge of procrastination
351
.  
The AIOC was aware that arbitration on the plan of 1936 would necessarily entail 
an exhaustive enquiry into the operations of the company during the period from 
1936 to the date of submission to arbitration. It would allow the government every 
possibility to call for any documents or evidence from any official of the company 
into the working and structure of the company in Iran. The company feared that the 
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arbitration tribunal might find itself sitting in judgment over conditions of work, 
health, wages and other difficult problems of relations between the company and the 
government. This would obviously be undesirable because the company would have 
to refund all payments to Iran
352
. To avoid this happening, Northcroft suggested in 
his correspondence that they should at this crucial point show open support for 
Iranianisation which they knew was of particular importance for the Iranians
353
.  
In short, the Iranian government was well placed to demand better terms for 
Iranian employees whose education and training was not well planned and which 
required further development by the company. 
3.2.2 Negotiating Iranianisation and Article (16) 
The Iranian government argued that the employment of foreigners entailed heavy 
costs of expatriation, travel, relocation not incurred by Iranians. The aim was 
therefore to reduce the number of non-Iranians by an increasing figure each year and 
a scheme was provided with illustrative figures to show a reduction of 150 non-
Iranians in the first year, 200 in the second year and 50 more in each subsequent 
year
354
. Abbas Golshayan, the Minister of Finance, acting as the government 
representative, made it clear that the principal concern of the Iranian government was 
about having a ratio, as the matter should be judged by tangible results. Therefore, 
the concession made provision for this via a yearly and progressive reduction of non-
Iranian personnel
355
. Ali Zarrinkafsh, the Iranian government's representative and 
Imperial Delegate to the AIOC (1933-39) explained that Article (16) could not be 
interpreted piecemeal and highlighted that efficiency and economy in the 
administration and operation of the company in Iran was a major factor, not only by 
the Article but of the entire concession. Therefore, he suggested that the company 
should prepare a plan and provide figures to indicate the extent of annual and 
progressive reduction of non-Iranian employees and submit it to him after 
completion
356
. Zarrinkafsh was willing to satisfy public opinion and demonstrate that 
full weight was given to the terms of the concession, in order to minimise subsequent 
public criticism
357
.  
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Article (16) revealed that the Iranians were very conscious of national 
independence and prone to react to any charge that their national interests and rights 
were being impaired. Consequently, Ali Razmara, the Iranian Prime Minister, 
studied the position in Iran with all the diligence it demanded and was left in no 
doubt that an improvement in social and economic conditions throughout the country 
was needed to save Iran from utter disintegration
358
. Razmara advised Northcroft that 
“certain changes in the Supplemental Agreement would be necessary if it were to be 
ratified by the Majlis (increased Iranianisation)”359. He was extremely concerned and 
distressed about the current situation in Iran because of the large numbers of 
unemployed persons in Tehran. He had studied the general plan and his views were 
that at the end of ten years, all posts in Iran except very top management ones should 
be held by Iranians
360
. Meanwhile, his plan was to receive “at least fifty-five millions 
sterling to put his projects in hand in such a manner as to ensure full employment and 
stable contentment throughout the country”361. However, Razmara believed that the 
Supplemental Agreement would be ratified if he were able to implement his 
programme within six months. He estimated that, after that period, the country would 
then solidly be behind the government and the Majlis could carry the ratification
362
. 
Razmara held the belief that the present time was not opportune for securing the 
ratification of the Supplemental Agreement.  
In fact, there should be no excuse for replacing British employees with Iranians in 
many non-technical posts in the company such as administration, accountancy, 
health services and railways since none of these jobs required technical training. 
Golshayan confirmed that there were a large number of company employees in 
Abadan and Tehran whose posts needed no technical qualifications which could 
reduce the ratio
363
.  
From the AIOC point of view, it is worth noting that the company was aware of 
the Iranian rights and the importance of Article (16) to the Iranians because Mr. 
Jameson, Director of the AIOC, mentioned in his report on a visit to Tehran that 
“Iranianisation is so important to the company that everything possible should be 
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done to make the policy fully effective”364. Moreover, Edward Elkington, the 
General Manager in Persia, asserted  
Our plan of education has got to start very high up the tree, 
and our friends in Persian circles must be taught that the 
company has not reached its present stage of development on 
any grounds which I term purely theoretical, such as those of 
nationality, but of the practical efficiency of the individuals 
forming every cog in a great machine, and not least the spindles 
at the centre of each cog-wheel
365
. 
However, regardless of the importance of Iranianisation, the reduction of non-
Iranian personnel and the improvement in the conditions of Iranian employees and 
workmen, Article (16) gave the British authorities and the AIOC management cause 
for concern. This was because they were worried about their British staff whom they 
did not plan to replace under any circumstances. This was the main motive behind 
Gass‟s suggestion to rearrange the company‟s present proposal in a rather different 
form to gain a better prospect of its acceptance
366
. Gass had hoped to obtain 
agreement with the Iranian government to all the other provisions of the General 
Plan, and left the main questions that deal with annual and progressive reduction of 
foreigners until the last, but the Iranian government insisted on taking this clause first 
with the ingenuous remark that a settlement of the other clauses would largely 
depend on our agreement to their proposal for this one
367
. The Article appeared 
impractical from the British point of view and would never come into effect, as the 
existence of non-Iranians as part of the workforce was considered vital to keep the 
company in the forefront of modern trends of scientific development and improved 
production methods. The company argued that its programme in the housing and 
amenity sphere was as a separate Memorandum and not part of the General Plan. 
Therefore, from the company‟s perspective they did not consider it to be a 
concessional obligation which they undertook willingly and with pride as an 
industrialist‟s contribution to the oil industry of Iran. 
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The AIOC was inclined to postpone the implication of Article (16) to safeguard 
themselves from any obligations and commitments and company representatives 
tried to find several excuses for not implementing the Article. Their first excuse was 
that the Iranians would not be able to run their own industry without the assistance of 
the British. Diplomats from London perpetuated the colonial myth that Iran was not 
ready to exploit its own oil and needed to be protected from itself. For instance, to 
overcome the implementation of Iranianisation the British thought of rewording the 
General plan in their own favour when Rice, company representative in London, 
asserted: 
So as to bridge the gap between its present form of words and 
our [British] position under the new General Plan (from which, I 
[Rice] repeat, we cannot in any way depart
368
.    
Moreover, Northcroft, chief representative of the AIOC in Tehran, in strictly 
confidential correspondence to Rice on 19th of October 1950 explicitly revealed the 
duplicitous methods that were adopted by the company for rewording the General 
Plan. For instance, he said: 
I have devised a form of words which (in a suitable legally 
worded version) might be used in substitution of the existing 
preamble of the General Plan, to be read in conjunction with the 
remainder, as a definition of its spirit
369
.  
I enclose for your consideration a form of words which it 
seems to us does not alter the sense of the text as signed, and 
which we believe would when translated into Persian produce a 
text free from any possible misunderstanding
370
. 
Similarly, Rice asked Northcroft to convey the company‟s attitudes and views 
without giving “the impression of unwillingness to cooperate or closing the door to 
further discussion of points which fall outside the limitations which [they] have 
stressed to the point of redundance”371. To avoid any commitments towards the local 
population, it is important to mention that Gass was worried about the wages and 
salaries that would have to be paid to the Iranians. As a result he suggested that 
Article 16 should be amended and the words “of the salary and conditions of service 
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applicable to, applicants‟ occupation and grading” should be deleted to avoid 
discussions of salary scales
372
. Gass and other members of the AIOC tried to 
disabuse the Iranian government minds of the conception of transforming men into 
figures, claiming that it was quite impracticable and contrary to their interpretation of 
the concession, and when projected into the future would be highly impossible to 
forecast the trend of consumption of oil products in the world in future years
373
. 
British authorities claimed that the formula of estimated reduction of foreigners must 
be a practicable one to which they must feel they could safely subscribe
374
. It is 
important to note that Jacks mentioned in his correspondence to Fraser that “the 
company would agree to no interpretation of annual and progressive reduction”375. 
Also, Dr. Idelson, AIOC‟s representative, was not happy with the basis of the 
percentage figures, and favoured a ratio between non-Iranian employees and the total 
employees
376
.  
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His argument was  
I would prefer to exclude all unskilled staff from the picture 
and adopt a ratio between the strengths of non-Iranian 
employees and total staff, exclusive of unskilled staff, and then 
diminish them in some progressively declining percentage. If 
this latter basis was adopted what ultimate percentage would you 
regard as reasonably safe, taking into account the safeguards 
with which the percentages are hedged round? Reverting again 
to the former basis, you will notice that I have reduced the 
percentage to 8% and had in mind that it would be safe to go to 
5% as an ultimate limit. In other words I kept 3% in hand for 
negotiation or for a stage subsequent to the next 10 years. I 
realise of course that percentages to-day are below 10% but I 
look upon that result as being covered by the undertaking in my 
plan to accelerate the rate of progress if no indeterminable 
factors operate to our disadvantage
377
.   
 
To confirm the company‟s intentions not to reduce British staff, Gass disclosed 
that the company held to the previous formula of a reduction in the proportion of 
foreigners to total skilled workers. But after a survey of the expected results of the 
training schemes came to full fruition over the following 7 to 10 years, the general 
management were satisfied that they could make a concession to the government‟s 
point of view, and reduce their non-graded or artisan categories to a definite figure 
and this concession had been offered at the earlier talks
378
. Within this context, it is 
quite clear that the British authorities were clever by declareing that they were 
prepared to make a concession to the Iranian government and reduce the non-graded 
or artisan categories to a definite figure
379
. However, it is quite clear that the British 
authorities were willing to reduce the non graded or artisan categories which 
included Indians and other nationalities and would not affect any of the British staff 
because they were always classified as skilled workers. In a nutshell, while foreign 
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oil workers were getting richer, the Iranian employees were destined for low-paid 
jobs and deteriorating housing: a recipe for revolution that the British ignored
380
.  
It is important to point out that the company distorted the facts, when releasing 
public information. The impression was given that the company was anxious to 
obtain the services of every suitable Iranian who came forward for employment; 
setting out in great detail the various measures which the company of its own 
volition proposed to take and was in fact already taking to increase the supply of 
suitable Iranians and to minister to their continued well-being.
381
 Obviously, 
Northcroft was completely aware that the general plan was unlikely to be effected 
and highlighted that if Britain had to base their “activities on Persian manpower to 
the degree which he [Razmara] envisaged, we [Britain] should be driven out of 
business”382. This reveals Britain‟s plans to maintain and achieve their own 
commercial interests in the area, regardless of Iranian aspirations.  
The company‟s stated policy had always been to “keep standards of education in 
Iran at their lowest, in order to prevent Iranians from acquiring any knowledge other 
than that which suits the AIOC. The company attempts to prevent the development 
of public health schemes in Iran. It is the company‟s objectives to keep in power 
governments which subserve its own ends. But free from men who are not willing to 
sign the agreement as the company wishes”383. Noticeably, the General plan was just 
a plan and would never be put into practice because the AIOC was unwilling to 
reduce the number of British staff in Iran. There was no wish to accede to the Iranian 
request for an arithmetical reduction each year to ensure a rigid control of the 
number of foreigners employed.  
3.3 Iranian claims for discrimination within the AIOC: Empirical 
evidence 
The nationalisation crisis brought the topic of discrimination into sharp focus and 
it became the subject of claim and counter-claim from the company‟s board and 
Iranian nationalist opinion. The AIOC had created its own “British Empire” in Iran 
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and established hierarchies by preference for British staff
384
. Keddie argued that the 
real changes in the structure of power “have been tied to social and economic 
changes that have reduced the power of certain social groups and classes while 
increasing that of others”385. Meanwhile, Bostock and Jones emphasized that the 
AIOC‟s linkages with the local economy were few and the fact that the British 
government was a majority holder in the company was widely disliked and was 
directly associated for most Iranians with British imperialism
386
. In this section, I 
will illustrate the validity of this, and demonstrate that the claims of discrimination 
against the Iranians are true, using relevant archival evidence. 
Expatriate workforce status communicated key messages about the AIOC. The 
company desired to have its own British staff seen as powerful and influential for 
prestige and to maintain control within these prevailing groups. It is worth noting 
that British managers in Iran did not develop local government relations nor even 
established social networking and teamwork with the Iranians. Racial injustice was 
shown by the company‟s practice of excluding Iranians in favour of British workers 
and through the company‟s most frequent claim that only British candidates had the 
required skills. The attitude of the company towards Iran was influenced by negative 
British attitudes towards the Iranians as demonstrated by their slogan “a native is 
always a native, however good”387. For instance, Mr. Jameson, Director of the AIOC, 
that the company is not willing to replace British staff with the university trained 
Iranians because of the unsuitability of the ordinary working man in Persia
388
. 
Discrimination between British and Iranian employees was a key feature in the 
AIOC where it had been specified by the company that staff must be British by birth 
and origin. Jacks, Director of the AIOC in Iran declared that the company would 
never agree to have its administration other than British and the Iranian government 
should never expect that it should
389
. Obviously, the AIOC was not willing to let 
Iranians hold technical jobs fearing that they might learn oil operations. Yet, the 
company avoided engaging British nationals who were thought to have “gone native” 
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and married locally because it was against the company‟s interest to employ them390. 
The company feared that those unskilled workers who had “gone native” might form 
unions and strike for better terms
391
. Therefore, it was quite obvious, on the 
perception of skills and character, that the company was preventing itself from 
“finding” Iranians. Their rationale was that it would be considered as heavy wastage 
if the company had an obligation to train the Iranian employees
392
. As a result, the 
AIOC had management hierarchies where the British were always at the top of the 
company regardless of their efficiency. For example, Jameson was aware of the 
previous disappointing technical reports associated with the company‟s earlier 
performance but he persisted in employing and hiring British engineers regardless of 
how unprofessional they might be. He asserted that: 
The Germans are at present erecting extensions to the jetties 
there [Khor Musa] and if this policy is adopted it is possible that 
the government may not call for our assistance. The view has 
been expressed that our proposal to employ consulting engineers 
to advise us would probably result in the confirmation of 
previous adverse technical reports
393
.  
British managers in the AIOC continued to exercise control over the company‟s 
operations in Iran and even clubs and stores discriminated against the natives, which 
had a negative impact on the Iranian workers. The company missed opportunities to 
offer better conditions, break down social barriers and mix more with the Iranians so 
there was no chance for Iranian and British solidarity because of class barriers. 
British workers used to scorn the natives and did not mingle with them. There was 
always a sense of oddness when referring to the Iranians because when British staff 
referred to the “company” this meant that they are referring to themselves as they 
had organized and conducted their operations, without much thought given to Iranian 
ideals and customs. All social and operational modes were based on their own usage 
and from their own standpoint
394
. Accordingly, the labour force was divided into 
three classes: the first class comprised British; the second class included technical 
men and salaried office workers with few Iranians who had their education in 
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Britain, whereas the third class included artisans, skilled and unskilled labour, who 
were exclusively Iranians. This reveals that British personnel were always employed 
in the top grade posts where their superiority could be always maintained and where 
they gained no experience of being among Iranians (who were in the lower grades). 
The following figures explain British and Iranian employment ratios in the AIOC. 
Firstly, the number of foreigners had risen in 1945 to over 4,000 out of a total of 
42,000 which is a ratio of less than 10 percent against 7 percent in 1938. Meanwhile, 
foreign salaried employees had risen from 1,744 to 2,478 between 1939 and 1945 
whereas Iranian salaried employees had actually fallen from 1,496 to 1,479. 
Additionally, in the artisan grade, the figures were 979 and 1,552 for foreigners, and 
6,516 and 6,254 for Iranians which illustrates a drop for the latter
395
. 
To the public, the British authorities claimed that the continued operation of the 
AIOC was vital to their mutual wellbeing, as it contributed to Britain‟s wealth396. 
Moreover, the AIOC justified their unfairness and inequality towards Iranian 
employees by claiming that “it has aroused in the various nationals feelings of 
jealousy towards the British, which in some instances are closely akin to dislike”397. 
There was no sense that the AIOC was in a quest for equality because discrimination 
remained and there was little scope for those amenities which ought to play a 
considerable part in the life of the Iranians
398
. The company continued to behave 
unfairly and even Cadman, Chairman of the APOC/AIOC (1927- 41), felt the 
injustice and advised Ministers to establish mutual confidence between the British 
and the Iranian government. He recommended that they should strive increasingly to 
regard the company‟s activities through Iranian eyes and in terms of Iranian 
vocabulary
399
. However, this was not the case and the company maintained its 
practice of not engaging Iranians even in non technical posts. 
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 The company claimed it was unable to find these talents and experience among 
the locals, for instance,  
The company is undertaking very extensive measures to 
increase the supply of Iranians possessing the requisite 
competence and skill and to attract and retain in its employment 
all available candidates. Even so, it seems certain that their 
numbers will fall short of the total number of skilled employees 
required for many years to come
400
. 
Moreover, among their excuses, Jacks affirmed in his correspondence to Fraser 
that “it should be no matter of surprise that as a result of [their] experience with 
purely local and uneducated tribal people the company and its management had little 
confidence in the ability of its Persian employees to rise to any important position in 
the company‟s operations”401. Attitudes to local staff in the AIOC showed 
indisputable discrimination against the Iranians in a direct way or indirect way. Even 
promoted and educated Iranians of the company were also in an unfortunate position 
because the company did not want them to prove successful nor to engage them in 
first grade jobs, and consequently their views were not necessarily respected. Even as 
the service of the company attracted the more intelligent Iranians, it became evident 
that their living conditions were unsatisfactory and this feeling of dissatisfaction 
among superior Iranian employees became increasingly evident
402
. Moreover, the 
company refused to provide additional training to competent and efficient Iranian 
employees and disclosed that it would be difficult to allocate an annual grant “in 
providing additional education and training abroad for Persians who in the course of 
their employment in the south had demonstrated by good work and general loyalty 
their suitability, subject to additional education and training, to promotion in the 
company”403. As a result, it was a very common complaint that the British staff of the 
company treated their Iranian colleagues and subordinates as racial inferiors with 
whom all association and contact had to be conducted
404
. Iranians of all grades, from 
workmen up to senior staff, including UK graduates, who served the company in 
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Khuzistan, related their experiences concerning alleged insults which they suffered 
on the grounds of nationality from British members of the staff
405
. 
To sum up, discrimination against the locals was all-encompassing in Iran as the 
existing British attitude was based on fear of allowing the Iranians to have influence 
in the company because this would be detrimental to company prestige. It is worth 
mentioning that these divisions of classes existed for housing, wages, hospitals and 
for all major issues concerned with the whole life of the community. Therefore, the 
evidence that the AIOC treated its Iranian staff badly will be set out in the following 
section. 
3.3.1 Housing 
Since 1933, the company was only concerned to provide houses and amenities to 
British staff and Iranians married to British citizens406. The company was keen on 
providing British employees with luxurious facilities for the sake of “British 
Prestige” which reinforced their superiority. The British authorities believed that, 
being “English they have had hundreds of years of experience of how to treat the 
Natives
407
. Different housing and social facilities were provided according to the 
grade of the employee. Jameson asserted that the company‟s original policy was not 
“to graft on to the Iranians too high a standard of living and therefore decided to 
build their [Iranian] accommodation in another section of the area”408. Meanwhile, 
Elkington suggested that it was preferable to have the minority of the employees in 
Bawarda area and Mr. Jameson requested to separate the British staff from the 
Iranians because “he did not consider Bawarda [as] an ideal position for a European 
residential area”409.  
Housing for the British was outstandingly superior to that provided for the 
Iranians and this was always the case because Iranians were not promoted above a 
certain level and housing was based on employee position at work. It was agreed that 
the accommodation provided to British staff was fully-furnished with air 
conditioning, W.C. and a pantry
410
. For instance, Elkington disclosed that the 
manager‟s house used to have 4 bedrooms in order to accommodate passers-
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through
411
. Writing to a family relative, Jameson commented about the amenability 
of life in Iran, referring to his luxurious housing, drinks and concert events and the 
comparable lack of expense
412
. 
On the other hand, housing and social facilities provided to Iranian employees 
were insufficient, and for a certain number it afforded a basis for legitimate 
discontent
413
. Accommodation for the clerical staff and the highest grade of artisan 
was not so problematic because they were able to get a room but a skilled worker on 
the lowest grade might have to wait thirty years. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the third class employees were randomly housed throughout rural areas and did not 
have the benefit of living in company houses
414
. For instance, the company had built 
houses which were called “coolie lines” for the unskilled Iranian workers415. Even 
Jameson asserted that he was unhappy with the accommodation provided to the 
artisans and said: I am disappointed with the progress in the artisan lines, and will 
see what can be done to accelerate building
416
.  
Iranian employees were forced to live in segregated houses in a single room 
“approximately twelve cubic meters in volume, say six feet by seven by eight feet 
high”417. Abdul Husayn Hazhir, the Minister of Finance, drew comparisons with 
housing and other developments in Arabia and suggested that the AIOC were 
laggards and referred to the essential need for the company to make some gesture 
outside the concession to satisfy the hopes and aspirations of Iran
418
.  
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Moreover, Mr. Kazem Hassibi (Under-Secretary of the Finance Ministry) made a 
strong attack in The Manchester Guardian on the slum conditions provided by the 
company for the Iranian employees at Abadan declaring that 
 20,000 workers were living in holes in the ground and even 
10,000 for whom the company had provided houses, lived 
surrounded by open gutters in which sewage, and drinking water 
mingled
419
.  
Furthermore, an Israeli employee who worked for the AIOC in Abadan since 
1944 explained the dreadful situation facing the Iranians and asserted that the Iranian 
workers lived during the seven hot months of the year under the trees and they 
moved into big halls built by the company during the winter where each family 
occupied the space of a blanket
420
. When the AIOC was compared with other firms 
in Iran, it was found that the others provided good houses with similar standards as 
they operated in the city and town areas
421
.  
It is remarkable that the AIOC exclusively regarded itself as “British” and 
employees always classified themselves as superior to the locals who were not 
permitted to rise up the hierarchy because of being Iranian
422
. As a consequence, 
antagonism towards the AIOC grew among Iranians because they did not enjoy the 
extraordinary European-style housing of the British staff and were accommodated in 
inferior accommodation which was not so well adapted to cope with their own 
typical weather
423
. At the other end of the scale, British staff were provided with 
everything they chose, including their preferred drink. For instance, Jameson 
mentioned in his letter to his father and Edith that he was enjoying his life in Iran and 
he used to go over to dine with his friends and attend concerts which regularly took 
place and his delight can be clearly illustrated when he asserted: How Edith (wife) 
could I do the above sort of things at home [Britain] and at the same put past more 
pounds
424
.   
It is worth noting that Elkington, General Manager of the AIOC in Persia, was 
aware of the slow progress and inadequacy of housing provided by the company and 
he declared that the housing schemes initiated in 1934 were proving inadequate and 
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their progress too slow to cope with the situation and suggested that the company‟s 
housing schemes must be increased if this feature in the social conditions of our 
employees is to be ameliorated
425
. Meanwhile, Elkington highlighted in his 
correspondence to company representatives in Britain that the disparity of treatment 
afforded by the company to its Iranian employees became more evident in housing 
and it was necessary for the management to take early steps to correct the position or 
alternatively some form of compensation granted in lieu
426
. He admitted that the 
company organized and conducted its operations without much thought for Iranian 
ideals and customs, and based everything on their own usage and from their own 
standpoint
427
. 
Also, John Wilson, the British architect in Iran, disclosed the result of his 
investigations for housing and affirmed that “the disparity in housing presented a real 
barrier between Iranian and British employees serving in the company, where the 
standard of living leaves much to be desired”428. Moreover, Jameson was aware of 
the company‟s discrimination towards Iranian employees and declared that about 
40% [accommodation in Bawarda] was occupied by European staff, and by putting 
Europeans into accommodation which has primarily been built for Iranians would be 
liable to cause comment
429
.  
Noticeably, British and Iranian personnel were kept separate due to partitioning 
and the enclosing of space policy that was adopted by the AIOC
430
. This political 
model of accommodation certainly led to the creation of exploitative regimes and 
poor economic conditions for the majority of Iranians
431
. Evidently, British workers' 
everyday life had immensely influenced the Iranian workers‟ aspirations and 
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activities, both collectively and individually. To sum up, racial discrimination was so 
evident in the AIOC that it represented a major barrier to the development of labour 
relations between British and Iranian workers. Antagonism towards the AIOC grew 
among Iranians because they did not enjoy the extraordinary European-style housing 
of the British staff and were accommodated in less spacious accommodation. In 
short, Britain was politically dominant and even though the company was called 
Anglo-Iranian but there was little Iranian in its culture.  
In short, the employment of British by the AIOC was a long-standing source of 
grievance because the senior posts were obviously held by the British. Iranian 
employees naturally remained unhappy about the company‟s discrimination.  
3.3.2 Wages 
The level of wages paid in the oil industry was considered more favourable than 
in other sectors with regard to unskilled labour
432
. Working conditions and training 
given by the oil industry to its employees was better than those offered in other 
sectors of the economy
433
. Nevertheless, the level of wages that the AIOC offered to 
its Iranian employees was always very low and had not risen in relation to their cost 
of living. The wages paid to Iranian workers were calculated on the basis of meeting 
the minimum necessities of existence for a single man. Whereas the oil workers were 
receiving less than Rials 80 per day which is equivalent to £4 a week, oil workers in 
the United States received $1.65 an hour which is about 6.5 times the rate paid by the 
AIOC.  Moreover, there was no area outside the Middle East paying as low a rate as 
in Iran
434
. It is worth noting that the situation was almost the same for higher grades 
and the wages and salaries offered for executive posts did not meet the expectations 
of ambitious men. Even Mr. Elkington declared that he was afraid that if their Iranian 
employees compared Iran with highly industrialised countries in the matter of pay “it 
would be found difficult at the present time to find Persians who would work for the 
company”435. However, the fear of unemployment and loss of wages was always 
present in Iranian workers‟ mind. Iranian authorities including the Iranian 
Government accused the company of ignoring the terms of the 1933 Agreement to 
improve pay and social provision since the wages paid to the Iranian workers were 
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calculated on the basis of meeting the minimum necessities of existence for a single 
man regardless of having his family accompanying him or not
436
. 
Wages also can be examined with reference to the comparative earnings data 
shown in Table (2) below. 
 
Table 2: Comparative earnings 
 £ £ % 
 Year Year Change 
Average annual wages and salaries 1945 1949  
a) All Iranian labour 76 314 3.13 
b) All British labour 980 2140 1.18 
A as a percentage of b 7.76 14.67  
    
c) non-graded Iranian staff 290 838 1.89 
d) graded Iranian staff 604 1910 2.16 
C as a percentage of b 29.59 39.16  
D as a percentage of b 61.63 89.25  
Source: Adapted from Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, and Table 14.4, 357. 
 
Although Table (2) shows that AIOC‟s Iranian employees‟ remuneration 
increased significantly after 1945, it is clear that higher graded Iranian employees 
received a disproportionate share of the general increase and it is clear that inequality 
within the Iranian workforce increased during the period. It is worth highlighting that 
the company‟s staff manager in Iran asserted in 1947 that “there is more joy in Iran 
over the appointment of one Iranian chemist/ engineer/ accountant/ doctor/ labour 
officer than there is over the appointment of 100 Iranian artisans or 1000 Iranian 
cooks”437.  
Jameson disclosed that “it was not the company‟s scale of salaries that was at fault 
but the occasional discrepancy in individual salaries which gave rise to a certain 
amount of grousing”438. In the interim, he justified the low payment to the Iranians 
by claiming that the Iranian staff are paid in sterling and by converting the sterling 
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into Rials, they would consider themselves very well paid
439
. Furthermore, the 
company justified the low pay to the Iranians by arguing “that a man working at 
home would have a higher standard of living than a Persian working in this 
country”440. In fact, the company used the excuse for their low pay to the Iranians 
that the wages were based on the market rate and that they could not consider paying 
rates in Persia exceeding the normal trade rates at home
441
. For instance, Gass 
disclosed that the AIOC “could not consider paying a Persian in his own country 
more than would be paid to British staff doing the same job at home”442.  
While the Iranians were not well paid, it was intended that British staff should be 
paid a sterling allowance in addition to their salary since “it was appreciated that 
such a basic salary would be insufficient for British staff who were employed in a 
foreign country”443. Not only that, but also the British staff asked the company for 
entertaining allowances. For instance, Jameson emphasized in his correspondence to 
his father that 
Before taking over the place I let them clearly understand 
that I would expect a good entertaining allowance as we get all 
sorts of generals of people
444
.  
When the situation is taken as a whole, it is apparent that the British, with their 
excellent rates of pay remained dominant and at the top of the hierarchy. From this 
position they were thus able to discriminate in favour of their British colleagues. 
3.3.3 Medical Treatment 
The discrimination against Iranians resulted in a mix of different groups including 
nationality, class and employment status. The total number of hospital beds provided 
by the AIOC was 590 for a population of 180,000 which indicates that many people 
were not entitled to medical treatment at all. There was a “staff” hospital for the 
Europeans and clerks and a Native hospital for the other “employees”445. The 
European hospital had 3 wards of 2 beds each for the treatment of Europeans and 
staff of clerical grades but the native hospital consisted of a single tent, surrounded 
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by expanded metal fencing
446
. The company seemed only concerned about the health 
of the British workers ignoring the health needs of the Iranian workers whilst 
asserting “…there were serious problems of health, especially among the white 
staff”447. Iranian doctors were not given the opportunity to benefit from the 
experience of British doctors whose duty was principally to take care of the British 
staff. This may be the reason why Iranian doctors preferred to work in other parts of 
the country even for less reward
448
. There were no maternity hospitals or even a 
midwife in smaller areas. 
As far as medical staff were concerned, the company‟s prejudice became evident, 
as there were separate wards for British and Iranians
449
. British wards were 
privileged to contain only 4 beds to accommodate few patients whereas the wards for 
the natives had 22 beds on average
450
. Moreover, British wards had their own 
bathrooms and toilets. All medical stores were kept separate so that no equipment 
from the British wards could be used in the other wards
451
. This discrimination is 
well captured from Idelson‟s attitude when he explained the plan of the AIOC 
towards the Iranian medical staff by asserting that: 
The obligations of the company to reduce its non-Iranian 
staff do not extend to the replacement of its medical and 
administrative staff. I still adhere to that view but regard it 
necessary not to express it in the general plan so as to avoid at 
this stage a controversy with the government
452
. 
Evidently, each component from housing to medical treatment was influenced by 
racial discrimination and inequality in favour of the British
453
. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, even the food was passed to the Matron to divide into two different 
quotas for the European wards and native wards respectively before handing it over 
to the cooks
454
. Clearly, the company remained conservative and refused to work 
towards Iranianisation despite the awareness of its importance in enabling the 
company to conduct negotiations (for instance sanitation, housing) with local 
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authorities (thereby circumventing the political questions raised by central 
government). The operations of the AIOC brought injustice and racial discrimination 
against the local population in Iran which was a major drive for nationalism. The 
evidence would seem to support Elm‟s view, that notwithstanding the economic and 
military importance of Iran, British politicians and the senior management of the 
AIOC displayed complacency and colonial arrogance
455
. 
3.4 Counter Claims by the AIOC: Empirical Evidence 
To study the negotiating position of the AIOC, this section will examine Fraser‟s 
role as a Senior Manager including his public views and his published statements in 
the company‟s annual reports as well as his private views towards the 
implementation of Article (16).  
3.4.1 The Public and Private position of the AIOC senior management  
Part of Fraser‟s strategy was to use financial reporting as a means of 
communication to maintain employee confidence. In view of nationalisation and the 
associated uncertainties from the company‟s point of view, Fraser was under 
considerable pressure whilst he was preparing for the company‟s annual general 
meeting in 1951. This could be considered a normal response in view of the new law 
promulgated in Iran on 1
st
 May 1951 in which the majority of the company‟s assets 
were detained by a foreign government. Fraser was attentive to the fact that without 
foreign technicians, oil fields could be kept going and the refinery could be run using 
Iranian personnel, even if at reduced efficiency
456. Therefore, Fraser‟s personal 
position and control had been brought into question and he had to explain how far the 
company aligned its behaviour with Iranian interests. Fraser distorted some facts in 
his statement and did not reveal his negative attitude towards Iranians. Neither did he 
reveal his tactical methods and true reasons for not engaging the Iranians. For 
instance, he made announcements concerning the difficulties in reaching a settlement 
with Iran and said that “all efforts to reach a friendly settlement having proved 
abortive”457. Not only that, but he addressed the British Government indicating that 
communicating with the Iranian Government appeared conclusively “that no further 
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negotiations with the present Iranian Government could produce any result, and that 
the negotiations, previously suspended, were to be considered broken off”458. Fraser 
was not presenting the truth but his insistence on the company‟s full control was the 
greatest obstacle to the solution of the Iranian problem and made him inclined to 
reject any of their proposals.  
It is important to note that Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, advised Fraser that 
the company‟s policy was not progressive and should “establish every possible 
relationship with the people in order to develop confidence between them and the 
company”459. By this, Bevin meant that Fraser had to do his utmost to develop a 
good relationship Iran and develop mutual confidence and assurance between them 
and the company. Consequently, Fraser used his statement as a piece of propaganda 
to portray the AIOC as fair and reasonable and to maintain the confidence among 
key AIOC stakeholder groups, including Iranian employees. Fraser adopted a tone of 
elusiveness in his statement to overcome the severity of the issues that confronted the 
AIOC with regard to Article (16) and with regard to the negative impacts of 
nationalisation facing the company. For example, in his statement in the annual 
reports for 1949 and 1950 (the years reflecting the oil crisis), Fraser could not avoid 
acknowledging his desire to maintain a relationship with the Iranians (see AIOC 
annual report, 1949, 1950). He announced an improvement in the company‟s social 
programme, saying: “The company carried out a vast expansion of the social services 
for its tens of thousands of employees in Iran, 94 percent Iranian nationals, whose 
numbers had been greatly increased”460. In another section of the main report, Fraser 
pointed out that the very large scale of the company‟s operations in Iran maintained a 
high standard by the company “in all matters concerning the welfare and working 
conditions of personnel”461. Also, Fraser communicated with the stakeholders and 
noted in his statement in 1951 that the AIOC “serves as a major national asset and 
fruitful source of revenue and employment”462. Furthermore, Fraser disclosed in his 
statement that “he carried out a vast expansion of the social services for its tens of 
thousands of employees in Iran”463.  
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In fact, Fraser used distorted facts to maintain a flourishing and progressive 
picture for the AIOC during nationalisation and as a result he disclosed in his 
statement more information than in previous years concerning the improvement in 
amenities and working conditions of the Iranian employees.  His aim was to create 
the impression that the company was still performing well regardless of the crisis. It 
is worth noting that Fraser‟s statement in 1950 included more detailed references to 
employee welfare provisions made by the company compared to 1949. For example, 
he emphasized that the “the Company's policy has always been to encourage the 
spirit of amity and partnership between members of the British and Iranian staff” and 
signalled that the company‟s strategy was to provide housing, leave and pension 
benefits, medical care and hospitalisation, club life and amenities to all employees 
irrespective of nationality
464
.  
Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, advised Fraser that the company‟s policy was 
not progressive and the AIOC “should go out of their way to improve pay 
conditions”465. Consequently, Fraser started to express in his 1950 statement his 
agreement to maintain a good relationship with the Iranians and show them that the 
company was not discriminating between the British and Iranian employees. For 
instance, he asserted in 1951 that “I [Fraser] wish to pay tribute to the many Iranians, 
some occupying very senior posts, who have given long, loyal and devoted service to 
the company and, I feel, also, their country”466. Moreover, Fraser disclosed in his 
statement to the employees that “Iranians received the same pay as British Staff in 
similar posts”467. Here Fraser equates the interests of the AIOC with the interests of 
Iran, although as documented in the review of evidence above, it was the injustice 
and subordination of the Iranians that had helped bring about the rise of 
nationalisation and antagonism towards the AIOC. In relation to the above, it is 
useful to note that there was no information disclosed in the previous year (1949 
annual report) about the treatment and payment to Iranians – an omission which 
could be seen as confirming his strategy to defend the company‟s existence and 
operations in Iran.  
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Yet, consistent with the practice of discrimination, British employees entered into 
“staff” status straight away, whilst the company tended to disregard Iranians in this 
respect, referring to them as “employees”. For example, Fraser mentioned in his 
1950 annual report “…tens of thousands of employees in Iran”, “…strikes occurred 
among our Iranian employees” and “…three members of our British staff were 
killed”468. The AIOC seems to have adopted an unconscious policy towards 
invisibility of the Iranians
469
.  
For more emphasis, using connotative word counts, Table (3) below reports the 
average frequency of occurrence of specific significant words by 500 unit word 
counts. The table contrasts keyword counts for the annual reports published in 1950 
and 1951 which contrasts Fraser‟s use of different groups of words and vocabulary 
that are particularly relevant to an understanding of AIOC‟s self-presentation. A 
software programme was used to analyse the semantic features of the text
470
. 
 
Table 3: Specific Word Counts 
Keyword 
Pre-nationalisation 
1950 
Post-nationalisation 
1951 
Staff † 11 
Employees 4 † 
Personnel 4 † 
Iran/Iranian 11 124 
Company/Company's 10 95 
Nationalisation † 10 
Sources: AIOC Annual Reports and Accounts, 1949 and 1950, Statement to Stockholders by the 
Chairman, 11-19 and 9-30 respectively. 
 
Notes:  
Counts performed using DICTION software
471
. 
† counts of <3 (in a standard 500-word passage) are ignored by the DICTION software. Nouns only. 
 
As shown in Table (3), the specific word counts illustrate that Fraser referred to 
all the workers including the Iranians as “staff” in 1951 and this was not the case in 
prior years because they were always ignored, or referenced as “employees” and 
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“personnel” as illustrated in 1950. Here the differences between British and Iranians 
highlights and provides an effective link between nationality and discrimination. The 
company was keen to present its British staff as superior to the Iranians for reasons 
of British prestige and this notion manifested itself from the start of their 
employment
472
. As a result, it was rare for Iranians to be referred to as “staff” at all 
because they scarcely appear in the few lists: representing a loss to the historical 
study of the Iranians activities and work lives
473
.  
Furthermore, Fraser increased the number of his references to the company‟s 
achievements in 1951 to maintain stakeholders‟ confidence during the crisis. For 
instance, he emphasised the improvements of the company and noted that “the 
Company's annual production of oil in Iran rose over fourfold”474 and “twenty-one 
new ships having been added since last year”475 to cope with the rise in production. 
Meanwhile, using the counts of keywords for the annual reports published in 1950 
and 1951, the word “company/company’s” has been mentioned 95 times during 
nationalisation (1951) instead of 10 times in (1950) and this indicates that Fraser 
referred to “the company” more than before nationalisation, in order to maintain 
stakeholders‟ confidence about the success of the company. Fraser was aware that 
Iranianisation had to take place because the Iranian workers felt inferior and had a 
sense of anti Iranian discrimination from the British. Moreover, he was aware that 
nationalism would be the only solution to protect Iranian rights. Therefore, he 
mentioned “nationalisation” 10 times in 1951 which was not previously mentioned 
in 1950. Meanwhile, it is enlightening to note Fraser‟s reference in 1951 to the word 
“Iran/Iranian”, which was mentioned 124 times, compared with only 11 references 
in 1950.  
It is interesting to contrast Fraser‟s public disclosures to his shareholders with his 
private correspondence to various political diplomats. In private, Fraser was aware of 
the rights of Iranians‟ and the importance of Article 16 to the Iranians, and as a 
consequence he took a measured view of the parameters of the negotiating position. 
On the one hand he was aware that any attempt to revise this clause in favour of the 
company would fail and would “produce an acrimonious discussion on the question 
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of equality of treatment [of] Iranian and non-Iranian employees”476. Therefore, 
Fraser considered that any discussion of that nature could do a great deal of harm and 
was not likely to result in any changes in favour of the company
477
.   
As previously mentioned, the Iranian government was looking for better terms but 
Fraser was unwilling to adhere to any commitments with regard to Iranianisation. For 
instance, the Iranian government‟s contentions included an allegation towards the 
AIOC that clause 16 (iii) of the concession called for a plan of annual and 
progressive reduction of foreigners which was too specific to allow any ambiguity.
478
 
On the other hand, the argument of Fraser towards this conflict was different 
claiming that their  
Programme in the housing and amenity sphere was not a 
concessional obligation. We [company] undertook it willingly 
and with pride as an industrialist‟s contribution to the oil 
industry of Iran
479
.  
Fraser therefore appeared reluctant to implement Article 16 but he was bound by 
the extraordinary provision that progressive reduction of non-Persian employees is 
applicable in terms of percentages of the numbers of foreign staff at the beginning of 
1934 up to the final suggested date of 1948
480
.  
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His irritation and his unwillingness to implement Article (16) were reflected in his 
correspondence by asserting the following: 
The more application of strict periods of twelve months is 
typical of the paper theory views held of the problem, and if any 
such percentages were acceptable they would clearly have to be 
applicable to the number of non-Persian staff at the beginning of 
each period in question, and not throughout the periods to the 
number of non-Persian staff originally serving. Furthermore, the 
higher one got in the graded employees the more difficult would 
it be to find efficient substitutes and if the principle even more 
acceptable common sense would call for a reduction in annual 
percentages, after some initial rise as a result of putting 
individuals through a course of training- which might or might 
not produce efficient men not merely failed B.A.‟s481. 
Obviously, Fraser was never prepared to engage Iranian employees in skilled and 
first class jobs because of his negative attitude towards them, even if they were well 
educated and trained because he made it clear in his confidential correspondence that 
the company  
Should at any time be prepared to engage only a very few 
Iranians in the company‟s service. Courses of training, 
examinations passed, academic distinctions, are all very well, 
but they are not ends in themselves and are of use only so far as 
they produce a properly equipped man. That is one of the things 
which I [Fraser] fear have yet to be learned by some of the 
nations who attach an excessive importance to education
482
.  
Moreover, Fraser revealed in his correspondence his tactical excuses for not 
engaging the Iranians, by disclosing his view that the company should not promote 
learning or manual training to help the Iranians possess a sense of responsibility and 
initiative, in case it may perhaps endanger their lives
483
. However, this was not the 
case for Fraser was distorting facts and found reasons for not engaging the Iranians 
with the British staff, in order, one may presume, to maintain the class and ethnic 
separation. 
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3.4.2 Review of empirical evidence  
The above discussion has re-considered the claims and counter claims of the 
AIOC and Iranian representatives in the light of Fraser‟s public and private 
correspondence. Historical evidence has tended to reflect the bi-polar aspects of the 
negotiations and the differences in historical interpretation. Such evidence has 
therefore been used selectively, with the purpose of reviewing the neglected 
documents, including the secret political correspondence between Fraser and other 
diplomats. There are interesting contrasts between Fraser‟s private views and his 
public pronouncements, and it was the former that informed the company‟s 
negotiating position and contributed to the failure of the talks and subsequent 
nationalisation. 
Undertones of colonial attitudes in these public documents demonstrate all the 
more strongly the underlying resistance to Iranian involvement in the management of 
the company revealed by Fraser‟s private correspondence. Within the above context, 
it is quite clear that Fraser‟s public pronouncements were part of a wider propaganda 
battle. It is clear to observe that Fraser used his public statements as a tool to 
communicate an assumed attitude towards the Iranians, in order to maintain their 
confidence. However, his mindset and personal attitude, as illustrated in the archival 
evidence, revealed his individual beliefs which underpinned the fact that the Iranians 
were not treated as genuine stakeholders.  
To the reader of the Chairman‟s statement of 19th November 1951, the behaviour 
of the company was nothing more than a reasonable response to difficult 
circumstances. However, the moral tone of Fraser‟s arguments only reinforced the 
colonial attitudes that angered many Iranians. Fraser was willing to be seen as a key 
visible figure in the AIOC, making public statements and speeches which would 
bring him credibility and respect. It was in his own interests, therefore, not to reveal 
his conflicting private opinions to the public. To the public, he played a major role in 
portraying the company as “fair” and in attempted to show the AIOC‟s employment 
policies in a positive light. On this point, nevertheless, the Iranian nationalists saw 
things quite differently, to the extent that their principal justification for 
nationalisation was the charge of discrimination by the AIOC against its Iranian 
employees.  
Even though the delayed 1951 report was a carefully worded document, it is clear 
from further analysis that Iranian and British staff were regarded as different. The 
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evidence shows that the AIOC was discriminatory towards Iranians, reflecting a 
negative attitude towards their technical potential as well as traditional colonial 
stereotyping. The segregation of housing and social facilities created relations of 
unequal power, thus, reinforcing hierarchies resulting in subordination and exclusion 
for Iranians. For instance, Fraser created racial hierarchies within the company 
according to his imperial beliefs which in turn isolated and deprived the indigenous 
people from becoming competent in their own country. He was clearly disdainful of 
their knowledge of the oil industry
484
. Evidently, the AIOC resisted Iranianisation 
because the redistribution of employment in favour of Iranians, including at senior 
level, threatened to compromise the control of the business. This point was therefore 
the most strenuously resisted by the AIOC negotiators and was the reason why the 
company was less willing to compromise. The AIOC concessions were insufficient 
to forestall the ensuing nationalisation crisis, which after all, was all about the crucial 
question of control of the oil fields. Therefore, Fraser‟s insistence on full control of 
the company and its operations by incumbent British staff was the greatest obstacle 
to the solution of the problem. 
Fraser had a negative attitude towards Iranian staff, and CSR policy and his 
comments on the issues raised by Article 16 were elusive. There was no concept of 
partnership and cultural incorporation with the Iranians and this left them living in an 
environment of injustice and social and economic domination. Obviously, this 
proved to be the point on which no compromise could be countenanced because the 
AIOC paid only lip service to the Iranianisation process. Documentary evidence 
shows that changes in staffing ratios, including reductions of British staff had no 
chance of being achieved from Fraser‟s perspective and thus these associated 
obstacles prevented more Iranians from being employed in the AIOC.  Meanwhile, 
social responsibility disclosures, on subjects such as health and housing, were easy to 
make but where imprecisely quantified especially in the published AIOC Annual 
Reports and Accounts.  
To sum up, the public image of the company was seen as a crucial ingredient of 
the nationalisation crisis, not least because a key objective of the AIOC management 
was to maintain the confidence of its own stakeholders in the face of a major threat 
and the backing of the British government in the face of that threat. However, it 
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might also be supposed that if the AIOC could defend itself from the claims made by 
the Iranian government regarding discrimination against Iranians, it would also 
absolve itself of any blame for the international crisis.  
3.5 Summary 
The notion of the British Empire and its political formation played a crucial role 
in defining the AIOC‟s operations and in transmitting British attitudes of racial 
discrimination that resulted in disparity between the company and the Iranians. The 
AIOC‟s economic hegemony in the 1950s was attributed to the prosperity of the 
company and high standards of living of the British staff. The AIOC‟s social and 
economic domination entailed inequality and violation of Iranian sovereignty 
because the company always regarded Iranians as low-grade and not on an equal 
footing with their British colleagues. Abadan was run as a company town, where 
“natives” were kept out of company stores and clubs. Although the efforts of British 
staff had resulted in growth and benefits to the company but it is estimated that the 
drawbacks of their performance was reflected in their treatment of the Iranian 
workers. Iranians believed that hiring expatriates and largely excluding the local 
population created problems in the running of the company and also certainly 
diminished the rights of Iranians. One of the more salient points in the AIOC‟s 
working environment was that the Iranian workers felt that they lacked a well-
articulated set of career paths because of cultural biases. This was coupled with the 
sense of anti Iranian discrimination from the British towards them. Iranians criticised 
the British staff for being inflexible, unfair, disrespectful and insensitive to them. 
From an adjustment perspective, the greater the economic and cultural distance, the 
more difficulty the Iranians have in accepting the new environment of the AIOC. 
Iranians always felt that they were inferior beings because their life was lived away 
from the British and because the company‟s attitude towards them seemed to require 
an acknowledgement of gratitude for the success of the company. It worth noting that 
there was instability in Iran at that time, as well as a general deterioration in housing, 
schools and hospitals during the AIOC‟s era.  
The Iranian government was justified in asking for better terms for Iranian 
employees whose education and training was not well planned and required further 
development by the company. However, the AIOC had never committed itself either 
to develop its training programmes or to recruit more local workers. It did not even 
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commit to increasing the construction of houses or providing other benefits for 
Iranian employees. It was not surprising that the unfair treatment and injustice 
against the Iranian employees were the precursor to the bill approving the 
nationalisation of the company‟s holdings, in May 1951485. Musaddiq was committed 
to nationalisation because expatriates from the foreign company‟s home country 
provided most of the managerial and technical skills, whereas locals constituted most 
of the labour force. It was clear that the Iranians were eager for their country to 
benefit from an important agreement, fairly honoured and properly implemented by 
the AIOC  
To conclude, the AIOC was seen as a typical colonial power and an arm of the 
imperial British government and the accusations against the AIOC of discrimination 
against Iranians can be upheld on the basis of the evidence reviewed here. 
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Chapter 4: Profit distribution by the AIOC 
4.1 Introduction 
 Since the 1933 concession, there was a great deal of dispute about how 
profits generated from the AIOC were shared unevenly with the Iranian government. 
In fact, Iran was not a shareholder but considered itself a stakeholder although AIOC 
took all the risks of exploitation. It is worth noting that by the AIOC‟s own 
admission, there were difficult accounting issues in arriving at an assessment of such 
profits
486
. For instance, the AIOC‟s preliminary statement was unhelpful since it did 
not disclose trading profit or the taxation provision for the year: because of these 
omissions the AIOC ignored a major requirement of the Stock Exchange
487
. The 
Iranian government and the Iranians in general were to some extent dissatisfied with 
the British Government‟s insistence on dividend limitations (to which the company 
adhered) because the Iranian royalties depended, in part, on the level of profit 
distribution. According to Elm, “the British government set limits on the distribution 
of dividends during and after the Second World War.....Iran was left at the mercy of 
the British government, which by increasing the AIOC‟s taxes decreased the 
company‟s net profits and thus decreasing Iran‟s 20 percent share in dividends and 
general reserves”488. This in turn affected Iran‟s immediate receipts489. Iranians 
realised that their country was not receiving profits and royalties from the AIOC‟s 
operations because their country did not have control over the allocation of net 
profits between dividends and reserves, therefore the company paid much more in 
income tax to the British government than it did in royalties to the Iranian 
government
490
. Moreover, Iran was in doubt whether the AIOC had included profits 
from all its subsidiaries or not and there had been a complaint from the Iranian 
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government that the rewards it received from the working of the British concession 
were inadequate. There were major disputes between Iran and Britain because of 
differences of opinion in the interpretation of some of the provisions of the 
agreement, particularly with regard to the conduct of the AIOC‟s operations. As a 
consequence the Iranian government was willing to pursue vigorously a policy of 
negotiation for the revision of the 1933 concession.  
At the behest of Abbas Golshayan, the Iranian Minister of Finance, Gilbert Gidel, 
a French Law Professor, produced a fifty page document describing the „accounting 
tricks‟ used by the AIOC to cheat the Iranians out of huge sums of money491. Gidel 
issued this Memorandum to the AIOC in order to discuss specific points and to 
revise the 1933 Agreement, with the hope of starting a new chapter in the 
relationship between the Iranian government and the company
492
. The Memorandum 
made a number of essential points. Most important among these were the insistence 
by the AIOC that non-Iranian subsidiaries should not be consolidated, having the 
effect of depriving the Iranian government of profits from overseas operations. This 
affected royalty figures, and further limited the distribution of dividends set by the 
British government. In conjunction with this there was resistance by the company of 
Iran‟s demands to inspect its books in order to ascertain whether the Iranian 
government received its due royalties
493
. There were repeated Iranian requests to 
allow them to audit the AIOC‟s accounts, which were refused494.  
As previously illustrated in Chapter 3, in an area of 'informal Empire', the AIOC 
paid only lip-service to the Iranianisation process and showed a reluctance to 
maintain control, which suggests an exploitative relationship between the company 
and Iran. In this context, this chapter aims to test the validity of the key claims of the 
Iranians and the AIOC counter claims, and to review the crucial elements leading to 
the nationalisation of the AIOC‟s assets by Musaddiq in May 1951. Iranian 
justifications for this action were based on accusations of unfairness in the 
distribution of profits and on their dissatisfaction regarding the royalties and policies 
adopted by the British government in limiting the dividend for 1947.  
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It is therefore important to review the evidence for the above accusations using 
selected key documents, in particular the Gidel Memorandum, which have been 
hitherto neglected. In reviewing these neglected documents, the justification of the 
claims made by both sides will be assessed by comparing the assertions of the AIOC 
annual reports with the private views which were reflected in correspondence. This 
will provide supporting evidence for the motive and extent of the AIOC‟s adopted 
methods for profit distribution. These documents include the private and public 
correspondence of AIOC executives and diplomats, published statements in the press 
and in annual reports, obtained primarily from the BP archives. To provide further 
evidence concerning these claims, a financial analysis of the AIOC‟s annual reports 
for 1948-1950 is conducted to assess the division of profits from the oil industry 
between the AIOC, the British and Iranian Governments. To the extent that these 
claims are upheld or rejected, Fraser‟s subsequent defence of the company‟s 
activities can be more precisely evaluated by conducting a textual analysis of the 
Chairman‟s Statement to Shareholders. The validity of the statements is then 
reappraised with reference to historical evidence. In short, this chapter aims to 
answer two questions: whether the company misled the Iranians and others about 
shares of the oil revenues and secondly, whether the company was the chief architect 
of its own difficulties.  
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the Iranian claims and 
AIOC counter claims over the injustice of the 1933 concession. Section 3 presents 
the empirical evidence, which involves examining the key controversial points in the 
Memorandum (a major neglected historical document). This section also illustrates 
the accounting analysis for the AIOC annual reports for 1948-1950 inclusive, to 
examine the evidence and review the claims of the Iranians and counter claims of the 
AIOC. Section 4 examines behind-the-scenes correspondence between various 
diplomats to discover the tactical plans adopted by different managers in the AIOC. 
Section 5 highlights the role of Fraser, the AIOC‟s Chairman (1941-56), in 
responding to Iranian accusations. Section 6 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
4.2 The 1933 concession: Claims and Counter Claims  
In the light of the literature reviewed in chapter 2, the question of distribution of 
oil income continued to be a major source of rising conflict between the AIOC and 
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the Iranian government
495
. In October 1947, the Iranian government committed to 
renegotiate the 1933 concession and demanded fair compensation. Later, the AIOC 
provisionally agreed a Supplemental Oil Agreement with the Iranian government but 
its ratification in the Majlis was successfully opposed by the National Front party. 
Iranians were not happy with the Supplemental Agreement and with the idea of 
extending the life of the concession for 32 more years. A subsequent proposal by the 
Iranians, for a fifty-fifty division of the company‟s total profits was proposed but the 
AIOC rejected the offer and insisted on dividing only “Iranian” profits. 
There was continuing economic and political conflict between the AIOC and Iran. 
The AIOC claimed that the search for oil was an expensive risk and to transform oil 
into actual value required vast capital, skill, tenacity and a widespread 
organisation
496
. The company believed that it had mutual interests with Iran, 
asserting that the continued operations of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company were vital 
to Persia‟s wellbeing497. In fact, the company held the view that their operation in 
Iran was a remarkable success, and capital was spent on an unprecedented scale with 
the result that production rose in Persia at a greater rate than other territories. Herbert 
Morrison, Leader of the House of Commons and Foreign secretary, highlighted the 
benefits that the AIOC offered to Iran by asserting that 
The company operations consist not only of extracting oil 
from the ground but of the extensive refining operations 
undertaken in the great Abadan installations and in a widespread 
marketing organisation, including a great fleet of tankers
498
.  
It is worth noting that there was cooperation and joint decision-making between 
the company and the British authorities at home and abroad through the 
government‟s shareholding in the company and its power of veto. The AIOC was 
eager to present a united front, listing its achievements and recounting the benefits it 
showered equally on both producers and consumers to defend its innocence against 
charges of deception and exploitation. 
The Iranian government and the locals, however, held a quite different opinion. 
Iran saw control of oil by the AIOC as damaging national control and argued that the 
country should gain as much revenue as possible from their oil reserves. Iranians 
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believed that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves because the 
Supplementary Agreement proposed by Britain did not offer Iran as much as it 
wished  and the definition of profits was difficult. Iranians strongly felt the injustice 
of the 1933 concession and argued that the AIOC „stole‟ their established rights, 
giving them, in return, a small fraction of their own oil. The Iranian government 
made great capital of the suggestion that the AIOC was only “the British 
Government under another form”499. Iranian accusations were numerous in regards to 
the unfairness and injustice of the AIOC whilst they were alert to the reality that the 
company‟s worldwide business had been built up on Persian oil500. Iranians argued 
that in spite of their rich underground resources and vast wealth on land and in the 
sea, the population was mostly poor, claiming that if any other nation possessed one-
tenth of their advantages, it would have made their country a paradise. The Iranian 
government was annoyed with the fact that the company had done little or nothing 
for the people of Persia in return for the natural wealth which the company had won 
and carried away
501
. The Iranian government believed that their negligible share of 
the oil profits served to meet unnecessary expenditures such as satisfying the 
demands of certain influential people, instead of being used for public welfare
502
. Ali 
Mansur, Iranian prime Minister, March-June 1950
503
, explained that the company 
enjoyed a range of privileges from their operation in Iran such as cheap labour, 
exemption from customs duties and charges, exemption from income tax and from 
any supervision over its imports and exports
504
. Iranians were extremely annoyed 
with the low bargaining power of the Iranian government in relation to the AIOC. 
This was in part because their government‟s oil revenues constituted only a small 
percentage of the value of oil exports which naturally slowed down the accumulation 
of capital reserves over the period
505
. From the Iranian point of view therefore, the 
lack of trust in AIOC‟s adopted policies was the precursor for the issuance of the 
Gidel Memorandum. The following section will therefore examine the key points in 
the Memorandum, addressing the validity of both parties‟ claims and counter claims. 
                                                 
499
 BP 72017, Memorandum by Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, 23
rd
 May 1922, 3. 
500
 Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 107. 
501
 BP 68386, Report by Sir John Cadman, visit to Persia and Iraq, spring 1926, 31. 
502
 BP 071181, Press extracts No. 798 on 6
th
 September 1948, 1. 
503
 Ali Mansur  is an Iranian Politician. Governor-General of Khurasan and then Azerbaijan. Head of 
Seven-Year Plan Organisation. 
504
 BP 126343, Notes on Supplemental Agreement handed by Ali Mansur to Shepherd on 3
rd
 June 
1950, 1. 
505
 Karshenas, Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran, 234 
 108 
4.3 Iranian Claims and AIOC Counter claims: Empirical Evidence  
As is illustrated above, the 1933 concession and the Supplemental Agreement had 
a number of key points which proved controversial and resulted in the issuance of 
Gidel‟s Memorandum. The Memorandum covered several issues that are worthy of 
further investigation. These issues formed the basis of the Iranian government‟s 
claims that the AIOC was paying an unjustly low return under the terms of the 1933 
concession. It challenged the validity of the company‟s arguments in self-defence, 
and, in particular, AIOC‟s accounting reports which featured in this controversy. 
These reports were used as a source of data about profit and performance which 
allowed AIOC to transmit arguments in defence of its position and behaviour.  
It is worth mentioning that no prior studies or research have examined the 
Memorandum in order to address the responses by the Iranians to the AIOC‟s 
counter claims or to reveal the tactical methods adopted by the AIOC management, 
including the management of information. According to Gass, some of the points in 
the Memorandum were of a trivial and departmental nature but others were very 
radical and novel interpretations of the concession, such as comparisons between the 
present concession and the D‟Arcy concession, and also the question of a gold 
premium and taxes payable to the British government506. The Memorandum also 
dealt with other general issues which are not included in this chapter; the main aim 
here is to address and scrutinize the key points of contention that the Iranian 
government regarded as necessary in order to reach a settlement with the AIOC. 
Therefore, the following section reviews the most prominent items in Gidel‟s 
Memorandum in terms of distribution of value and the question of control and will 
examine and assess these in the light of Iranian claims and AIOC counter claims. 
4.3.1 Difference in the value of gold 
The gold clause specified within the AIOC concession allowed the Iranian 
government the option to receive payment in gold or gold equivalent. In fact, the 
Memorandum claimed that the AIOC had not abided by the gold clause in the 1933 
concession and therefore the Iranian government had not received the quantity of 
sterling was assured it by the conditions governing the gold guarantee. The Iranian 
government therefore called for more sterling because the price of gold was 
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controlled
507
. According to Elm, “in 1933 the royalty figure of 4s per ton represented 
one-eighth of the price of Iran‟s crude oil, whereas in 1947, considering the gold 
guarantee, it represented less than one-sixteenth. Thus, Iran‟s royalties in relation to 
the price of oil exported dropped from 33 percent in 1933 to 9 percent in 1947”508. In 
a similar vein, Ali Mansur, the Iranian Prime Minister, pointed out that the price of 
goods and particularly that of oil products had risen more than the price of gold and 
the currency used at the time of the agreement would still not have had the same 
value when payment became due.
509
. Ali Mansur also declared that the total amounts 
paid to the Iranian government in the early years of the execution of the 1933 
Agreement were often between 35 and 40 percent of the company‟s profit, whereas 
for the year 1948, assuming that the Supplemental Agreement would have been put 
into effect, they would come to about 26 per cent thereof
510
. In this above context, 
Ali asked the AIOC that any amounts to be paid on account of royalty and taxes due 
retrospectively, irrespective of the date of the agreement and the date of payment, 
should be reckoned on the basis of the price of gold on the day of payment
511
. In 
June 1950, when Ali Razmara became the Prime Minister, he studied the 
Supplemental Agreement and asked for a lump sum payment of £14,000,000 to take 
account of the devaluation in sterling, and in settlement of the accounts for the years 
1947 and 1948
512
.  
Gass countered that the efficacy of the gold conversion clause was challenged by 
the government, on the grounds that it was not providing the intended security.  The 
crisis which arose at the beginning of the war owing to reduced output and 
diminished revenue was settled by make-up payments, to bring the total royalty 
revenue and tax composition up to £4,000,000 per annum between 1939 and 1945 
inclusive
513. Furthermore, the AIOC‟s treasury countered that “it was nevertheless 
accepted that the Iranian government had the unilateral right under clause 10 (v) (b) 
to call for review of the protection afforded to it by the conversion factor in that sub-
clause and that their present complaint originated from their view that they were no 
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longer fairly protected against the depreciated purchasing power of sterling because 
of the fixed official price of gold”514. The AIOC pointed out that the Iranian 
government‟s objective in raising this gold conversion issue was to receive larger 
sterling payments from the company by using a new and lower factor for the basic 
price of gold in place of the existing factor of 120/-d. per ounce in the concession. 
Also, the AIOC claimed that Iran was seeking to replace the fixed official price of 
gold in London, for royalty calculation purposes, with a higher fixed price515.   
In short, the Iranian government was aware of the fact that the price of gold was 
not free but was looking for better terms for the country and for the Iranian people, 
by protecting their rights from being violated under the gold clause. The British 
government‟s main objection was that whenever an increase or decrease occurred in 
the official price of gold, the Iranian government would demand a revision of the 
special price fixed for royalty purposes, which would be impossible for the British to 
meet. 
4.3.2 Taxes and Immunities 
Iranians were willing to see the payment terms improved because they were 
dissatisfied with the massive amount of tax paid to the British government
516
. The 
Memorandum claimed that British tax should not have been deducted from the profit 
share of the Iranian Government, and that the company underpaid Iranian tax on its 
profits because of the immunities it enjoyed. An important moral argument from the 
Iranian point of view was that Iranians strongly wished to develop their country and 
get terms as good as, if not better than, those contained in the concessions in other 
countries
517
. According to Ali Mansur, Iranians found it shocking that Iran, the main 
source of the AIOC‟s income, receive a negligible share in the profits which was by 
no means proportionate to the company‟s net profits518. The Memorandum clarified 
that the Iranian government‟s revenue should be exempt from any kind of tax and the 
amounts which had been withheld by the British government, were to be restored
519
. 
For a clearer picture, Table (4) presents a comparison of the amount of taxes paid to 
both the British and the Iranian governments for 1933-1947 inclusive.  
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Table 4: Comparison of the taxes paid to the British Government and Iranian 
Government 
Year 
Total tax payable to British 
government (£) Iranian Government's tax (£) 
1933 305,418 274,412 
1934 511,733 301,135 
1935 408,635 291,169 
1936 910,559 328,524 
1937 1,651,588 362,734 
1938 1,157,029 378,494 
1939 1,955,606 466,204 
1940 2,975,156 460,118 
1941 2,920,682 568,667 
1942 4,917,486 454,168 
1943 7,662,764 606,948 
1944 10,636,457 514,725 
1945 10,681,364 646,644 
1946 10,279,241 768,599 
1947 15,266,665 765,405 
Sources: BP 101099, Gidel Memorandum, 1946-1949, 6b. 
 
As shown in Table (4), the amounts received by the British government in 
taxation were huge, and not proportionate to the payments received by the Iranian 
government. Professor Gidel noted that the company paid to the Iranian government 
£274,412 in 1933 on account of income tax and £305,418 on the same account to the 
British government whilst in 1947, the amount received on account of taxation by the 
Iranian government was £765,405 and that received by the British government was 
£15,266,665
520
. Mr. Ebtehaj, Governor of Bank Melli, reported that the company 
made large tax payments to the British government and urged Iran to claim a share of 
these payments
521
.  
AIOC countered that it could not change British tax provisions, and that the 
Iranian government enjoyed benefits from AIOC investment which would not have 
been possible if the company had not been given tax immunity. The company 
claimed that the royalties paid to Iran were a source of revenue to the Iranians and in 
return, it argued, the company should receive a substantial proportion of any profits 
from oil, without which Iran would not have benefited from the AIOC‟s exploration 
of their oil reserves. Furthermore, AIOC claimed that it should not overlook the 
existing provisions regarding tax composition; the British Treasury had informed the 
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company that the level of taxation in the UK was a matter for the British 
government
522
.  
An important moral argument from the Iranian point of view was that profits 
earned in Iran were being used to generate profits elsewhere. Gass, the AIOC 
negotiator, noted that his Iranian counterparts “possessed only a very elementary idea 
of accounts”523. Even so, an analysis of the accounts (Table 5 below) reveals first, 
that the AIOC was financially self sufficient and did not raise significant new loans 
or equity capital and second, that it was committing significant resources to capital 
expenditure in other countries. With or without knowledge of accounting, the 
diversion of funds outside Iran was quite obvious to both sides of the negotiations.  
 
Table 5: Funds generated and location of capital expenditure: 1946-1951 
Year A B C D E 
 Funds generated 
from operations 
Increase in 
capital* 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(total) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(Iran) 
% 
D/C 
1946 15.2 Nil 20.2 9 44.55 
1947 43.9 Nil 31 8 25.81 
1948 58.8 Nil 39 14 35.90 
1949 43.1 1.6 55.7 18 32.32 
1950 93.5 0.8 42.1 10 23.75 
1951 83.2 4.2 60.2 n/a n/a 
Totals 337.7 6.6 188 59** 31.38** 
Sources: Adapted from Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, table 10.4, 276 and 
figure 14.1, 348. 
 
Notes:  
* Refers to loan capital 
** Excludes 1951 
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From the above analysis, the evidence strongly supports Elm‟s conclusion, 
endorsed by British Treasury and Foreign Office officials- Britain could not refute 
Iran‟s claim that the company‟s worldwide business “had been built up on Persian 
oil”524. The AIOC performed commercial activities overseas with the status of a 
British domiciled company resulting in unfairness of capital payments to Iran when 
compared with other countries (see Table 5 above). Thus, the Iranian government‟s 
income from oil was largely confined to taxation, resulting in reduced capital 
reserves. In short, the company demonstrably found reasons for not changing its 
currently advantageous tax provisions.  
4.3.3 Company’s Reserves and Profits 
Since the 1933 concession, the Iranians had found it difficult to arrive at an 
assessment for the division of profits
525
. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the 
1933 Agreement offered Iran a share in AIOC‟s overall profits around the world, 
equivalent to 20 percent of dividends distributed among holders of common stock in 
excess of £671,250
526
. The 1933 concession did not bring any substantial changes to 
the extremely unequal shares nor did it create a significant increase in the absolute 
value of the oil income of the Iranian government
527
. Karshenas has pointed out that 
although the total profits of AIOC constituted a formidable sum in the Iranian 
economy, the Iranian government‟s share of the profits was relatively very small528.  
Gidel‟s Memorandum called for the method of calculation of the company‟s 
various reserves to be clarified in an accurate manner
529
. Professor Gidel recognised 
that the AIOC‟s treatment of depreciation was seen as creating a misleading 
reduction of profits with the aim of reducing the amount it was required to pay the 
Iranian government
530
.  
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He argued from two different perspectives: 
First, the government would in effect have paid for a part of 
the depreciation of properties outside Iran to which it had no 
right at the end of the concession and secondly, the government 
would in effect have been paying towards the depreciation of the 
company‟s properties in Iran which should under the concession 
revert to the government at the end of the concession free of any 
cost and at the end of the concession the government would have 
no share in the reserves provided for this purpose. The result 
would be that the ordinary stockholders would benefit from the 
reserves at the end of the concession and from the company‟s 
property outside Iran, while the government‟s reversionary right 
to the property inside Iran would be defeated
531
. 
Moreover, the Prime Minister Ali Mansur commented that the reserves were 
implausibly large, a matter which should be cleared up thoroughly and without any 
ambiguity so that the interests of Persia should be completely safeguarded
532
. He 
explained that  
(The) AIOC has acted under instructions from the British 
government and reserved terrific amounts in order not to pay 
more than what the company laid down in the 1933 Agreement, 
however it should be stipulated in the Supplemental Agreement 
that the Persian government would share in all the reserves up to 
20% whether visible or invisible
533
.  
The AIOC became anxious and was ready to re-open discussions with the Iranian 
government rather than let the latter‟s concerns become magnified into serious 
grievances
534
. The Board of the company decided to discuss with the Iranian 
government the policy, advocated by the British government, of suspending payment 
from the General Reserve, resulting in hardship to Iran
535
. The company maintained 
that the only amount available to the Iranian government was 20% of its general 
reserve at the date of expiration of the concession or of its surrender
536
. Other 
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reserves, it claimed, such as those for taxation, preference dividends and bad debts, 
could not be calculated „with absolute accuracy‟ and were not likely to be payable to 
shareholders unless they were found to have been overstated
537
. As for the Iranian 
claims that depreciation should be divided between properties inside and outside 
Iran; the AIOC argued that the assets in Iran were contained in different accounts and 
that depreciation was provided separately for each company. The AIOC declared, 
however, that its accounts included, in addition to the Iranian assets, certain small 
assets outside Iran which amounted to less than 1% of the total gross value
538
. Their 
implication was that only trivial amounts of non-Iranian asset depreciation were 
being charged against Iranian profits.  
As previously demonstrated, the AIOC paid much more in income taxes to the 
British government than it did in royalties to the Iranian government, and this was 
regarded with increasing concern in Iran
539
. The following section draws upon the 
arguments developed here to provide further evidence concerning the Iranian claims. 
Detailed financial analyses were conducted for the share of profits using data from 
the 1948 – 1950 AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, to contrast the profit shares for 
these periods and re-examine the distribution of the firm‟s pre-tax profit during the 
company‟s nationalisation to three stakeholder groups: the Iranian Government, the 
British Government and other AIOC shareholders. As discussed in the introduction, 
the British government had exploited the Iranian oil deposits according to its own 
interests (for example, the control of oil for its navy) and acquired a majority 
shareholding (51%) stake in the AIOC. Meanwhile, the AIOC shareholders had a 
49% stake of ordinary shares not controlled by the British government and the 
owners of the preference shares. Tables (6), (7) and (8) compute a more detailed 
analysis of these shares of profits using data from the 1948, 1949 and 1950 AIOC 
Annual Report and Accounts to examine how compatible they are with the claims 
made by either side. 
As can be seen, Table (6) computes a more detailed analysis of these shares of 
profits, using data from the 1948 AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, to examine the 
distribution of the firm‟s pre-tax profits to three stakeholder groups: the Iranian 
Government, the British Government, and other AIOC shareholders. The company‟s 
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financial reports play a significant role for a number of reasons. They were analysed 
by both sides as evidence for and against changes to the basis on which the AIOC 
was taxed and also for the royalties paid under the concession. Moreover, a 
calculation of the other elements of the return made to Iran arising from the AIOC‟s 
activity is set out in the table below. 
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Table 6: Stakeholder shares of AIOC profits, 1948 
A) Geographical distribution of AIOC activity 
Country 
Crude 
production 
(Tons) 
Refined 
(Tons) Total (Tons) % 
Iran (i) 24,871 20,936 45807 87.26% 
Kuwait 3,146  3146 5.99% 
Iraq 1,292 963 2255 4.30% 
Qatar   0 0.00% 
UK 43 1241 1284 2.45% 
Total   52492 100.00% 
 
B) Stakeholder shares of AIOC Profits 
1948 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 
 
Iranian 
Gov. 
British 
Gov. 
Other AIOC 
shareholders 
Estimated 
Iranian 
Estimated 
Non-
Iranian 
Total per 
accounts 
Royalties (ii) 9170   9170  9170 
Ordinary dividend (iii)  2680 2575 5255 785 6040 
Preference dividend   932 932 139 1071 
Reserve 
Appropriations (iv)  7543 7247 14790 2210 17000 
Retained profit (iv)  -21 -20 -41 -6 -47 
Minorities and 
subsidiaries (iv)  181 174 354 53 407 
UK taxation: profits  6158  6158 920 7078 
UK taxation: dividend 
income tax  18473  18473 2760 21233 
       
Total 9170 35013 10907 55090 6862 61952 
% Share 16.65% 63.56% 19.80% 100.00%   
      9170 
Accounting Profit (v)      52782 
Sources: Annual Report, 1948 
Notes: 
i) Division of profits between Iranian and Non-Iranian activities allocated pro-rata from Panel A estimates 
ii) Total Iranian royalties as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, Annual Report 1948. Iranian production 
royalties computed as the difference between total royalties and total ordinary dividend in excess of 
£671k x 20%. As these were charged to the accounts as a cost of production (Bamberg, p.325) they need 
to be added back to the profit available for distribution to the above stakeholders, so a deduction of 
£9,170 is made in the final column to reconcile to disclosed accounting profit. 
iii) Remaining equity dividends attributable to Iran divided 51:49 British Govt, Other AIOC Shareholders. 
iv) AIOC shareholders are non-Iranian shareholders. 
v)  Reserve appropriations, retained profit and minority interests are allocated in the same proportions. The 
effects of discounted pricing to the benefit of the British Admiralty and their consequence for reduced 
Iranian royalties are not factored in the calculations above.  
vi) £52782 is the profit for the year before tax taken from the annual report and accounts 1948, p.8. 
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As shown above in Table (6) panel (A), an estimated 87% of the profit and other 
figures are attributed to Iranian activities in Iran. The main aim of the analysis in this 
panel is to show the oil contribution of each country and determine exactly where it 
came from. Panel (B) illustrates the distribution of the AIOC profits and how it was 
allocated among three different stakeholder groups: the Iranian government, the 
British government and other AIOC shareholders. From the accounting analysis 
shown in Panel (B), it is obvious that the British government received a massive 
amount in taxes in 1948- the British Treasury had accrued £35 million in tax revenue 
for that year. Iran, however received £9.1 million in royalties and taxation for the 
same year, whereas the proportions in 1947 were £16.8 million and £7.1 million 
respectively
540
. Moreover, it worth noting that the total shares for the Iranian 
government was 16.7%, implying that 83.3% accrued to British equity interests; with 
the British Government‟s share predominating. 
It is crucial to note that, as argued by Penrose, when firms are vertically 
integrated, the entire integrated group is the relevant unit for the calculation of 
profitability and any profit or loss generating from the intermediate stages would be 
relevant only for internal accounting purposes or for taxation
541
. In this case, 
however, we do not have very complete and detailed historical financial information 
about the affiliates of AIOC in the underdeveloped countries and it is perhaps partly 
for this reason that the accounting analysis does not include the accounts generating 
from the AIOC subsidiaries. Meanwhile, the bulk of the AIOC income is derived 
from the production of crude oil and its refining, calculated on the basis of petroleum 
activities in Iran but the income has not been traced beyond that region to the final 
consumers. The analysis therefore does not include income derived from transport 
and marketing outside the region. 
Similar analyses were conducted for financial years 1949 and 1950 illustrating 
that the total profits of AIOC constituted a formidable sum in the Iranian economy 
and the Iranian government‟s share in the profits was relatively very small, as 
illustrated in Tables (7) and (8). 
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1947 figures from Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 325; 1950 figures 
calculated from table 4. 
541
 Penrose, The large International firm in developing countries, 153. 
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Table 7: Stakeholder shares of AIOC profits, 1949 
A) Geographical distribution of AIOC activity 
Country 
Crude production 
(Tons) 
Refined 
(Tons) Total (Tons) % 
Iran (i) 26,807 23245 50052 84.58% 
Kuwait 5,625 118 5743 9.70% 
Iraq 1348 132 1480 2.50% 
Qatar   0 0.00% 
UK 45 1857 1902 3.21% 
Total 33825 25352 59177 100.00% 
 
B) Stakeholder shares of AIOC Profits 
1949 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 
 
Iranian 
Gov. 
British 
Gov. 
Other AIOC 
shareholders 
Estimated 
Iranian 
Estimated 
Non-
Iranian 
Total per 
accounts 
Royalties 13489   13489  13489 
Ordinary dividend  2618 2516 5134 906 6040 
Preference dividend   910 910 161 1071 
Reserve 
Appropriations  4769 4582 9350 1650 11000 
Retained profit  121 116 237 42 279 
Minorities and 
subsidiaries  23 22 46 8 54 
UK taxation: profits  5614  5614 991 6605 
UK taxation: 
dividend income tax  13800  13800 2435 16235 
       
Total (ii) 13489 26945 8146 48580 6193 54773 
% Share 27.77% 55.47% 16.77% 100.00%   
      13489 
Accounting Profit 
(iii)      41284 
Sources: Annual Report, 1949 
Notes: 
i) Division of profits between Iranian and Non-Iranian activities allocated pro-rata from Panel A estimates. 
ii) Profits are allocated as 1948. 
iii) £41,284 is the profit for the year before tax taken from the annual report and accounts 
1949, p.6. 
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As shown above in Table (7), above, relating to 1949, the British government 
received a massive amount of taxes in this year: the British Treasury accrued £26.9 
million in tax revenue, whilst Iran received £13.5 million in royalties and tax 
revenue. It is worth noting that the total share for the Iranian government was 27.8%, 
implying that 72.2% accrued to British equity interests; with the British 
Government‟s share predominating. However, it is worth highlighting the fact that 
the Iranian royalties increased in 1949 by 4.4 million and the British equity interests 
declined by 11.5%
542
. The above explains how the AIOC had enriched itself with the 
proceeds of their operations in Iran and failed to generate significant new loan or 
equity capital for the Iranians. 
  
                                                 
542
 As illustrated in Tables 3 and 4, the Iranian royalties increased from £9.1 million in 1948 to 13.5 
million in 1949 and the British equity interests declined from 83.35% in 1948 to 72.2% in 1949. 
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Table 8: Stakeholder shares of AIOC profits, 1950 
A) Geographical distribution of AIOC activity 
Country 
Crude 
production 
(Tons) 
Refined 
(Tons) Total (Tons) % 
Iran (i) 31750 24050 55800 80.15% 
Kuwait 7367 1054 8421 12.10% 
Iraq 1681  1681 2.41% 
Qatar 380  380 0.55% 
UK 46 3291 3337 4.79% 
Total 41224 28395 69619 100.00% 
 
B) Stakeholder shares of AIOC Profits     
1950 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 
 
Iranian 
Gov. 
British 
Gov. 
Other AIOC 
shareholders 
Estimated 
Iranian 
Estimated 
non-Iranian 
Total per 
accounts 
Royalties 16032   16032  16032 
Ordinary dividend  2464 2368 4832 1208 6040 
Preference dividend   857 857 214 1071 
Reserve 
Appropriations  10608 10192 20800 5200 26000 
Retained profit  -3 -3 -6 -2 -8 
Minorities and 
subsidiaries  268 258 526 131 657 
UK taxation: profits  9368  9368 2342 11710 
UK taxation: 
dividend 
 income tax  31197  31197 7799 38996 
       
Total (ii) 16032 53902 13671 83605 16893 100498 
% Share 19.18% 64.47% 16.35% 100.00%   
      16032 
Accounting Profit(iii)      84466 
Sources: Annual Report, 1950 
Notes:      
i) Division of profits between Iranian and Non-Iranian activities allocated pro-rata from Panel A estimates. 
ii) Profits are allocated as 1948 and 1949. 
iii) £84,466 is the profit for the year before tax taken from the annual report and accounts 1950, p.6.   
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As can be seen in Table (8), relating to 1950, the total share for the Iranian 
government dropped to 19.2%, implying that 80.8% accrued to British equity 
interests, with the British Government‟s share predominating. The British 
government received a massive amount of taxes in 1950 because the British Treasury 
accrued £53.9 million in tax revenue (from AIOC) whilst Iran received £16.0 million 
in royalties and tax revenue. Thus, the above implies that in spite of the £2.5 million 
increase in royalties in 1950, the Iranian government share decreased by 8.6 % and 
the share of British equity increased by 8.8%, demonstrating that the AIOC had 
enriched itself with the proceeds from their operations in Iran. In addition to the 
above evidence, the Majlis deputy, Allahyar Saleh, addressed the fact that AIOC was 
accumulating exorbitant profits at Iran‟s expense enabling it “to self-finance a host of 
other profitable companies”. He summarised his opinion by stating that Iran had 
earned from her oil no more than crumbs and said that Iranians “are not prepared… 
to finance other people‟s dreams of empire from our resources”543. In a similar vein, 
Makins, deputy under secretary at the Foreign Office, expected the company‟s 
statement to “cause a furore” because “the gross profit and the deduction of the 
United Kingdom taxation have more than doubled in relation to the figures of 1949”.  
By contrast, Iranian royalties had increased from £13.5 million in 1949 to only £16 
million
544
.  
In 1950, Northcroft met Musaddiq informally and took the opportunity to put the 
company‟s case. In a note of the meeting, Northcroft recorded that he gave Musaddiq 
figures that revealed that Iran‟s income was larger than that of the British 
Government and that he “suggested that the shareholders of the Company, who after 
all were the owners, were probably the most hard done by of all, as for the last year 
or so they had been only receiving something like 5% of the Company‟s annual 
profits as a return for their investment”545. However, as illustrated in Table 8(b), the 
empirical evidence illustrates that the contrary was true, because the shareholders 
were receiving 16.35% of the company‟s annual profits and not 5%. 
The company seems to have deliberately misled the Iranians by giving them 
incorrect information. This was presumably because it was alert to the fact that the 
Iranian government would make made a strong case in support of their contention 
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that the profit-sharing element of their royalty was not in practice working in the way 
they expected. This assumption would provoke in them a strong feeling of 
grievance
546
. Within the above context, it is clear that Fraser used his statement in the 
annual reports as a piece of propaganda to present the Iranian Government as 
unreasonable and to portray his generosity, by the proposed deal for increased 
royalty payments under the Supplemental Agreement of 1949, as “the most 
advantageous offered to any country then producing oil in the Middle East”547. 
Fraser criticised Razmara‟s secretive behaviour548. On the Iranian side, Razmara‟s 
objective was to avoid a conflict with the British and keep the details of the 50/50 
discussions secret as a result, in part because he feared public opinion would be 
disappointed if aware that anything less than nationalisation were being 
considered
549
.  
On a literal reading of this statement in the context of the explosive situation, it 
can only be concluded that Fraser did not understand Razmara‟s royalist political 
objectives and the essential role of secrecy if they were to be achieved. As the AIOC 
was intended to be a principal beneficiary of the secrecy, it is difficult to comprehend 
the views of Fraser. Moreover, Shepherd later admitted that he had written „the gist‟ 
of Razmara‟s speech to the Oil Committee on 3rd March550. Alternatively, and 
perhaps equally unlikely, is that Fraser simply misunderstood the mood of the Iranian 
people: such misjudgement was symptomatic of paternalist colonial attitudes. A 
more likely interpretation therefore is the role of the Chairman‟s statement as a piece 
of propaganda, in which the public face of a „reasonable‟ company is portrayed, and, 
consistent with the wider British discourse, nationalism is treated as inconsequential 
and ephemeral
551
. 
Perceived unfairness of profit distribution and Iranians‟ strong mistrust of the 
AIOC led to deep bitterness against imperialism and were the precursor for the 
vigorous and ever-growing desire for autonomy and nationalisation. Britain feared 
that the existing political situation in Iran could threaten the flow of oil from Iran, 
which would negatively affect the production and exports of the company, and so 
                                                 
546
 BP 126407, Report on visit to Tehran 31
st
 August to 26
th
 October 1948, 48. 
547
 AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, 1950, 13. 
548
 Ibid. 
549
 Ansari,  Modern Iran since 1921, 111. 
550
 Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 80. 
551
Ansari, A. M. Modern Iran since 1921, 112. 
 124 
considered nationalisation as a potential threat. In a similar vein, Morrison, Leader of 
the House of Commons and Foreign Secretary, asserted that  
If the Iranian oil supplies ceased to flow from Iran, the 
consequences upon the economy, the life, and the political and 
strategic future of wide areas throughout the world would be 
disastrous, since about a quarter of oil products which AIOC 
draws comes from Abadan
552
.  
A series of unsuccessful negotiations culminated in the subsequent ratification of 
nationalisation of AIOC‟s Iranian assets by Musaddiq on 1st May 1951. Musaddiq 
believed that the only means of escape from the company‟s oppression was to 
nationalise the AIOC‟s holdings553. The repercussions were potentially serious, not 
just for the company, which lost a significant proportion of its assets, but for wider 
regional, and indeed global, geopolitics.  
4.3.4 Royalties 
Royalties were paid by the AIOC to Iran in return for taking away minerals from 
their exhaustible natural deposits, and they should reflect either a proportion of 
mineral output or a fixed sum based on the volume of production
554
. The basis of 
calculation and the amount of royalties received by the Iranian Government were key 
issues. Penrose has pointed out that in the period 1930-9:  
Royalty and tax payments to the Iranian Government 
substantially exceeded income tax payments to the British 
Government and amounted in total to nearly two-thirds of the 
net profit after tax of the Company
555
.  
For the period, the tax and royalties paid to Iran were £22,134,000 compared with 
UK income tax of £8,749,000 and net profit of £35,754,000
556
. AIOC management 
argued that Iran was in a sound position financially and had always managed to 
balance her national budget, since royalties had formed a reserve on which the 
government could draw for special purposes
557
. But meanwhile, Jacks pointed out to 
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Fraser that, after the Second World War, the Iranian government became unhappy 
with the concession and with the Supplemental Agreement because it was eager to 
improve the royalty terms
558
.  
The Iranian government received royalties representing half of the company‟s 
post-tax proceeds, while the British government received over double this amount in 
taxes from AIOC. The proportions were then reversed, so that the AIOC paid much 
more company tax to the British government than it did in royalties to the Iranian 
government, a fact which was regarded with increasing concern in Iran
559
. The 
Iranian government was also conscious that the royalties paid for oil extraction in 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Venezuela were more favourable than those paid to the 
Iranian government. Therefore, Iranians thought that a comparison with the 
concessions granted in Venezuela during the same period would help to bring to light 
the poor bargain reached between the Iranian government and AIOC
560
.  
The Gidel Memorandum reiterated this point, claiming that:  
Total royalties earned by the Iranian government in the year 
1933 amounted to 33% of the price of all the petroleum 
extracted while for the year 1947 this ratio was in the 
neighbourhood of 9%
561
.  
Katouzian described the fall in royalties as “ridiculous” and “inexplicable”562. The 
Memorandum also claimed that if the same basis had been used for Iranian as for 
Venezuelan royalties, the 1947 payment would have been more than three times 
higher
563
. Ali Mansur proved unwilling to defend the Supplemental Agreement and 
remarked to Shepherd that a gesture by the company would be expected involving an 
increase in royalty payments
564
. Ali suggested that it would be expedient for the 
AIOC and the Iranian government to revise the terms and conditions of the 
concession satisfactorily
565
. To reinforce the point, Table (9) below compares the 
cost of oil production in Iran with that in Venezuela to examine whether the 
concession in Venezuela compares favourably or not with Iran. 
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Table 9: Comparison between the cost of oil production in Persia and that in 
Venezuela 
 Persia ($) Venezuela ($) 
Cost of production per ton 1 4.65 
Cost of transport to Europe 8.22  
Cost of transport to Europe and America  2.62 
Royalty 2.88 5.88 
Total 12.1 13.15 
Price in Europe 20  
Price, 35% in Europe and 65% in America  18.7 
Net profit of the companies 7.9 5.55 
Sources: BP 126343 Notes on Supplemental Agreement handed by Ali Mansur to Shepherd on 3
rd
 
June 1950, p.1. 
 
As noted from Table (9) above, the AIOC received $2.35 more per ton from 
Persia than the companies exploiting reserves in Venezuela, assuming that the 
Supplemental Agreement had been put into effect. This raises the question of why 
the AIOC‟s royalty payments to the Iranian government declined despite the 
company‟s higher profits in comparison to Venezuela? Was the AIOC‟s intention in 
this method of paying royalties to enhance the prosperity of the company alone?  
AIOC Chairman, Sir John Cadman, was concerned not to carry discussion on the 
royalty matter beyond a certain point
566
. AIOC was worried that any revised deal 
would be less advantageous to them than the present one: Fraser for instance 
commented in 1948 that it was the very last thing the company desired, as no new 
concession could ever be as favourable to the company as the one then in 
existence
567
. Furthermore, Gass was aware of the injustice of AIOC and declared that 
“the company‟s 1947 financial results added fuel to the fire” because he knew that 
the profit-sharing method of calculating royalties would invite curiosity and a wish 
by the Iranian government to interfere with the company‟s commercial transactions 
and accounting systems.
568
 The AIOC contended that it was unrealistic to make 
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comparisons over time or between countries
569
. Moreover, the company argued that 
Iran also benefited from the high level of the company‟s investment, from the 
amount of Rials it purchased annually and from its subsidization of cheap oil 
supplied to the Iranian Government
570
. AIOC claimed that its role first and foremost 
was as a commercial undertaking, committed both to heavy royalty and taxation 
payments to the Persian government and to dividend returns to its shareholders
571
.  
To provide further evidence concerning the Iranian claims, a financial analysis is 
conducted in Table (10) to assess the royalty estimates under different negotiating 
assumptions, applied to profits subject to the 1933 Agreement.  
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Table 10: Royalty estimates under different negotiating assumptions 
 A B C 
Date Total Pre-tax 
Profits 
Iranian government 
bid: 50/50 share of 
pre-tax profits 
Royalties paid under 
1933 Agreement 
1932 3.5 1.8 1.5 
1933 3.1 1.6 1.8 
1934 5.3 2.7 2.2 
1935 5.3 2.7 2.2 
1936 7.8 3.9 2.6 
1937 9.8 4.9 3.6 
1938 8.7 4.4 3.3 
1939 7.4 3.7 4.3 
1940 10.3 5.2 4.0 
1941 11.5 5.8 4.0 
1942 21.0 10.5 4.0 
1943 22.7 11.4 4.0 
1944 27.9 14.0 4.5 
1945 23.4 11.7 5.6 
1946 28.9 14.5 7.1 
1947 37.3 18.7 7.1 
1948 51.0 25.5 9.2 
1949 41.2 20.6 13.5 
1950 85.7 42.9 16.0 
Total 411.8 205.9 100.5 
Sources: Compiled from AIOC, Annual Reports and Accounts and Bamberg (1994), tables 1.2, 8.5, 
10.3, 12.1. 
 
Notes:  
i) All figures in £m.  
ii) Column A is compiled from Bamberg, The History of British Petroleum, table 1.2, 23; table 8.6, 
228 and table 10.3, 275. 
iii) Column A values are adjusted for inflation so this explains the difference in the computed 
Accounting profit figures in Tables 6, 7 & 8. 
iv) Column B estimates calculated under the fifty-fifty (50:50) share of pre-tax profits 
v) Column C is compiled from Bamberg, The History of British Petroleum, Table 12.1, 325. 
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Table (10) sets out the royalty shares under various negotiating assumptions. 
Column A shows the total pre-tax profits; column B illustrates the Iranian 
government bid to share 50% of total profits; and column C records the actual 
royalties paid under the 1933 Agreement. The Table highlights how the 1933 
Agreement was of marginal benefit to the Iranian government because the royalties 
due to the Iranian government in 1948 under the 1933 Agreement were £9.2m 
whereas, had the Iranian government demanded a 50% share of the pre-tax profits, it 
would have resulted in a payment of £25.5m to Iran. Therefore, a difference of 
approximately £16.3m represented a large increase on the existing agreement. 
Moreover, the royalties paid in 1950 under the 1933 Agreement were £16m; if they 
were renegotiated line with the Iranian government 50/50 bid, this would have 
resulted in a payment of £42.9m to Iran, a difference of approximately £26.9m which 
was large enough, from the Iranian point of view, to terminate the agreement. 
Consequently, the Iranians‟ lack of trust in AIOC accounting, coupled with the 
former‟s understanding that their bargaining position had led them to forego the sum 
of £26.9m, provided two important reasons behind the Iranians‟ nationalisation 
sentiment.  
4.3.5 Dividends 
Dividends were restricted as a result of post war limitations imposed on British 
companies by the British Government and the AIOC “could not as one of Britain‟s 
most prominent businesses realistically break ranks with government policy”572. In 
view of the dividend limitations imposed on AIOC arising from UK fiscal policy, the 
Iranian government indicated to the company that they were not satisfied with the 
existing arrangement under the concession whereby they received a yearly payment 
equal to 20% of the sum distributed to the ordinary shareholders
573
. Penrose pointed 
out that early in 1948; the AIOC had planned discussions with the Iranian 
government to remedy the apparent prejudice to Iran of the British government‟s 
policy of limiting dividend payments
574
. 
The Memorandum called for dividends payable to the Iranian government to be 
exempt from this restriction, claiming that “the restriction imposed on the amount of 
dividend on the company‟s shares on the authority of instructions issued by the 
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British government should not affect the shares of the Iranian government in the 
company‟s profits”575. Furthermore, Ali Mansur argued that the 20% rate paid to the 
Iranian government of dividend for ordinary shares had never been realised due to 
the British manipulation of their tax rate
576
. 
AIOC countered that the deferred participation in profits might not accord with 
the Iranian government‟s immediate interests because defining profits were a major 
difficulty which faced the company. The company pointed out that the amounts held 
back by the restriction were being held in reserve for the Iranian government and 
offered to make these funds available immediately
577
. Meanwhile, Fraser believed 
that the Iranian government might well be successful in bringing about an 
amendment to the concession so he proposed that an “ex gratia” payment should be 
made by the company to the Iranian government either by way of a loan or on 
account, being in effect a unilateral “gift” by the company without any sort of 
conditions, in order to forestall any problems
578
. Moreover, Gass aimed to convince 
the Iranian government that its share in the company‟s profits had been in no way 
affected by the policy of limiting dividends and claimed that the ex gratia payment 
offered by the company would be in the Iranians‟ best interests579. 
By restricting the dividend payments to shareholders and imposing taxes on the 
company, which were greater than Iranian royalties, British fiscal policy helped to 
fuel Iranian grievances about the AIOC‟s distribution of income580. This appears to 
provide evidence that Iranian claims were genuine, that certain features of the 
concession agreement were not operating in the way that was originally intended, 
and that AIOC, by making such claims, were merely defending their position. 
4.3.6 Subsidiaries (Establishments outside Iran) 
Iranians were dissatisfied with the insistence of AIOC on not consolidating the 
non-Iranian subsidiaries. Elm has pointed out that non-Iranian subsidiaries were not 
consolidated by the AIOC to deprive the Iranian government of profits generating 
from overseas operations
581
. Meanwhile, Penrose describes the exclusion of 
                                                 
575
 Gidel Memorandum, 1. 
576
 BP 126343, Notes on Supplemental Agreement handed by Ali Mansur to Shepherd on 3
rd
 June 
1950. 
577
 Gidel Memorandum, 8. 
578
 BP 101099, AIOC opinion on 20
th
 June 1948, 1. 
579
 BP 126407, Report on visit to Tehran 31
st
 August to 26
th
 October 1948, 29. 
580
 Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 326. 
581
 Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s oil nationalisation and its aftermath, 53. 
 131 
subsidiaries as “an important element of arbitrariness” in the realisation of profits, so 
that, for instance, profits might be realised in regimes with the lowest tax rates
582
. In 
fact, the company‟s statement of 1950 noted that  
The accounts of fifty-one subsidiary companies....have not 
been included in the Consolidated Accounts since your Directors 
are of the opinion that such consolidation would be 
misleading
583
.  
The above illustrates that the process of integrating subsidiaries is not only an 
economic process but also a political one and therefore affected by the main 
country‟s social and political dynamics. The AIOC produced 51 percent of the 
Middle East‟s oil, three-quarters of it from Iran and the other quarter shared between 
Iraq, Qatar and Kuwait. The remaining 49 percent was made up of 44.5 percent from 
American companies and 4.5 percent from Dutch and French companies
584
. This 
raises the question of why AIOC insisted on withholding profits earned outside Iran. 
The resource was Iranian, and the capital investment and other costs (except the 
initial historic costs) were met from the sale of Iranian resources- so why was the 
income retained by, or paid out to, Britons? 
Clearly, the treatment of subsidiaries was a matter of concern because of its 
implications for AIOC‟s profitability. The Memorandum invoked the Government‟s 
right upon expiry of the concession with regard to the subsidiaries
585
. In 1949 
Husayn Makki, who held office under General Zahedi (Musaddiq‟s successor), 
complained that the company accounts did not mention the capital employed in its 37 
subsidiaries
586
. Moreover, in 1950 Musaddiq attacked the company‟s treatment of its 
subsidiaries from two angles. Firstly, AIOC could not withhold its profit from 
Iranian royalties on the basis that it had been earned outside Iran, bearing in mind 
that the majority of its earnings were Iranian. Musaddiq pointed out that, in its 
balance sheet for 1948, the AIOC had about £28,000,000 worth of shares in its 
subsidiary and combined companies and in respect of these shares it received only 
£2,000,000, which implied that the amount received was not above 7% of the 
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investment which totally belonged to Iranian oil resources
587
. Secondly, Musaddiq 
argued that the subsidiaries were in any case financed with Iranian profits. For 
instance, the profits of the British Tanker company, (a shipping company for Iranian 
oil, whose capital had been provided by the AIOC) were at least £10,000,000 in 
1949. From this amount it gave only £240,000 to the parent company, although 
£4,000,000 of the earnings from Iranian oil had been invested in that company
588
. 
The AIOC countered that it was willing to protect its overseas investments and 
maintain control over its assets, an idea as important to them as nationalisation was 
to the Iranians
589
. Gass was aware that the Iranian government was very concerned 
about the establishment of subsidiaries outside Iran, believing that the government 
was looking to maximise its revenue from expansion of operations and of refining 
capacity from within Iran. This would have been very desirable from the Iranians‟ 
viewpoint, furthering their policy of raising the level of employment and increasing 
the rate of foreign exchange
590
. However, the company responded by stressing that 
the “fundamental difference” between its establishments inside and outside Iran was 
that the former would revert to the Iranian government, but that there was no 
question of allowing the latter to do so
591
. In short, the AIOC was not willing to 
consolidate the non-Iranian subsidiaries to maintain control over their assets. 
4.3.7 The financial inspection of the companys books 
Ferrier has pointed out that, as part of Persia‟s dividend was based on 20% of the 
company‟s profits, the Iranian government must certainly be aware of the company‟s 
accounts and have the right to ask the company to furnish information similar to that 
given to auditors
592
. Sir William McLintock, a professional accountant and one of the 
leading figures in his profession, issued a report disclosing certain undoubted errors 
and irregularities of accounting which had resulted in underpayment of royalties to 
the Iranian government
593
. McLintock‟s report reflected unfavourably on the AIOC 
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but his comments were directed not so much towards the company as to the auditors 
who were, in a sense, his professional rivals.
594
 
The Gidel Memorandum claimed that, in order to supervise the operation of the 
Concession and check the calculation of its royalty and dividend share, the 
Government needed to “examine the Company‟s books and accounts and should 
acquire prior information with regard to such transactions and decisions as affect the 
rights of Iran”595. Ali Mansur was astonished that the owner of oil wells should not 
be confined as much as the auditors were
596
. Makki complained in 1949 about the 
quality of AIOC reporting and he emphasised that, under the D‟Arcy concession, 
Iran had had the right to examine all the technical and financial information of the 
company
597
. Razmara in 1950 called for the admission of a government auditor to 
their Head Office books
598
.  
These demands caused alarm for AIOC who argued that experts would always 
differ in defining gross profits because of the very many factors involved and that it 
would be quite impracticable to make the conclusion of purely commercial 
transactions subject to government approval
599
. British representatives were unhappy 
with the above-mentioned Iranian aims and consequently Gass claimed that Iranians 
were seeking control over their commercial transactions, accountancy, construction 
programme, the entry of foreign employees and even their management
600
. 
Meanwhile, Northcroft resisted the Iranian demands and stressed to Razmara that the 
books were kept in London and audited in accordance to British law by a firm of 
Chartered Accountants of unquestionable integrity, at the forefront of their 
profession
601
. He also pointed out that stockholders who had put all their money in 
the company had taken all the risk for nearly half a century and accepted the 
company‟s accounts without any question.  These stockholders, he claimed, had 
received little enough in comparison with other participators
602
. 
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 The discussion ended with Northcroft rejecting the idea of inspection of accounts, 
saying: 
If the Iranian government is allowed to access their central 
ledgers which contain confidential information about the affairs 
of other sovereign governments and large foreign commercial 
undertakings, it would mitigate the resentment of those parties 
because their affairs are being subjected to scrutiny by a foreign 
government
603
.  
According to the 1948 Companies Act
604
, shareholders had the right to access 
companies‟ registers of shareholders and directors so they could see who these were, 
and also access audited accounts. The shareholders did not have access, however, to 
the financial accounts, so Iranian understanding of the performance of AIOC would 
depend on what the auditors considered “true and fair” information. Thus, the Iranian 
request was nevertheless reasonable in the context of Iranian willingness to make an 
assessment of the alternatives. The AIOC was alert to the fact that the Iranian 
government had made a strong case in support of their contention that the profit-
sharing element of their royalty had not been fairly calculated and this was the main 
reason for their often repeated wish to scrutinise the company accounts.  
4.3.8 The price of oil products  
In view of the importance of cheap fuel in the economic life of Iran, it was 
necessary that the sale price of petrol in Persia should not be more than to the British 
Admiralty or to the American companies. As a result, the Memorandum highlighted 
the importance of reaching a decision in regards to the price of marketing of 
petroleum products within Iran
605
. The Iranian government representatives 
maintained their objection and continued to press for some formula which would 
ensure reduced prices to all Iranian consumers
606
. Moreover, Razmara said that their 
retail prices in Iran were too high and should not exceed the rates that are charged to 
the British Admiralty or the Royal Air Force
607
. 
Gass was aware of the Iranian attitude and was fairly sure that this objection was 
one that that Razmara hoped to announce to the Majlis, but he feared that this sort of 
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price adjustment could cost the company a huge sum of money per annum
608
. The 
AIOC countered, in the Memorandum, with claims that the company‟s intention 
under the concession was to ensure the sale of oil in Iran to yield to the suppliers a 
reasonable commercial return
609
. Meanwhile, the company argued that there were 
mutual benefits to buyer and seller to be obtained from concluding long term, large- 
scale contracts and by accepting a reduced price in return for an assured market
610
. 
The dispute over the price of oil indicates convincingly that the AIOC was master 
of the environment in which it operated, controlling the price of oil products to its 
own advantage. Because of this, there appeared to be very little opportunity for the 
Iranian government to control the pricing of oil.  
4.3.9 Period of the concession 
At the time of the amendment of the D‟Arcy concession two matters received the 
attention of the two parties more than other subjects: on the part of the Iranian 
government the question of royalties and on the company‟s part the question of the 
period of the concession. As described in Chapter 2, the AIOC claimed that the 
Iranian oil industry had been built up on the strength of an agreement entered into 
freely between the Iranian Government and the company, to last until 1993 unless it 
was cancelled as a consequence of default by the company in performance of the 
agreement
611
. The company knew that it would be of great advantage to obtain a 
substantial extension to the D‟Arcy concession612. Penrose has pointed out that it 
would be inconceivable for the Iranian government to extend the period of the 
concession  
Hence it is not feasible for any business firm to make a 
capital investment for a return on which it would have to wait 60 
years where the present value of anything in 60 years would 
have little relevance for current investment decisions
613
.  
The Memorandum attached extreme importance to the negotiation of the period of 
the concession because the period of the D‟Arcy concession would have expired in 
1962, whereas the 1933 concession laid down that it should be valid for 60 years 
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from that date. Another point which the Iranians were willing to consider was that, 
with the D‟Arcy concession, all the property and establishments of the company 
anywhere in the world would, on the expiry of the concession, revert to Iran but 
under the 1933 concession, this right was limited to the company‟s properties in 
Iran
614
.  
The AIOC was aware of the injustice that was facing Iran in respect of the period 
of the concession. In order to defend the company against such an accusation, Gass 
claimed:  
That it seemed to be improper to compare the relative merits 
of two concession agreements, one of which had replaced the 
other by mutual agreement
615
.  
Moreover, the company argued that extending the period of the existing 
concession certainly meant that the company would be able to draw on Iranian 
petroleum reserves for a further thirty years which would not be carried out free of 
charge but in return for payments which had been agreed between the company and 
the Iranian government
616
.  
The AIOC thus sought to remain in control of Iranian oil resources by planning to 
extend the period of the existing concession. Clearly, the AIOC was not prepared to 
give up any of its control and share power with the Iranians and as a consequence the 
company justified its position by arguing that its presence in Iran was not free of 
charge. 
4.3.10 Company’s shares 
The Memorandum invoked the Iranian government‟s desire to convert Iran‟s 
participation in the company‟s reserves into the form of shares of the company, as in 
the case of shareholders
617
. The AIOC countered that the capitalisation of reserves by 
the issue of ordinary shares in no way enhanced the earning capacity of either a 
company or the total sums available for distribution to shareholders
618
. Moreover, the 
company contended that in any event the Iranian government‟s participation rights 
were fully secured, regardless of the nominal holding of shares “since these rights are 
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related to the total amount allocated for distribution to ordinary shareholders and not 
to the proportion paid out per individual share”619.  
The above illustrates that the AIOC was not willing to issue ordinary shares to the 
Iranian government and preferred to retain the money in the company‟s reserve. As 
always, the company was unwilling to compromise in order to satisfy the Iranian 
requirements, all the while giving reasons which defended its own point of view.  
4.4 Tactical Plans of AIOC to face Iranian accusations: Empirical 
Evidence 
Gass and other AIOC representatives attended the meetings in which the contents 
of the government‟s Memorandum were discussed and each party kept its own 
record of the detailed minutes of each meeting. The different items discussed in the 
Memorandum were grouped broadly by subject, by Gass
620
. It is important to note 
that the company was annoyed by the Memorandum, and that Gass was astonished 
when he learnt that the full version of the Memorandum occupied fifty pages. Gass 
pointed out that the summary was compiled from some fifty pages of detailed 
grievances against the company, including views expressed from time to time by 
deputies, the press and others. These grievances were symptomatic of the strong 
feeling of nationalism that had arisen in the country. It is a struggle which would 
unfold through the coming years
621
.  
In a similar vein, Gass highlighted that acceptance of some of the novel 
interpretations within this Memorandum would amount in fact to drastic revisions of 
the concession. He indicated that the AIOC should make it clear that it would not 
accept any novel interpretations of the concession or any suggestions of claims in 
regard to the past
622
.  
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It is worth noting that Gass communicated with Fraser immediately after the 25-
point Memorandum had been handed to him, asserting that 
It is a summary comprising 25 points for discussion and is a 
very rambling Memorandum drawn up in a rather rudimentary 
way. Some of the points for discussion are of a trivial and 
departmental nature such as payment of income tax by foreign 
contractors employed by us [AIOC] and safeguarding Iran‟s 
rights in respect of Naft-i-shah in view of its contiguity to Naft 
Ehaneh. Others are very radical and novel interpretations of the 
concession and comparisons between present concession and 
D‟Arcy concession. Question of gold premium and taxation 
payable to the British government are prominent items
623
. 
Gass feared the dangers that could be brought up by the press and the consequent 
feeling of insecurity that might be created in the minds of shareholders. As a result 
he told the Prime Minister that the sense of antagonism between the government and 
the company portrayed to the rest of the world by the press could be responsible for 
the future insecurity of the company
624
. In the interim, he was aware that the 
Memorandum attracted nationwide attention not only from Iran and that many 
staunch friends and supporters of the company in Iran shared the same belief, even if 
to a lesser degree
625
. Therefore, Gass and the other AIOC representatives had clear 
aims and objectives in mind to justify the existence of the company‟s operations and 
they set a tactical plan. They started by convincing the Iranian government that it was 
in their interests to adhere to the existing methods of payments and principles 
established in the present concession. Moreover, they planned to resist retrospective 
claims, arguing that they had observed the terms of the concession and intended to 
decline to discuss legal or accounting questions
626
.  
The company planned to adopt a two-stage negotiation as a matter of caution, and 
advised Gass to act accordingly. From the tactical angle a two (or more) stage 
negotiation meant treating the discussions throughout as exploratory, extracting from 
the Iranian Government as much information as possible, to gauge its mood, whilst 
not revealing what the company might be prepared to do. The company could then 
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use all its persuasive powers to convince the Iranian government that the principles 
and the methods in the existing concession were in the latter‟s best interests627.  
One of the tactical methods adopted by the AIOC management was to have a 
government which could be assured of a following in the Majlis, and a Minister of 
Finance who had the advantage of continuity of knowledge of the company‟s 
affairs
628
. Consequently, Gass maintained a close relationship with the British 
ambassador, Sir John Le Rougetel, who had been helpful and gave constructive 
suggestions on the current issues and who critically analysed political affairs
629
. He 
also maintained good relations with  Abdul Husayn Hazhir, Prime Minister of Iran, 
June-November 1948, who declared to Gass that he had been most careful, whilst 
Minister of Finance, to deal departmentally with any differences with the company 
and to keep them away from the press
630
. After the removal of Hazhir as Minister of 
Finance, who was succeeded by Forouhar, the company made all efforts to keep in 
touch with the new Minister of Finance and to remain informed of committee 
proceedings. Forouhar met Northcroft weekly to give him the details of the 
discussions raised in the Majlis and of the personal views of Musaddiq that emerged 
during the meeting
631
. For instance, when Forouhar had been asked by Musaddiq 
about his opinion on the losses incurred by the AIOC in the 1933 concession and 
whether he would carry on with such losses or whether the concession should 
terminate, Forouhar had already discussed the matter exhaustively with Northcroft, 
to tell him privately whether he was in favour of any alterations, deletions or 
additions
632
.  
Forouhar distorted facts and defended the operations of the company, with the aim 
of getting the Supplemental Agreement ratified in the next Majlis. He told Northcroft 
that the deputies were now in a highly excitable and nervous state and he proposed to 
procrastinate a little
633
. Firstly, he claimed that the D‟Arcy concession had been 
cancelled by Iran and replaced by a new agreement which left no opportunity for 
compromise regarding the means to be adopted in assessing the Iranian government‟s 
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share
634
. With regard to the Admiralty contract, Forouhar claimed that it was 
universal business practice to refrain from giving advantage to competitors by 
disclosing detailed figures of sales contracts entered into with other parties. Finally, 
he defended the performance of the company by claiming that the company‟s affairs 
were conducted in the interests of all the beneficiaries by the shrewdest judges in the 
world and it would be ridiculous to suppose that a management with such a record 
would conclude contracts at unjustifiably low rates, even if this would not have been 
to Iran‟s disadvantage635. 
Forouhar could be regarded as a puppet for the AIOC as he frequently updated the 
company with the news of the Majlis and asked the former‟s advice on what to do 
and say. Consequently, Musaddiq commented in the Iranian newspaper 
“ITTILA‟AT” on Forouhar‟s misleading and incorrect attitude by asserting that:  
The Supplemental Agreement does not vindicate the rights of 
the nation. Not only does it not secure Iran‟s interests, but it will 
also deprive the nation of its rights. In spite of its defects and 
disadvantages in reply to my question, the Minister of Finance 
gave a misleading and incorrect reply in order to satisfy 
opponents and to deceive some of the members of the 
committee. As his reply could be used as evidence by those who 
are not competent to perform their national duties, and as I was 
ill and could not attend today‟s committee meeting for giving 
oral explanations, I wrote down my opinion for the information 
of committee members. In order that the nation may be aware of 
my last defence before the committee, I give the full text of my 
explanations for publication in your paper
636
.   
The AIOC management adopted various tactical plans to achieve their own 
interests and get the Supplemental Agreement Bill ratified in the next Majlis, to the 
detriment of Iranian rights. 
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4.5 Response of Fraser to Iranian accusations: Empirical Evidence  
Fraser was aware that the existing concession gave advantage to the AIOC. He 
therefore stressed that the company should not request the amendment of the current 
concession on the grounds that a new concession would never be as favourable to the 
company as the one now in existence
637
. Fraser feared Iranian claims for re-
distributions of the company‟s profits in which the Iranian government should take 
part
638
. Historical evidence reveals that Fraser was keen to safeguard the current 
concession and that he did not wish for any change to the situation. For instance, 
Fraser had disclosed: 
I thought the fact was that we had favourable terms- our 
royalty payments, taxation position etc., all seemed favourable 
relative to others and I felt that if I had to open up the whole 
question of the concession I would very likely get demands from 
the Iranian government to bring the terms more in line with what 
is being paid in other countries…..I stated that my feeling was 
that the really important thing for us was to try to safeguard the 
terms of the concession for the post-war period. I mentioned that 
if concession terms were opened up doubtless the American 
advisers would now take a part in the negotiations
639
.  
Foreign Office officials, as well as the Americans, urged Fraser to propose to Iran 
a fifty-fifty profit-sharing but he remained unwilling to take this step and expressed 
his irritation towards the Americans, stating that they had not been helpful in 
Tehran
640
. In fact, Fraser was unwilling to accept the fifty-fifty profit sharing 
proposal and believed that there was no need to give Iran any concessions. He 
demonstrated this attitude by saying that “Fifty-fifty is a fine slogan, but it seems to 
be of dubious practicality”641.  
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However, Fraser did not disclose the truth in his statement to stockholders and 
asserted:  
Despite the Company‟s endeavours to persuade the Prime 
Minister to make known in Iran both the company‟s offer to 
reopen negotiations for a fifty-fifty profit sharing scheme and its 
action in undertaking to make advances, General Razmara 
refused to do so and maintained the closest secrecy regarding 
both matters
642
.  
Razmara‟s objective was to avoid a conflict with the British authorities and keep 
the details of the fifty-fifty discussions secret, in part because he feared public 
opinion would be disappointed if aware that anything less than nationalisation were 
being considered
643
. Razmara was convinced that the present time was not opportune 
for securing the ratification of the Supplemental Agreement and it would be defeated 
if it were to be put in the next Majlis so he thought of waiting six months, at which 
time the ratification could be carried in the Majlis
644
. Razmara planned to set up an 
entirely a new Ministry under the title “Ministry of Mines” to be entrusted with the 
conduct of all matters concerning the AIOC, which, at that time, came within the 
province of the Ministry of Finance
645
. However, it can be concluded that Fraser did 
not understand Razmara‟s royalist political objectives and the essential role of 
secrecy to be achieved.  
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, Fraser‟s strategy was to use financial 
reporting as propaganda to portray a reasonable company in front of the public whilst 
depicting nationalism as insignificant and short-lived
646
. Fraser was vigilant and 
influenced the lobbying process to counter the Iranian accusations and maintain 
various stakeholders‟ confidence by using the annual reports as a means of 
communication and a part of a wider propaganda battle. He was aware of the fact 
that Reports of listed company Annual General Meetings, at which the Chairman 
would also present the published statement, appear in the national press
647
. Fraser‟s 
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communication with the shareholders is an important issue and thus the key to an 
understanding of the company‟s portrayal of itself and its actions. Did he wish to 
appear resolute or accommodating, determined or responsive; how far was he 
aligning his behaviour with British interests generally; and, finally, was he open to 
further negotiation with Iran?  
With reference to Fraser‟s statement in the 1950 report which was published in 
19
th
 November 1951
648
, it is clear that he was aiming to avoid the wrath of AIOC 
shareholders and maintain their confidence. Fraser convinced the investors, both 
potential and actual, that the risk of nationalisation had decreased. He therefore 
advised the shareholders to be aware of the fact that nationalisation made the 
company less profitable for a while but claimed this would not affect their dividends. 
Fraser stated: 
However, after reviewing all the circumstances, I feel I can 
say that unless there is some wholly unforeseen happening in the 
remaining few weeks of this year the company will be in a 
position to pay the same rate of dividend on the ordinary stock 
for 1951 as has been paid for some years past
649
.  
Meanwhile, Fraser informed the shareholders that: 
New arrangements had been made because of the situation in 
Iran, described earlier in this statement; there have been 
important developments during the current year in the 
company‟s widespread interests and operations outside the 
country
650
.  
The momentum behind the AIOC‟s new strategy involved switching the 
company‟s exploration efforts towards Alaska and the North Sea to overcome any 
threats to its existence
651
. Fraser believed that the best chance of delivering 
something which would be of any value to the shareholders of the company would be 
by the company itself negotiating some new and quick bargain
652
.  
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Consequently, he reported in his 1950 Chairman‟s Statement that on hearing of 
the improvements in the Saudi Arabian Agreement concession  
The company lost no time in communicating to General Ali 
Razmara, the prime Minister, its willingness to examine with the 
Iranian Government suggestions for a new agreement on similar 
lines…There was no question of the Company being behindhand 
or less generous
653
.  
However, the records show that the reverse is true and that again he distorted the 
facts in this statement to maintain the shareholders‟ confidence. For instance, he 
refused to improve the terms that the AIOC had offered to Iran by going beyond the 
Supplemental Agreement, claiming that “one penny more and the company goes 
broke”654. Moreover, he asserted that any more concessions “would leave nothing in 
the till”655. It worth noting that the view of the Times correspondent was that Fraser‟s 
statement of 19
th
 November 1951 “is conciliatory and restrained in tone. It burns no 
bridges”656.  
As previously illustrated in Chapter 3, for more emphasis from the AIOC annual 
reports, counts of keywords for the annual reports published in 1950 and 1951 were 
examined to contrast Fraser‟s use of different groups of words and vocabulary that 
are particularly relevant to an understanding of the AIOC‟s self-presentation and 
response to the shareholders. The software DICTION
657
 has been used, as indicated 
below, to examine the incidence of a number of significant terms in the AIOC‟s 
annual reports pre-and post-nationalisation, with the aim of investigating how far 
their vocabulary was adapted as a response to circumstances. Table (11) below gives 
a brief summary of a textual analysis of Fraser‟s Statement to the shareholders. It 
contrasts keyword counts for the annual reports published in 1950 and 1951, in order 
to examine the validity of the statements with reference to historical evidence from 
the AIOC annual reports.  
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Table 11: Specific word counts 
Keyword 
Pre-nationalisation 
1950 
Post-nationalisation 
1951 
Profit † 11 
Agreement 19 26 
Sources: AIOC Annual Reports and Accounts, 1949 and 1950, Statement to Stockholders by the 
Chairman, 11-19 and 9-30 respectively. 
 
Notes:  
Counts performed using DICTION software
658
. 
† counts of <3 (in a standard 500-word passage) are ignored by the DICTION software. Nouns only. 
 
As shown in Table (11), the specific word counts contrast Fraser‟s use of different 
groups of words and vocabulary that are particularly relevant to an understanding of 
the AIOC‟s self-presentation. For instance, the word “agreement” was used 26 times 
during nationalisation (1951) compared with 19 times in 1950, suggesting  that 
Fraser aimed to demonstrate to the public that he was seeking to reach an agreement 
with Iran which was difficult to achieve. For instance, he disclosed in his statement 
in 1951 that he found it impossible to make a deal with Musaddiq and “....all efforts 
to reach a friendly settlement having proved abortive”659. Furthermore, he asserted 
that  
There seemed no immediate prospect of reaching agreement 
with the Iranian government, either for arrangements to enable 
large scale activity of the industry to be restored, or for the 
assessment and payment of compensation to the company
660
.  
 
Moreover, according to the above table, the frequency of the word “profit” 
increased to 11 times in 1951, which was much higher than in 1950. This indicates 
that Fraser‟s use of the word “profit” was comparatively higher during 
nationalisation to reassure the investors.  
From the above, it is clear that Fraser‟s tactical plan was to distort facts and not to 
reveal to the public his desire to maintain full control over Iran. He was willing to be 
seen as a key visible figure within the AIOC by making public statements and 
                                                 
658
 Hart, DICTION 5.0: The Text-analysis Programme that analyses rhetoric and was used in this 
research as a computerized content analysis approach.  
659
 AIOC annual report 1950, 16. 
660
AIOC Annual Report 1953, 16. 
 146 
speeches which were not only calculated to enhance his own personal image, but 
also, crucially, to portray the company to the public as fair. In addition, the AIOC 
became more aggressive in buying advertising space in the newspapers
661
 as a 
response to the nationalisation crisis, to publicize its preferred policies and to 
maintain a flourishing image to the public, regardless of nationalisation.  
4.6 Summary 
As the existence of the AIOC depended on power and control, the contrast of the 
powerful AIOC with the weak Iranian government provides interesting evidence 
about the AIOC‟s industrial dominance in Iran. To illustrate the role of the company 
as an arm of the British Empire, this chapter reviewed the evidence on accusations of 
unfairness in the distribution of profits from oil production with reference to the 
Memorandum and other major neglected documents to examine the Iranian claims 
and the AIOC counter claims.  
The recurrent themes of the clash between the Iranian government and the AIOC 
were the unfairness of the royalty and tax payments made by the company. Iran 
stressed that the AIOC used an unfair basis – quantity of oil production rather than 
profit – to calculate royalties, and keep down the dividend payable to the Iranian 
Government, using  accounting practices which overstated the charge to reserves. A 
related concern of the Iranian government was that the AIOC reports concealed the 
performance of subsidiaries. Iranians argued that it the AIOC‟s deliberate intention 
to adopt this method of royalty payments, thereby allowing the company to retain 
very large amounts of reserves. This would naturally result in a significant growth in 
the company‟s prosperity at the expense of Iran. Meanwhile, they argued that the 
process of integrating and ignoring the performance of subsidiaries was not only an 
economic process but also a political one, through which the British Government had 
an impact on the behaviour of the AIOC in Iran and deprived the Iranian government 
of profits it generated from overseas operations. The AIOC‟s argument was that the 
accounting records which the Iranians sought were potentially misleading because 
the data depended so heavily on judgement, explaining the company‟s consistent 
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invocation of quantity rather than profit as a basis for royalties. In any case, AIOC 
representatives contended, Iran should be considering not solely its income from tax 
and royalties, but also the variety of other benefits conferred such as the level of 
investment that the AIOC had made in Iran, and the jobs it had created. However, as 
illustrated in Chapter 3, the AIOC failed to fulfil its Corporate Social Responsibility 
obligations towards the Iranian employees and Iranianisation never came into 
practice.  
The AIOC management was alert to the reality that the company had an extremely 
good deal which they were willing to maintain, because their royalty payments and 
taxes paid to the British Government were evidently better relative to those of other 
countries. As a consequence of this, Fraser used his annual Chairman‟s statements as 
a tool to defend his position from the claims made by the Iranian government about 
unfairness in profit distribution to the Iranians and to portray the Iranian government 
as unreasonable. Fraser used the annual reports as a propaganda tool and, in doing 
this, succeeded in maintaining shareholders‟ confidence during nationalisation. This 
freed him of any blame for the international crisis. Allegations levelled at the 
Iranians, such as secrecy and the use of propaganda were made with great vigour by 
the AIOC. 
In the light of reviewed empirical and historical evidence, the validity of the key 
Iranian claims and the AIOC counter claims are examined to justify and explain the 
major elements leading up to the nationalisation of AIOC‟s assets by Musaddiq in 
May 1951. The AIOC had a weak case as far as the equity of oil production was 
concerned, and the accusations against the AIOC of not sharing the profits from oil 
fairly can be upheld on the basis of the illustrated evidence. The financial analysis of 
profit shares between stakeholders clearly shows that AIOC shareholders and the 
British Government were increasingly benefiting at the expense of the Iranians. 
Unfairness of profit distribution and the Iranians‟ strong mistrust of the AIOC led to 
deep resentment of imperialism which was the precursor to the vigorous and ever-
growing desire for autonomy and nationalisation.  
In summary, the financial analysis of profit shares between stakeholders shows 
that AIOC shareholders and the British Government were increasingly benefiting at 
the expense of Iran. The AIOC clearly exploited Iranian oil resources for its own 
advantage. Moreover, it was unwilling to accept the Iranian argument that it should 
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improve the concession in order to give them the chance to improve living conditions 
in their own country.  
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Chapter 5: The AIOC’s Stock Market reaction to 
nationalisation: Event Analysis and empirical results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the AIOC‟s stock market reaction to nationalisation. As 
previously discussed in Chapter 2, the AIOC operated in Iran on the basis of a 
concession for oil drilling rights granted by the Iranian Government and thus the 
company had the most noticeable and strongest British government connections, 
because it was dealing with a strategic asset in a strategic area. From 1947 onwards 
the renegotiation of the concession became a source of dispute between the AIOC 
and successive Iranian governments. The difficulty in reaching a reasonable solution 
that satisfied both parties was the precursor to the Bill approving the nationalisation 
of the AIOC‟s major assets by Musaddiq in May 1951. As a consequence, the 
impatience of political groups opposed to the company‟s domination of the country‟s 
oil resources intensified, providing momentum to Musaddiq‟s National Front 
coalition and the passage of the nationalisation act. Behind the scenes meanwhile, the 
AIOC worked closely through its channels of influence to undermine Musaddiq, 
including the abortive coup that preceded the successful one carried out by the CIA 
in 1953. These events worsened the relationship between Iran and AIOC, and the 
company never regained its previous influence in Iran. 
From the point of view of the AIOC and its shareholders, nationalisation would 
appear to be explicitly bad news that implied a serious failure in the company‟s 
policy. In the months following nationalisation, however, the AIOC management, in 
public pronouncements at least, displayed confidence about the subsequent 
recoverability of the lost assets. Such confidence was potentially well grounded. 
Working through international legal and political institutions, and in Iran, through the 
Shah and other institutions, including the parliament (Majlis), the media and police, 
the AIOC exercised considerable influence in the period prior to nationalisation. 
Meanwhile in the shorter run, a further reason for the AIOC‟s confidence was its 
control of the oil industry through resources not subject to nationalisation legislation, 
such as technical expertise and control over refining, tankers and other distribution 
channels. 
 This chapter therefore examines how two key events associated with the 
nationalisation were perceived by the London Stock Market. These were the 
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nationalisation itself on 1st May 1951, a major theme running over a longer course in 
the 1950‟s, and the publication of the AIOC annual report on 16th November 1951, 
which influenced shareholders‟ confidence regarding their investment in the 
company. The response of the London‟s Stock Exchange to nationalisation and to the 
information content disclosed by Fraser to the AIOC investors is important for 
several reasons. Firstly, as illustrated in the previous chapter, around 80% of the 
company‟s operational assets were affected by nationalisation. Secondly, from a 
range of evidence arising from the AIOC annual reports and historical sources 
including the British press, it can be clearly seen that Fraser regarded the 
shareholders‟ interests to be superior and taking preference over the interests of 
Iranian and other stakeholder groups. Thirdly, the first annual report to be published 
post nationalisation, 1950, was delayed so that Fraser and his advisors could draft a 
convincing response to the nationalisation, consistent with representing shareholders 
as being protected by international law. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there 
is the possibility that the market priced shares according to sources beyond those 
immediately communicated by the company and the financial press. For example 
those with a detailed knowledge of the company‟s operation and diplomatic situation 
might have concluded that Musaddiq‟s medium- term position was very weak, 
notwithstanding the popular reaction in Iran to the nationalisation event itself. 
To assess the potential threat to the AIOC‟s assets posed by the nationalisation 
legislation of May 1951, this chapter aims to evaluate the relative bargaining strength 
of the AIOC and Musaddiq‟s government in economic terms. To do so, it uses an 
event study methodology, comparing the stock market response with key events in 
the political negotiation calendar preceding and subsequent to the nationalisation. 
The AIOC stock price is used as a barometer to test the extent of belief in the long- 
run durability of the nationalisation act, factoring in the relative strength of the 
political positions of both sides. 
Event studies involve constructing indices of relative share price performance 
around specific events and testing the statistical significance of their impact from an 
information and economic value point of view. Event studies are popular in various 
fields including accounting, finance and management, but nevertheless have not been 
widely applied in historical research. Nonetheless, historical analysis should feature 
prominently in empirical accounting research, a major motivation behind this 
analysis. 
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The importance of this investigation is threefold. Firstly, this examination 
provides the opportunity to assess the economic impact of nationalisation within a 
political context where studies linking stock market reaction to political events are 
rare. Secondly, this investigation is useful in evaluating and analysing the 
information content of annual report disclosure during the company‟s nationalisation 
(which was by all accounts a major political crisis during that era). Finally, this study 
gives indications of the level of market efficiency and tests how good the market is at 
anticipating bad news.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 sets up the event study 
methodology with emphasis on the reasons behind its choice, then giving an 
explanation of the test procedures and the determinants of market efficiency. This 
section also discusses the market data used in more detail, followed by an 
explanation of the FT30 Index and the AIOC return index. Finally, the section 
explains the market adjusted model and outlines the hypothesis for testing. Section 
1.3 presents the historical background for the major events leading to significant and 
insignificant losses in Iran during the 1950‟s, defines the event window and provides 
statistical evidence illustrating the stock market reaction of the AIOC during the 
political crisis. Finally, section 1.4 draws conclusions and summarizes the findings. 
5.2 Methodology 
The impact of nationalisation on the AIOC has been the subject of considerable 
debate among different scholars and this has provided motivation for this thesis to 
study its economic impact on the AIOC‟s security value, market efficiency and social 
welfare. The following section reviews event study methodology and market 
efficiency, highlighting their importance and the assumptions underlying their 
application. 
5.2.1 Event Study 
Since Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969), event studies have become a 
major part of empirical research in finance and many other disciplines. Indeed, event 
studies have been used in multiple settings
662
. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) argued 
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that the event study method is a powerful tool that can help researchers assess the 
financial impact of changes in corporate policy. Furthermore, the event study 
obviates the need to analyze accounting-based measures of profit. Event studies use 
financial market data to assess the impact of specific events on the value of the 
security. They provide an ideal tool for examining the information content of 
disclosures
663
, and also act as a direct test of market efficiency
664
. Given the 
rationality of the efficient market and the immediate impact of an event on security 
prices, an event‟s economic impact can be constructed using stock prices over a short 
period of time
665
.  
The event study method has become popular because it responds to the need to 
analyze stock prices to reflect the true value of firms by incorporating all the relevant 
information. Furthermore, the method is relatively easy to implement, because the 
only data necessary are the names of publicly traded firms, event dates, and stock 
prices. Yet, there are demerits of using event study methodologies in assessing the 
financial impact of changes in corporate policy. For instance, the event study method 
has been criticised for not being a very good indicator of the true performance of the 
firms. Moreover, there are measurement problems associated with the difficulty of 
observing true stock prices and market index levels at the end of short measurement 
intervals. The sample used in event studies will typically be non-random and 
correcting for thin-trading may affect the results
666
. Furthermore, benchmark 
parameters are sometimes computed unconditionally without excluding the 
estimation and test period and then the estimated parameters will be biased
667
. 
However, it is well established that the event study method is a useful tool which has 
its own merits. It depends heavily on a set of rather strong assumptions
668
 that are 
reviewed below: 
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(a) Markets are efficient 
Fama
669
 asserted that the “cleanest evidence on market efficiency comes from 
event studies, especially event studies on daily returns”. He explained that event 
studies can give a clear snapshot of the speed of adjustment of prices to information 
through the abstracts from expected returns to measure abnormal daily returns. 
Market efficiency implies that stock prices should incorporate any financially 
relevant information that is newly revealed to the market. It does this by identifying 
the period over which the impact of the event will be measured, which is commonly 
known as the “event window”.  
(b) The event was unanticipated 
The second assumption is based on the idea that the market previously did not 
have information on the event and traders gained information from the 
announcement. Security prices may not adjust or anticipate the event beforehand and 
consequently the security prices will not adjust before the event date and may take a 
longer period to fully reflect the event‟s information, even after the “event date”. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that the market price shares according to sources 
beyond those immediately communicated by the company and the financial press.  
(c) Confounding Effects  
The third assumption is perhaps the most critical assumption of the event study 
methodology; it is based on the impact of confounding events during the event 
window. By looking at a series of events, there is a confounding event problem 
because of the difficulty involved in measuring the impact of managerial 
decisions
670
. Therefore, it is crucial to control for the effect of confounding effects to 
avoid uncertainties about the validity of the empirical results and conclusions drawn. 
For instance, declaration of dividends is considered to be a major confounding event 
which might have an impact on the share price during an event window. Thus, the 
event study method was developed to measure the effect of an unanticipated event on 
stock prices. Using the event analysis method enables the researcher to assess the 
extent to which security price performance around the time of the event has been 
abnormal
671
. Therefore, the impact of an event can be investigated by measuring the 
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security‟s return over the event date to enable us to compute the difference between 
the observed return on the event and the expected return before and after the event 
date. Any significant difference will be interpreted as an abnormal return or loss. 
With the determination of abnormal returns, the researcher can infer the significance 
of the event in order to assess managerial decisions and trace the course of 
managerial behaviour
672
. In a nutshell, these abnormal returns are assumed to reflect 
the stock market's reaction to the arrival of new information. 
5.2.2 Market Efficiency  
As previously mentioned, the event should be unanticipated and the magnitude of 
abnormal performance is consistent with market efficiency since it measures the 
impact of the event on the wealth of the firm‟s shareholders673. Toms674 argued that 
testing for market efficiency is an approach that allows the investigator to look 
behind technical conditions for the reasons why accounting disclosures might or 
might not have information content. The major role of the capital market is allocation 
of ownership of the economy‟s capital stock. The ideal is a market in which firms 
can make production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among the 
securities that represent ownership of firms‟ activities under the assumption that 
security prices at any time fully reflect all available information
675
. If information 
fails to be quickly and fully reflected in the stock market prices then the stock market 
is said to be inefficient because those who had privately gained access to such 
information can benefit by anticipating the course of such prices. Hence, the lack of 
efficiency in stock markets does not allow price mechanisms to work correctly. 
Fama
676
 determined the conditions at which the capital market is efficient. First of 
all, there should be no transaction costs in trading securities. Second, all available 
information should be available, without cost, to all market participants. Finally, all 
agree on the implications of current information for the current price and 
distributions of future prices of each security. Hence, in such a market, the stock 
prices fully reflect available information. 
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) assumes that the stock prices adjust 
rapidly to the arrival of new information, and consequently, current prices fully 
reflect all available information and should follow a random walk process.
677
This 
means that stock returns are independently and identically distributed (IID), and 
therefore future price changes cannot be forecasted from historical price changes. 
Fama
678
 formalized the theoretical and empirical evidence on efficient market 
hypothesis and divided it into three levels. First, the weak-form EMH, states that 
current stock prices fully reflect all historical market information such as prices, 
trading volumes, and any market-oriented information. Second, the semi-strong form 
EMH asserts that prices fully reflect not only the historical information but also all 
public information including non-market information, such as earning and dividend 
announcements, economic and political news. Finally, the strong-form EMH 
contends that stock prices reflect all information from historical, public, and private 
sources, so that no one investor can realize abnormal rates of return. To sum up, the 
categorization of the tests into weak, semi-strong, and strong form will help in testing 
the null hypothesis and determining the level of information at which the hypothesis 
breaks down. 
Stock market efficiency is an essential component of the performance of capital 
markets and their contribution to the development of a country‟s economy. The EMH 
has significant implications for both investors and authorities. For instance, if the 
stock market is efficient, the prices will represent the correct values of the stocks and 
in turn this will serve in a way that benefits both the individual investors and the 
country‟s economy as well. The Random Walk Model (RWM) is one of the 
mathematical models that assume that consecutive price changes are independent of 
identically distributed random variables so that future price changes cannot be 
predicted from historical price changes. A number of statistical tests have been used 
in the literature to examine the validity of weak-form EMH and the RWM. 
Autocorrelation tests are the most popular ones, so this study employs serial 
correlation to test the statistical independence between rates of return. Serial 
correlation is a parametric test assuming normality of the stock price time series and 
hence measures the association between two elements of returns time series, 
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separated by a fixed number of time periods. Fama
679
 explained that tests enrich our 
knowledge of the behaviour of returns across securities and through time and that 
stock index returns may show positive autocorrelation if some of the securities in the 
index trade infrequently.
680
 Statistically, the absences of statistical significance in 
autocorrelations tests indicate that the market is efficient at weak-level which implies 
that the market prices follow a random walk. Thus, the RWM has some testable 
implications for the weak-form EMH. 
To test for weak form efficiency, the study employs the random walk model and 
serial correlation (or autocorrelation) tests to measure the correlation coefficient 
between a series of returns and lagged returns in the same series. An autocorrelation 
is the slope in a regression of the current return on a past return. A significant 
positive serial correlation implies that a trend exists in the series, whereas a negative 
serial correlation indicates the existence of a reversal in price movements. A return 
series that is random will have a zero serial correlation coefficient. The beta 
coefficient from the following regression equation measures the serial correlation of 
stock i with a lag of K periods: 
  tiktiiiti rBr ,,,                                                          
(1) 
Where tir ,  represents the return of stock i at time t, i and iB are constants, ti ,  
represents random error, and k represents different time lags. The serial correlation 
tests assume normal distribution for the stock price changes (or returns). The 
independence of increments implies not only that increments are uncorrelated, but 
that any nonlinear functions of the increments are uncorrelated. Changes in stock 
price are used as the dependent variable in linear regression while one lag of change 
in stock price is the independent variables.  
Semi-strong form tests of efficient market models are concerned with whether 
current prices “fully reflect” all publicly available information. The test is concerned 
with the adjustment of security prices to one kind of information generating event 
(e.g. publication of AIOC annual reports on 16
th
 November 1951 and announcement 
of nationalisation on 30
th
 April 1951). Hence, the test brings supporting evidence for 
the impact of the release of information on the current stock prices. 
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5.2.3 Data 
The study will focus on the AIOC return index and the daily security return index 
for 30 firms in the FT30 Industrial Index over the period from May 1950 to May 
1951. This period was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, May 1950 was the date of the 
nationalisation of the AIOC so this period covers the influential events leading up to 
nationalisation and ends with the event itself on 1
st
 May 1951. Secondly, this period 
is essential because it assists in defining the control period which is needed for 
undertaking the event study methodology. We need to bear in mind that the market 
price during the control period was before any nationalisation would have taken 
place. The process of data collection involving the AIOC index and FT30 index will 
be explained thoroughly in this section. 
The daily prices of the AIOC employed in this event study are generally “closing” 
prices which represent the prices at which the last transaction occurred during the 
trading day. The company‟s stock price quoted on the stock exchange is assumed to 
present the “fair” value of the stock and when the stock exchange values all the 
stocks fairly then it is considered as an “efficient market”. The dividends paid are 
assumed to convey important information to the market concerning the 
management‟s policy and dividend-paying potential. In view of this expectation, the 
AIOC return index is adjusted with the dividends paid to the shareholders during the 
period because it might be expected to have stock market information content. It 
must be noted that the AIOC left its dividend unchanged for a period of five years 
from 1947 to 1951 where the annual net payment to the shareholders was 16 pence 
per share in these years
681
.  
Thus, the stock price daily returns for AIOC are calculated as follows, 
   
1


it
itit
P
DP
itR -1,                                                                       (2) 
Where, Rit is daily stock price return stock i on day t, Pit is price of stock i on day 
t, Pit-1 is price of stock i on t-1, Dit is dividend payment for stock i associated with 
day t. 
The Stock Exchange has been progressive in disclosing information from the 
companies whose shares are quoted and traded
682
. The Stock Exchange publishes a 
daily “Official List” that prints for all shares the different prices at which bargains 
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had been struck during the previous business day
683
. The Financial Times Industrial 
Ordinary Shares Index (FT30) was the first major UK share index on the London 
Stock Exchange and its computation began on the 1
st
 July 1935
684
. The index 
consists of 30 heavily traded securities chosen to provide almost 30% of the market 
value of the securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange and to this extent they 
reflect movements of the whole market quite effectively. The principal purpose of 
the index was to measure market movements over the short term and not to provide 
any estimates of market return or to act as a benchmark portfolio. Nonetheless, the 
FT30 index has the advantage that it is the only one which is readily available, it has 
a small base and thus this may potentially lead to some inaccuracy. However, AIOC 
tends to be one company out of 30 companies from the list and for any price increase 
the difference computed will be relatively very small
685
. The FT30 index was 
initially adopted from Loughborough University
686
 and for the purpose of this 
research it was modified by defining the corresponding dates for the Index values 
and also by excluding weekends and public holidays from the index for the period 
under study
687
.  
Using daily data takes into account the market‟s daily reaction to the signal during 
the event month. Daily returns for FT30 index are calculated as follows, 
1

it
it
P
P
mtR -1,                                                                           (3) 
Where, Rmt is the daily return on market portfolio, Pit is price index of stock i on 
day t, Pit-1 is price index of stock i on t-1. 
Comparing the AIOC‟s Return Index (RI) with the FT 30 will provide a clear 
picture about the performance of AIOC in relation to the market, which is very useful 
for assessment of the company
688
. Therefore, the FT30 index is ideal for 
investigating the performance of AIOC during its nationalisation.  
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5.2.4 Market Adjusted Model 
There are three different models used in event study literature to estimate ex ante 
expected returns
689
. These are Mean Adjusted Returns, Market Adjusted Returns and 
Market and Risk Adjusted Returns.  
The Mean Adjusted Returns assumes that the ex-ante expected return E (Rit) is 
constant for each security over time however it differs across securities
690
. It assumes 
that the return on security i at any point of time is a function of the average past time 
series of returns. The Mean Adjusted model is consistent with the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) which assumes that the stock has a constant systematic risk 
and thus the expected return is constant. The Market Adjusted Returns assumes that 
the ex-ante expected returns are constant across securities but not necessarily 
constant over time for a given security since all securities in the sample are assumed 
to be equal in terms of the size and the risk. The ex-ante expected returns for any 
security at a point of time E(Rit) equals the expected market return at that particular 
point of time, i.e. E(Rmt) = Σ Rit, where t = [1,2,3…,T]
691
. Finally, the Market and 
Risk Adjusted Returns model is based upon the market model estimates for each 
security in the sample and the abnormal returns are calculated as the difference 
between the actual stock return and the expected return relative to the market. 
Abnormal returns result when an event is unanticipated. It worth highlighting that 
CAPM controls for security risk as well as for the market and assumes non-zero 
intercept terms through the use of a single factor, β, to compare the excess returns of 
a portfolio with the excess returns of the market as a whole
692
. This in turn may lead 
to simplifying the complex market. However, Fama and French
693
 added two factors 
to CAPM to reflect a portfolio's exposure to these two classes: 
             (4) 
Here r is the portfolio's rate of return, Rf is the risk-free return rate, and Km is the 
return of the whole stock market. The "three factor" β is analogous to the classical β 
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but not equal to it. SMB measures the historic excess returns of small caps over big 
caps and of value stocks over growth stocks. These factors are calculated with 
combinations of portfolios composed by ranked stocks and available historical 
market data which can bias the results. There is no doubt that the Fama French model 
works better than the single factor market models in empirical tests. However, these 
tests are based on longer run windows for portfolios of large samples of stocks. In an 
event study of this kind, with a shorter window and single firm case study, there are 
insufficient observations of book value to operationalise the tests in a three factor 
framework. 
Brown and Warner (1980) argued that there are a variety of ways of measuring 
abnormal returns under different Asset Pricing models. They asserted that the Market 
Model and Market Adjusted Model had the same power where the specification and 
power of the actual tests for abnormal performance is similar to that obtained with 
the OLS market model
694
. They explained that the Market Adjusted Model takes into 
account market-wide movements which occurred at the same time as the firm 
experienced the event. Moreover, they asserted that the Market Adjusted Model is 
also consistent with the Asset Pricing model if all securities have a systematic risk of 
unity. When the return on a security and the return on the market index are each 
measured over a different trading interval, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 
market model parameters are biased and inconsistent
695
. Furthermore, OLS estimates 
of market model β might be biased and inconsistent due to non-synchronous trading. 
By constructing OLS residuals for a security sum to zero in the estimation period, a 
bias in the estimate of β is compensated for by a bias in α696. Therefore, they assume 
that there is a stable linear relationship between the market return and the security 
return where market model parameters are adjusted as α=0 and β=1 assuming the 
same risk level among the market and sample security. Thus, the expected value of 
the difference between the return on a security and the return on market index should 
in an asset pricing model framework be equal to zero which indicates that the 
expected return is equal to the market return.  
Appraisal of the event‟s impact requires a measure of the abnormal return. A 
security‟s price performance is considered to be abnormal relative to a particular 
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benchmark
697
. The abnormal return for a given security in any time period t is 
defined as the actual ex post return of the security minus the normal return of the 
firm over the event window. Estimates of daily abnormal returns (AR) for the ith 
firm will be calculated as follows: 
mtitit RRAR                                                                                                            (5) 
Where, Rit is daily stock price return stock i on day t and Rmt is the daily return on 
market portfolio. In this context, the variable of interest is the difference between the 
return on the individual security and the corresponding market return on the index. 
The abnormal returns (ARit) represent returns earned by the firm after the analyst has 
adjusted for the "normal" return process. Any significant difference is considered to 
be an abnormal, or “excess return”. Therefore, (ARit) is the difference between the 
actual and expected rates of return on the security at time (t) during the event 
window (t0 to t+T).  
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) are then calculated by aggregating 
the abnormal returns over the event period whilst dividends are not ignored. 
it
I
It
ARCARi 


2
1
                                                                         (6) 
Where, CARi is the i
th
 stock‟s cumulative abnormal return, 1I  is the start date of 
the event window and 2I is the end date of the event window.  
The basis for inference in event studies is a test statistic for the significance of the 
empirical results and there is no general agreement on the t-test formula. Therefore, 
the statistical significance of short term CARs over the event window applied in this 
study are adopted from Dodd and Warner
698
, Kothari and Warner
699
 and Goergen and 
Renneboog
700
 who computed the test statistic as the ratio of the mean of CAR to the 
estimated standard deviation of abnormal returns over the estimation window as 
follows:  
)(AR
CAR
t

                                                                               (7) 
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Where, CAR  is the mean of CAR and σ (AR) is the estimated standard deviation 
of abnormal returns which was computed using estimation period (-244 days to -6 
days) as follows: 
238
)()(
2
6
244
ARARAR
t
t
t  


                                            (8) 
AR = 


6
244239
1 t
t
tAR                                                                  (9) 
Brown and Warner (1985) explained the above t-statistic for testing one day 
abnormal return. However, if the event window has multi day intervals, then the t-
statistics will be calculated differently by multiplying the standard deviation of 
abnormal returns by the square root of the number of event windows as follows: 
 
TAR
CAR
t
)(
                                                                         (10) 
Where, T is the number of days in the event window and other terms are explained 
above. It is important to aggregate the abnormal returns for the event window and 
across observations of the event. The aggregation should be considered through time 
without any overlap in the event windows of the included security. 
5.2.5 Hypotheses Testing 
This section proposes three related and alternative hypotheses to be examined 
using a data set of historical quantitative variables. The first hypothesis involves 
investigating the economic impact of nationalisation on AIOC investors by 
comparing the loss in market value with the book value of the assets nationalised as 
disclosed in the 1950 AIOC Annual report and Accounts. Thus, the null and 
alternative hypotheses are: 
H0: Nationalisation event has no economic impact on the AIOC 
investors 
H1: Nationalisation event has an economic impact on the AIOC 
investors                                                                                      (1) 
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The second hypothesis involves testing the impact of announcement of 
nationalisation in 30
th
 April 1951 on AIOC investors 
H0: Announcement of nationalisation has no information impact 
on AIOC investors  
H1: Announcement of nationalisation has an information impact 
on AIOC investors                                                                         (2)                                                               
The third, and related, hypothesis involves testing the impact of the publication of 
the AIOC annual report in November 1951 on AIOC investors. 
H0: There was no information content of annual report 
disclosure during the publication of AIOC report 
H1: There was information content of annual report disclosure 
during the publication of AIOC report                                          (3)                           
                                                                                                   
Finally, a subsequent and essential hypothesis arising from the previous 
hypotheses, involves testing whether the Market is weak and semi strongly efficient 
during both events or not.  
H0:  Market was inefficient at weak-form and semi strong level  
H1: Market was efficient at weak-form and semi strong level  
                                                                                                   (4) 
These hypotheses follow from the clear features of the capital market that were 
discussed in the previous section. To test the information content hypotheses, I will 
employ the event study as a tool to investigate the impact of nationalisation on AIOC 
investors by measuring their abnormal returns and to test whether they can anticipate 
bad news. Abnormal returns are calculated with reference to day t0. Daily returns are 
used to compute abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are measured in circumstances 
where the availability of data is restricted by using the market adjusted return model 
rather than the market model
701
. Consequently, this study aims to measure the short-
term wealth effects for AIOC shareholders using the Market Adjusted Model, 
examine the response of the stock market to the information content disclosed by 
Fraser in the published AIOC annual report in 16
th
 November 1951. And finally test 
for weak form efficiency and semi strong efficiency. 
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5.3 Analysis 
The AIOC share price was compared with the first major UK stock market index, 
the Financial Times Industrial Ordinary Shares Index (FT30), over the period 1950 to 
1951. Comparing the AIOC‟s Return Index (RI) with the FT30 will provide a clear 
picture of the performance of the AIOC in relation to the market which is very useful 
for assessing the AIOC‟s security prices reaction to nationalisation event. In the 
interim, this study examines the efficiency of the UK stock exchange at the weak 
level and semi-strong level for the AIOC stock listed in the market by using daily 
observations of the FT30 index. Parametric testing will be used to test for serial 
dependence in the AIOC returns. 
The event study involves various procedural steps. It starts by defining the event 
and specifying the event date, then estimating the expected returns and observing the 
realised ones within the event window. It then involves measuring the abnormal 
return (AR) which refers to the shareholder return over and above the average return 
on the market. Finally, it aggregates the abnormal returns over the event window 
(CAR). In order to define the event window, a historical analysis including a timeline 
of events has to be defined – here the background to the nationalisation crisis.  
5.3.1 Historical Analysis 
Iran‟s investment and growth rate flourished in the second half of the 1940s but 
the recovery was short-lived due to the high level of political instability during those 
years, reflected in frequent demonstrations and strikes as well as the assassination 
attempt on the Shah
702
. In October 1947, the Iranian government committed to 
renegotiate the concession, demanded a fair compensation for the British 
„expropriation‟ of the oil resources and was keen to increase the amount of royalties 
paid to them. The Iranian government‟s control was largely confined to revenue 
taxation and minimal maintenance of order due to the influence of internal and 
external forces resulting from British imperialism. As previously indicated in 
Chapter 4, Iranian grievances were well explored and justified in Gidel‟s 
Memorandum: Iranians were dissatisfied because they did not have control over the 
allocation of net profits between dividends and reserves
703
.  
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The development of the Iranian economy was affected by international price 
movements, international market trends and by the ebbs and flows of events 
occurring in Iran during the 50‟s. The worldwide demand for oil increased 
throughout most of the 1946 to 1951 period which resulted in profit increases for the 
major oil companies
704
. However, Iran suffered periods of economic decline when 
non-economic concerns became overwhelming, during the political turmoil of the 
first decades of the 20
th
 century or at times of domestic and international conflict 
(e.g. 1940-1945, 1950-1953)
705
. In the early 1950s, political conditions had changed 
considerably and new nationalisms started to emerge because the Iranian government 
wanted to develop policies with which the country could earn higher returns from its 
oil production.  
On 7 March 1951, Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated after his broadcast to 
the nation, which seemed to be urging the Iranians to support the AIOC and continue 
to produce handicrafts rather than trying to run an oil industry
706
. By this time, 
nationalism and democracy had become constant features of the Iranian political 
landscape. The Nationalisation Bill was ratified and had important implications for 
the performance of the AIOC in that it aimed to secure for the Iranian government 
rights to nationalise its resources and excluded foreign companies from 
exploitation
707
. Consequently, on 9 March 1951, the parliament of Iran approved the 
nationalisation of the British-owned AIOC – one of the largest companies quoted on 
the Stock Exchange. Nationalisation resulted in a decline in AIOC‟s share price by 
3/8 to 5 3/8, which was the lowest price for its stock since 1946
708
. 
Nationalisation was a special economic event and, as could be expected, AIOC 
stock prices were influenced
709
. In a similar vein, nationalisation was a living 
illustration of the structural problems facing the British government and the AIOC. 
While Iran‟s oil exports declined in the 1950s and the AIOC‟s assets in Iran were 
nationalised, the British government was anxious to negotiate a solution with 
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Musaddiq in a reasonable atmosphere
710
. The Times reported that nationalisation was 
“accomplished by one of the most rapidly completed measures ever passed by the 
often dilatory Persian Parliament”711. However, in a more positive vein, the Times 
declared that “it is natural and right that the Persian people should now take a greater 
share in the operation of their main industry”712. 
The movement to nationalise the oil industry was a major issue and the country 
came to face an economic embargo from outside and political instability from inside. 
Oil revenues dropped and brought investment to an end. There were attempts to 
increase non-oil exports and to keep the level of imports at a minimal level. 
Regardless of this plan, the non-oil exports became costly to maintain and imports 
outpaced exports. This kind of ambition naturally generated conflict with the British 
government which had its own agenda. The way the conflict evolved and the kind of 
actions the Iranian government took were, however, determined by the type of 
regime each of the nations lived under. These events lead us, therefore, towards an 
examination of the impact of the nationalisation crisis on the value of shareholders‟ 
investments and an investigation of how successful they were in managing their 
expectations during such a crisis. 
Table (12) below summarises the major events dealing with the negotiations 
between the Iranian government and the AIOC for the revision of the existing 
concession and the introduction of the Supplemental Agreement to be ratified by the 
Iranian Majlis. The timeline below started in May 1950 and ended in May 1951, 
providing a complete picture of the major events that took place before the company 
was nationalised. This time frame was chosen because there tended to be a crucial 
build-up towards nationalisation since negotiations were intensified by the National 
Front party during May 1950, which finally resulted in the nationalisation of the 
company‟s major assets, including the world‟s largest refinery in Abadan, by 
Musaddiq on the 1
st
 of May 1951. 
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Table 12: Time line of events for AIOC, for the period May 1950- May 1951 
Date Commentary and related events 
May 1950 Increased National Front representation on Majlis Oil Committee (MOC) 
- Elections to Majlis. 
June 1950 General Ali Razmara had become Prime Minister and he was in 
favourite of British and opposes nationalisation. 
29
th
 September 1950 In 1950, AIOC offered an increased share of profits to the Iranian 
Government but not the fifty-fifty ( 50:50) sharing that the Majlis 
wanted. 
26
th
 December 1950 The Supplemental Agreement was not again discussed and was referred 
to a special Majlis Oil Commission. The Oil Commission reported early 
in December 1950 that the agreement did not safeguard Persian rights 
and in consequence the Persian Government withdrew the Bill on 26
th
 
December, 1950. Subsequently, the Oil Commission was approved by 
the Majlis on 11
th
 January 1951. 
10
th
 February 1951 The AIOC informed the Persian Prime Minister that they were ready to 
negotiate an entirely new agreement based on equal sharing of profits in 
Persia. 
19
th
 February 1951 Dr. Musaddiq, the chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission, formally 
proposed in the commission that the oil industry throughout Persia 
should be nationalised. 
24
th
 February 1951 Shepherd (His Majesty‟s Ambassador in Tehran) handed the Persian 
Prime Minister a note stating that in the view of His Majesty‟s 
Government, that the Company‟s Concession Agreement prevented its 
legal termination by an act such as nationalisation and added that the 
company could not negotiate under threat of nationalisation. 
28
th
 February 1951 Negotiations between Northcroft and Razmara offer 25 Million and fifty- 
fifty (50:50) share of Iranian profits. 
7
th
 March 1951 Assassination of the Prime Minister M. Ali Razmara. 
8
th
 March 1951 The day after the assassination of the Prime Minister M. Ali Razmara, 
the Oil Commission passed a resolution concerning nationalisation. 
14
th
 March 1951 His Majesty‟s Government sent a note to the Persian Government to set 
out their views and restated the company‟s readiness to discuss a new 
agreement on the basis of an equal sharing of profits in Persia. 
15
th
 March 1951 The Majlis approved a “Single Article Bill” which confirmed the Majlis 
Oil Commission‟s decision of 8th March 1951 and approved the 
extension of the Commission‟s term of office but this took place before 
the British note on 14
th
 of March had been communicated to them. 
20
th
 March 1951 The senate approved the “Single Article Bill”. 
8
th
  April 1951 The Persian Government replied to the British note sent on 14
th
 March 
1951 and maintained that the question of nationalisation lay solely 
between the Persian Government and the AIOC. 
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Date Commentary and related events 
26
th
 April 1951 Shepherd put to the Persian Prime Minister M. Ala, tentative proposals 
for reaching a settlement and these embraced a new United Kingdom 
Company to run the oil industry in Persia and to be owned by AIOC but 
with some Persian directors, the profits of the company to be shared 
equally between the Persian Government and the Company, if the 
Persians wished a purely Persian company would be set up for the 
distribution of oil products within Persia. On the same day, the Majlis 
Oil Commission approved a solution calling for the formation of a mixed 
board of Senators and Deputies with the Minister of Finance or his 
deputy to implement the decision of the two Houses of Parliament for oil 
nationalisation throughout the country and setting out in nine articles the 
method of this implementation called “Nine Point Law”. 
28
th
 April 1951 AIOC protested to the Persian Government over their intended 
nationalisation measures.  
29
th
 April 1951 Dr. Musaddiq became the Iranian Prime Minister. 
30
th
 April 1951 “Nine Point Law” for nationalisation received the approval of both 
Majlis and Senate. 
1
st
 May 1951 “Nine Point Law” for nationalisation was promulgated by His Imperial 
Majesty the Shah. 
Sources: Compiled from Cmd 8425, „Explanatory Memorandum‟ Correspondence between His 
Majesty’s Government; AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, 1950, 11-22; Bamberg, The History of 
the British Petroleum Company, chapters 15-18. 
 
As clearly shown in Table (12), due to increased National Front representation on 
the Majlis Oil Committee (MOC) in May 1950, the AIOC offered the Supplemental 
Agreement to increase the Iranian share in profits in September 1950, but this was 
not an agreement for an equal division of profits. Consequently, the Oil Commission 
produced an adverse report in December 1950 explaining that the Supplemental 
Agreement did not safeguard Persian rights and interests and the Persian Government 
withdrew the Bill on 26
th
 December, 1950. During February of the following year, 
the AIOC proposed to negotiate a new agreement based on equal profit sharing but 
Musaddiq formally proposed to nationalize the oil industry in Iran to safeguard 
Iranian rights and interests. Eventually, on 7
th
 March 1951, the Iranian Prime 
Minister, Razmara, was assassinated and this induced the Oil Commission to pass a 
resolution concerning nationalisation. Finally, after Musaddiq became the Iranian 
Prime Minister on 29
th
 April 1951, nationalisation was approved by both the Majlis 
and Senate on 30
th
 April 1951.  
In addition to the timeline of events explained above, the AIOC share price 
reaction in relation to the stock market is explained by the following graphs. First, 
Figure (2) below presents the AIOC share prices along with the FT30 index for May 
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1950 and May 1951 to illustrate the company‟s performance in relation to the market 
during nationalisation. 
Figure 2: AIOC share prices and FT30 Index for the period 12/05/1950 to 
01/05/1951 
 
Source: AIOC stock prices are compiled from The Times and Manchester Guardian newspapers; 
FT30 Index is compiled from Loughborough University Website, see Appendix 1 & 2. 
 
Figure (2) illustrates that there was a steep decline in the trading range of the 
AIOC share prices during May-July 1950 which is most likely to be attributed to the 
influential role of the National Front in Iran. The National Front was willing to 
safeguard Iranian rights and thus was in favour of nationalisation. AIOC stock prices 
started to recover between August 1950 and November 1950, reflecting the 
company‟s willingness to negotiate an agreement and increase the share of profits to 
the Iranian government. Finally and most importantly, it can be clearly seen that 
AIOC stock prices gradually fell and reached their minimal value on May 1951. It 
was at this point that the Majlis first demanded nationalisation and created the MOC, 
headed by Musaddiq, and the company lost 80.15% of its operational assets
713
. Mid 
1951 showed a version of oil nationalism influenced by the events in Iran and 
consequently this had a negative impact on AIOC stock prices. 
On the other hand, Figure (2) shows that there was a gradual increase in the FT30 
index value from May to July 1950, where it rose slightly from 107 to 115, offsetting 
the decline in AIOC stock prices that was encountered during this period. Later on in 
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December 1950, the index declined, thus reflecting the collapse of the Supplemental 
Agreement and revealing the negative impact of the Majlis Oil Commission on the 
performance of AIOC. Although the events of 1951 were more dramatic, with the 
assassination of Razmara and the formalisation of the nationalisation legislation, the 
FT30 index shows an increase in its value, reaching its peak at 130.9 on 1
st
 May 
1951. 
For further illustration, Figure (3) below demonstrates the abnormal returns 
calculated for the period May 1950 to May 1951. 
Figure 3: Abnormal returns for the period 12/05/1950 to 01/05/1951 
 
Source: Calculated using the AIOC return index and FT30 Return Index- See Appendix 1 & 2 
 
Figure (3) shows that the abnormal returns fluctuated between May 1950 and May 
1951, reflecting the difference between the expected rates of return of AIOC stock 
and the actual market rates of return computed from the FT30 Index. By December 
1950, the abnormal returns declined significantly by almost -0.08 because the AIOC 
shares had lost their value, reflecting the collapse of the Supplemental Agreement. 
Also, it can be clearly seen that the abnormal returns steeply increased in February 
1951 reflecting the rise in AIOC stock prices, perhaps due to the negotiations 
between the company representatives and the Iranian Prime Minister, Razmara. In 
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the period immediately prior to nationalisation, March-May 1951, the abnormal 
returns decreased, reflecting the significant decline in AIOC stock returns. It was at 
this point that the Majlis approved the “Single Article Bill” by the Iranian Senate and 
consequently nationalisation was headed by Musaddiq on 1
st
 May 1951. 
Furthermore, Figure (4) below presents the cumulative abnormal returns 
calculated for the period May 1950 to May 1951. 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for the period 12/05/1950 to 01/05/1951 
 
Source: Calculated from the abnormal returns using AIOC return index and FT30 Return Index- See 
Appendix 1 & 2. 
 
Figure (4) shows that the cumulative abnormal returns were negative throughout 
1951, with a marked decrease in the values in March 1951 and in May 1951. This 
may explain that nationalisation had a negative impact on the investors of the AIOC. 
However, it is worth noting that, notwithstanding the assassination of Razmara in 
March 1951, the appointment of Musaddiq as Prime Minister in May 1951 and the 
worsening of the AIOC‟s trading position following the huge amount of profit for 
1950, the reaction was far less than might have been expected. 
5.3.2 Event Window 
Defining the event of interest and identifying the event window are important 
reasons why we should examine the period over which the stock prices of the AIOC 
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involved in the event responded to the new information released to the market. It is 
important to note that there is no consensus regarding the definition of the event or 
about the start of the period for the measurement of the short term wealth effects. It is 
assumed that the event date could be identified with certainty but using narrow 
windows might lead to significant error if there was a leakage of information before 
the first mention in the press. In this case, the event window is defined as the period 
from the transaction itself (t0) which is the event date through the presumable dates 
after the event date (t+T) to investigate the period beyond the disclosure dates. For 
instance, Mackinlay
714
, Ajlouni and Toms
715
 suggested that the common approach to 
handle this matter of uncertain event date is to define the event window to be larger 
than the specific period of interest and to examine the periods surrounding the event 
whilst controlling for other event effects. 
The event date in this study is 30
th
 April 1951 when nationalisation was approved 
by the Majlis and Senate and this was denoted as (t0). It is worth noting that the news 
about nationalisation was released, and announced by the Times, on 30
th 
April 1951, 
confirming that the AIOC under Persian law had become the property of the Persian 
nation
716
. This study extends the event window long enough beyond the event date 
whilst controlling for other events, such as the announcement of dividends, to test the 
impact of news releases on the investors and test the effect of nationalisation on the 
price of the AIOC‟s securities. Therefore, the control period will start 240 trading 
days before the event date, 12 May 1950 to 20 April 1951, to capture the impact of 
nationalisation on the shareholders. It should be noted that the control period covers 
transactions by the AIOC before its nationalisation and includes the announcement of 
nationalisation. For instance, it includes the point when the Majlis first demanded 
nationalisation and created the Majlis Oil Committee headed by Musaddiq in 19
th
 
February 1951 and the announcement of nationalisation by the Majlis in March 1951. 
5.3.3 Economic impact of nationalisation on AIOC investors 
The discussion above has several implications for empirical testing. Given the 
data availability and the history of the AIOC, empirical evidence is reported in this 
section to explain the reaction of the AIOC share price to political events in Iran in 
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relation to the stock market. The empirical results will lead to insights relating to 
understanding the sources, the causes and effects of nationalisation on AIOC stock 
prices. 
Table (13) below computes a more detailed analysis of the market and book value 
of AIOC assets during nationalisation from the 1950 AIOC Annual Report in order 
to examine the long run effects and economic value impact of nationalisation on 
AIOC investors. 
 
Table 13: Loss of Market Value due to nationalisation 
Explanation Date 
Book Value 
(£) 
Market Price 
(£) 
Market value 
reflected permanent 
nationalisation 
Value of share before 
nationalisation 
12/05/1950 5.35 6.88 6.88 
Value of share after 
nationalisation 
01/05/1951 1.06 5.03 1.37**** 
Loss of value per 
share 
  4.29 1.85 5.51 
    £'000 £'000 £'000 
Capital before 
nationalisation 
12/05/1950 107.72 138.49** 138.49 
Capital after 
nationalisation 
01/05/1951 21.34* 101.25*** 27.58***** 
Loss of value for 
capital  
  86.38 37.08 110.91 
Loss of value in %   80.19%**** 26.89%***** 80.09%****** 
Sources: Annual Report, 1950; The Times and The Manchester Guardian. 
 
Notes: 
Book value of AIOC capital is £107,719,810 as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, Annual 
report 1950 and 1951. 
Ordinary Stock is £20,137,500 as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, Annual Report 1950and 
1951. 
Book Value per share =107,719,810 / 20,137500= £5.35     
Geographical distribution of AIOC activity is calculated from 1950 annual report as illustrated 
previously in chapter 4; the Iranian activity was 80.15% and non-Iranian activity was 19.85%.   
Book Value per share after AIOC assets were nationalised= 5.35* 19.85%= £1.06 
* Book value of AIOC capital after nationalisation=1.06*20.13=21.34 
Market price of AIOC share prices were compiled from The Times newspapers and The Manchester 
Guardian newspapers during 12 May 1950- 1st May 1951. 
** Market price of AIOC capital after nationalisation=5.03*20.13=101.25 
Market value per share reflected permanent nationalisation=6.88*19.85%=1.37 
*** Market value of AIOC capital reflected permanent nationalisation= 1.37*20.13=27.58  
****Loss of B.V in %= 4.29/5.35=80.19% 
*****Loss of Market price %= 1.85/6.88=26.89% 
******Loss of Market value reflected nationalisation= 5.51/6.88=80.09% 
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As shown in Table (13), the book value per share dramatically declined from 
£5.35 to £1.06 after the AIOC‟s nationalisation, which is most likely attributed to the 
loss of 80.15% of the profits arising from Iranian activity. As a consequence, the 
AIOC‟s capital declined dramatically after nationalisation and amounted to £21.34 
million.  As mentioned above in the notes, the market prices of AIOC stocks were 
compiled from The Times and The Manchester Guardian newspapers and the value 
of capital was calculated accordingly. Quite clearly, the loss in market value of 
£37.08m is substantially less than the book value of the assets nationalised of 
£86.38m. However, if the market price is adjusted to reflect the impact of 
nationalisation and the loss of 80.15% of the company‟s assets then the loss in 
Market value would have been £110.91m. In a similar vein, the percentage loss 
reflecting the impact of nationalisation would have been 80.09% instead of a loss of 
only 26.89%. Consequently, this explains that there is the possibility that the market 
priced shares according to sources beyond those immediately communicated by the 
company and the financial press and as a result the market was ascribing greater 
value to other factors such as the value of private information. Therefore, those with 
a detailed knowledge of the company‟s operation and diplomatic situation might 
have concluded that Musaddiq‟s position was very weak, notwithstanding the 
popular reaction in Iran to the nationalisation event itself. 
5.3.4 Information impact of nationalisation on AIOC investors 
Empirical tests are carried out in this section, to investigate the correlation 
between the release of information to the market place and the observed change of 
AIOC stock prices as a response to the event. Moreover, empirical findings in 
relation to the research hypothesis are examined. The tests are devised to identify 
information content in nationalisation and in the publication of AIOC annual reports 
and note changes through time in weak form and semi-strong form market efficiency. 
Hence, the study aims to compare relative efficiency at two different points in time 
by varying the length of the event window. 
To test for weak form efficiency, the serial correlation for AIOC stock and FT30 
are computed to measure the correlation coefficient between a series of returns and 
lagged returns in the same series. Table (14) shows the serial correlation for AIOC 
stock and FT30 index for time period t-1.   
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Table 14: Serial Correlation for AIOC stock and FT30 Index for one time lag 
Source: The AIOC return index for the control period and one time lag within the publication of 
AIOC annual report 
 
The results from Table (14) show that the serial correlation is consistently close to 
zero at t-1 (one time lag) for AIOC stock, implying that the AIOC shares are weak 
form efficiently priced. However, the results for the FT30 Index show a significant 
serial correlation for the Index, implying that the FT30 Index is not weak form 
efficient and that the shares were thinly traded. To avoid sampling errors, the FT30 
Index has been checked for a longer period (1946-1953) but the results also illustrate 
that the Index is not weak form efficient and the AIOC shares are thinly traded. As a 
consequence, the AIOC and FT30 data are checked for normality using the Shapiro 
Wilk test and it was found that the data are highly non-normal. Therefore, the above 
implies that there have been market limitations on the ability of the shareholders to 
dispose of shares in response to bad news, had they wished to do so. This restriction 
may have tended to increase the evident loyalty of the shareholders, who tended to 
believe that the company would recover from nationalisation following the 
reassurances of Fraser in his Chairman statements. 
To test for semi-strong efficiency, cumulative abnormal returns were calculated in 
varying event windows to explore the impact of nationalisation and publication of 
annual reports on the investors. For instance, cumulative abnormal returns were 
calculated with reference to the publication date (t0) of the annual reports of the 
AIOC, for the period surrounding the announcement t-n, t+n. Moreover, cumulative 
abnormal returns were calculated with reference to nationalisation of the AIOC, for 
the period surrounding the event t-n, t+n. To extend the tests to a longer event 
window, the above tests were repeated for days between t0, t-5, t+5 and t+10. Since 
nationalisation was announced to the public on 30
th
 of April 1951, it was possible to 
specify the exact date of disclosure for the event. The estimated standard deviation of 
abnormal returns was computed using the control period (12 May 1950 to 20 April 
1951) as previously explained in equations (6) and (7), so that it would not overlap in 
the event windows of the included security. Then, to examine the statistical 
 
Time Lags Correlation t-statistics 
AIOC Stock One Day 0.0589 0.90 
FT30 Index One Day 0.3568 5.88 
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significance of the CAR during the event period, the test statistics were computed. 
The interval was set to one day, and thus daily stocks are used. Tables (15) and (16) 
below report the CARs over 10 days before and after the event date and report their 
significance at a one-tailed significance level. 
 
Table 15: Cumulative Abnormal returns and Test Statistic for nationalisation- 
Semi-strong market efficiency 
 Pre-announcement tests Post announcement tests Full Period 
    
t-5, t0          -0.0415   
         (-0.9087)   
t-1, t0         -0.0672***   
         (-2.5499)   
t+1, t0     -0.1025***  
      (-3.8912)  
t+5, t0      -0.1015**  
      (-2.2239)  
t+10, t0      -0.0861*  
     (-1.3935)  
t-1, t+5                              -0.0954** 
   (-1.9343) 
t-1, t+10   -0.084* 
   (-1.3005) 
     t-5,t+10              -0.0851 
   (-1.1423) 
t-5,t+5   -0.08191* 
   (-1.32548) 
t-1,t+1      -0.0846*** 
   
(-2.6217) 
Notes: Mean of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported for different event windows. 
Moreover, t statistics are reported in parentheses illustrating the significance of the results. *** 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level, ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, *significant at the 
0.1 level (applying one-tailed tests according to the hypothesis). 
 
The results in Table (15) illustrate that the mid 1951 point showed a version of oil 
nationalism influenced by the events in Iran and consequently this had a negative 
impact on the AIOC stock price. A summary of the above extensive body of 
empirical evidence shows that there is an abnormal return on the day prior to 
nationalisation, which is cumulatively significant at about 6.7% in the period t-1. 
Thus, the results suggest that the market experienced an abnormal return at t-1 of 
about 6.7 % as bad news prior to nationalisation, which suggests semi-strong 
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efficiency, because stock prices responded adversely to the announcement of 
nationalisation. Meanwhile, the results show that nationalisation yielded significant 
and persistent cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) immediately after the event, at 
the end of the assumed day of disclosure (t+1) and this finding is consistent with the 
event definition. Hence, Fama
717
 argued, as the typical result in event studies on 
daily data is that stock prices seem to adjust within a day to event announcements, 
the market recognized nationalisation and reflected the signal as soon as it had been 
disclosed. CARs are also significant at (t+5, t0), (t+10, t0), (t-1, t+5), (t-1, t+10), (t-5, 
t+5) and (t-1, t+1). 
It is important to note that shareholders holding their investments until 1
st
 May 
1951 would have suffered a negative cumulative return of 10.25%. Meanwhile, 
shareholders holding their investment until 5
th
 May 1951 would have suffered a 
negative cumulative return of 10.15% and negative cumulative return of 8.6% if they 
had kept their investment until 10
th
 May 1951. This may in turn explain how 
nationalisation had a negative impact on the investors of the AIOC, as illustrated in 
their negative cumulative returns. AIOC stock prices were marked by a new period 
of more problematic relations between the company and the host country, 
communicated via diplomatic channels – which had intimidated the investors. 
However, the reaction of the stock market was far less dramatic than might have 
been predicted. 
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Table 16: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Test Statistic for publication of 
annual reports- Semi-Strong market efficiency. 
  Pre-announcement tests Post announcement tests Full Period 
      
t-10, t0 0.0084    
  (0.1360)    
t-5, t0  -0.0087    
   (-0.1922)    
t-1, t0    0.0459**    
  
 (1.7412) 
    
t+1, t0  0.0349*   
   
(1.3235) 
   
t+5, t0  0.0408   
   
(0.8950) 
   
t+10, t0   0.0553   
    (0.8943)   
t-10,t+10  
 
0.0342 
    
(0.4009) 
 
t-5,t+5   0.0067 
    
 (0.1089) 
 
t-1,t+1     0.0474* 
      
  (1.4687) 
 
Notes: Mean of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are reported for different event windows. 
Moreover, t statistics are reported in parentheses illustrating the significance of the results. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * significant at the 0.1 level (applying one-tailed tests 
according to the hypothesis). 
 
The results from Table (16) show that there is statistical significance close to the 
announcement date. There are no cases of statistical significance beyond this 
immediate window. Although the proportion of CARs registering significance is 
therefore small, the results thereby confirm that the market incorporated the effects 
of the event into the share price very rapidly.  Within the above context, the event 
study results imply that the publication of the annual report in 1951 was received 
positively and the market anticipated its contents. However, the statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns only exist for very short periods. A summary 
of the above extensive body of empirical evidence shows that there was an abnormal 
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return on the day before the annual report was published, which is cumulatively 
significant by 4.5 % in the period t-1. Thus, the results suggest that the market was 
pricing in an abnormal return at t-1 of about 4.5% in anticipation of good news prior 
to publication of the AIOC annual reports. This suggests that there was information 
content in Fraser‟s announcement and semi-strong efficiency because stock prices 
reflected the publication of annual reports. Furthermore, the results show that CARs 
were cumulatively significant after the event, at the end of the assumed day of 
disclosure (t+1) but none of the returns were significant during the remaining days. 
In general, the longer the event window, the more difficult it was to detect 
relationships between CARs and so the results tended to be insignificant. In the 
shorter t-2 window, the market adjusted model was significant.  
Obviously, Fraser was concerned to protect British interests in Persia and 
maintain the confidence of the stockholders because he was aware of the fact that the 
interests of stockholders were paramount
718
. Fraser used the British press to promote 
shareholders‟ confidence, and asserted in the Times719, after the publication and 
release of the company‟s annual reports in 19th November 1951, that the results for 
the year are of “great prosperity in the oil industry and of full operation of the 
Persian properties”720. Furthermore, to maintain shareholders‟ confidence at the time 
of crisis for the company, he emphasised in the Times that: 
One-quarter of the company‟s trading activities were based 
on supplies of oil from non-Persian sources, and naturally a 
much larger proportion than that was earned outside Persia by 
virtue of the company‟s widespread shipping, refining, and 
marketing activities
721
. 
1951 had the benefit of a superlatively good trading period 
during the first half of the year, while the company was 
operating in Persia as usual. And the extra cost imposed by 
sudden changes will gradually diminish
722
. 
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Not only that, but in order to align the performance of the AIOC with the 
behaviour of British interests, Fraser disclosed in his statement to the public
723
 as 
well as the Times
724
 that:  
Unless there is some wholly unforeseen happening in the 
remaining few weeks of this year, the company will be in a 
position to pay the same rate of dividend on the ordinary stock 
for 1951 as has been paid for some years past. 
 It is worth noting that Fraser was eager to increase the dividends paid to the 
ordinary shareholders even during the nationalisation crisis. Meanwhile, the British 
government did not reject Fraser‟s opinion and was also interested in adopting the 
company‟s dividend policy, since the company‟s activities could affect Britain‟s 
foreign relations and economic position
725
. Hence, the British Government was 
willing to show the public that:  
The AIOC genuinely desire to see a reasonable settlement 
reached between the company and the Persian government 
which takes fully into account not only the rights of the 
company but also the wish of the Persians to take a fuller part in 
the development of the industry
726
. 
Furthermore, Fraser undertook a review of the company‟s supply position, which 
reflects the growing response by Britain to the possible loss of Iran‟s oil industry727. 
He established the Future Programme Committee in July 1951 to study and plan 
alternative market outlets, such as Kuwait, Iraq and Qatar, to supply oil instead of 
those forgone by Iran. Obviously, Fraser aimed to increase production from other 
Middle Eastern countries to offset the loss of Iranian oil during nationalisation and 
thus prove to “the Iranians and to other potential miscreants that they could quite 
well do without their oil”728. Since Fraser‟s role came into sharp focus as the subject 
of claims and counter-claims from the AIOC board and Iranian nationalist opinion, 
this study presents an empirical investigation of the AIOC‟s daily stock returns to 
examine their behaviour during the company‟s nationalisation.  
                                                 
723
 AIOC Annual Report and Accounts, November 16, 1951. 
724
 The Times, November 28, 1951. 
725
 Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950-1975, 41. 
726
 The Times, May 1st, 1951, 4(E), Issue 51989. 
727
 Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950-1975, 20. 
728
 Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the world they made, 135-136. 
 181 
Finally, 1950 reports of the AIOC Annual General Meetings, at which the 
Chairman presented the published statement, appeared in different local newspapers 
such as the Economist and the Times
729
. Fraser‟s statement, which was produced in 
full elsewhere, was conciliatory and restrained in tone: it burned no bridges but built 
up a strong factual defence against Persia
730
. For instance, the New York Times, the 
New York Herald Tribune, and the Wall Street Journal were among the newspapers 
which “carried the full text – in 12 columns – of the statement to the shareholders of 
the Anglo Iranian Oil Company by Sir William Fraser, the Chairman”731. Given 
Fraser‟s involvement, it might be expected that extensive publication of the 1950 
annual report and press discussion of accounting data and results might have led to a 
closer relationship with the stockholders. 
In a nutshell, the empirical results clearly and significantly reject the null 
hypotheses that the nationalisation event and information disclosed in the published 
AIOC annual reports had no impact on AIOC investors. Neither did the stock prices 
respond to the event. Instead, the test results suggest that with respect to AIOC- 
specific events, the market was semi strongly efficient and discounted not only the 
short run negative impact of nationalisation, but also explain the AIOC‟s control of 
the Iranian oil industry value chain beyond mere drilling, refining and distribution. 
Moreover, the results explained the weak medium term position of the Iranian 
government from a diplomatic and political point of view. This leads one to the 
conclusion that the nationalisation episode tended to be more damaging to British 
pride than to the stock market. 
5.4 Summary 
Oil, with its enormous geographical spread and political consequences, had been a 
major source of contention and gave the AIOC power of control over the Iranian 
resources. In fact, the introduction of nationalisation resulted in short episodes of 
high growth but AIOC policies were not geared towards maintaining the momentum. 
Hence, the AIOC feared that the political situation in Iran during 1951 could threaten 
the flow of oil from Iran which would negatively affect the production and exports of 
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the company. The AIOC naturally considered nationalisation as a potential threat. 
Therefore, Fraser and the AIOC board aimed to fight for control of Iranian oil 
resources without destroying their industry by maintaining a flourishing and 
progressive picture for the AIOC during nationalisation. They went to great lengths 
to hide the true nature of the political situation in Iran and to defend themselves 
against the Iranian claims. In short, Fraser and the AIOC board took great risks with 
the shareholders‟ assets, yet the shareholders were kept in ignorance of the political 
situation in Iran was affecting the company. It is possible that investors were misled 
by the British press, which shared many of the pre-conceived colonial attitudes of the 
AIOC. It is possible that this also included the complacency that accompanied these 
attitudes. By promoting ignorance (and with the support of certain elements in the 
British Press) Fraser was able to manipulate facts to promote shareholder confidence, 
and in this respect at least, he was successful. 
The impact of specific events on the security prices of the affected firms has been 
the subject of great number of studies
732
. This study examines the behaviour of 
AIOC stock prices during different event windows. For instance, it examines the 
impact of nationalisation and management of information on the AIOC investors 
over 1950 and 1951, employing an event study methodology to measure Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns. As previously mentioned, event study has continued to be a 
valuable and widely used tool in accounting and finance. Using the Market Adjusted 
Model, the results revealed that nationalisation had a negative impact on the 
shareholders and there is an impressive body of empirical evidence in this study 
which indicates that the market adjusts rapidly to new information as soon as it is 
disclosed.  
Within the above context, the event study has shown that AIOC daily stock data 
responded in a measurable way to nationalisation and publication of the company‟s 
annual reports. Three important conclusions are suggested by the above statistical 
and historical analysis. These are as follows. First, disclosure and announcement of 
nationalisation resulted in negative cumulative abnormal returns for the investors 
immediately after the event. Second, the announcement of nationalisation produced 
significant statistical results for the earlier days of the event window whilst 
controlling confounding events, which suggests that the market reacted significantly 
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sooner and faster to bad than to good news. Third, the statistical analysis for market 
efficiency suggests that the market is efficient for the AIOC at the weak and semi 
strong form, which in turn implies that we can rely on the market data. 
By adopting the event methodology to examine the impact of political events on 
stock market returns, the study makes a robust contribution to knowledge for the 
following reasons. First of all, this study uses daily data which is advantageous in 
estimating the market model terms with shorter event windows. For instance, Brown 
and Warner
733
 argued that the power for estimating the market model terms is much 
greater with daily than monthly data. Second, this study uses the security‟s return 
instead of share prices. The statistical tests have greater power when using daily data, 
which in turn will provide more accurate results and allow a precise measurement of 
the speed of the stock-price response, which is a major issue for market efficiency. 
Third, this study provides empirical evidence on the impact of nationalisation on the 
AIOC shareholders using the Market Adjusted Return model. An understanding of 
the stock market reaction to the events in Iran is important for assessing the 
performance of the Iranian economy and gaining insights into Fraser‟s role of 
maintaining stockholders‟ confidence. Finally, historical analysis is an essential 
complement to the statistical process, so press discussions that took place along with 
the published annual reports of the company were used to increment the quantitative 
analysis. 
To conclude, the results suggest that the stock market‟s reaction was 
proportionately small, relative to the scale of the assets potentially at risk, reflecting a 
strong endorsement of the political bargaining power of the company. Indeed, 
following the overthrow of Musaddiq in the CIA sponsored coup of 1953, and the 
end of an Iranian democratic experiment already thoroughly undermined, the 
company fully recovered its assets. With respect to the prior literature, the evidence 
suggests that the strength of Musaddiq‟s position had probably been overstated, even 
in 1951, and that in this case at least, the power of big oil remained undiminished in 
the post-colonial era. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
   
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences by drawing conclusions that are linked to the thesis 
objectives and the research questions set out in chapter 1. Section 6.2 presents a set 
of detailed objectives to highlight the social, economic and political impact of the 
AIOC‟s operations on Iran. Furthermore, this section explains how the research 
questions were investigated, emphasises the issues that have been revealed in the 
thesis and addresses how the AIOC and Iran responded to each of the issues. Then 
section 6.3 demonstrates the reflections on the detailed objectives. Section 6.4 
highlights the usefulness of the research methods that are adopted in this thesis. 
Section 6.5 discusses some limitations of the research. Finally, section 6.6 makes 
suggestions for future research.  
6.2 Conclusions from the study 
 The principal aim of this thesis was to contribute towards the understanding of 
AIOC practices in Iran thereby providing a clear picture of how nationalisation 
evolved on 1
st
 May 1951 and how it was perceived by the stock market. The AIOC 
oil concession in Iran had never been free of controversy. Generally, there was a 
clash between the AIOC‟s claim to be a well managed company playing a 
progressive and developmental role in Iran and the Iranians‟ view of the company as 
a rapacious exploitative representative of British imperialism. Whether or not the 
AIOC contributed towards the Iranian economy, the parties to the dispute were so far 
apart that no compromise settlement would have been considered as agreeable by 
both sides. The AIOC failed to close off opportunities for economic nationalists in 
such a way that the dispute between the AIOC and Iranian government culminated in 
the nationalisation crisis in 1951. Nationalisation brought into sharp focus issues 
affecting key AIOC stakeholder groups, including Iranian employees, Iranian 
government and UK investors which became the subject of claim and counter-claim 
from the AIOC board and Iranian nationalist opinion. As a consequence of these 
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disputed claims, a propaganda battle became a crucial ingredient of the crisis, not 
least because a key objective of the AIOC management was to maintain investor 
confidence in the face of a major threat to its asset base but also reflecting the 
AIOC‟s ability to defend itself from the claims made by the Iranian government 
about unfairness in the sharing of proceeds, and discrimination against Iranians. In 
fact, this was crucial in absolving the company from any blame for the international 
crisis. Given the above context, this research addresses the claims by the Iranians 
against the AIOC and the company‟s counter claims drawing on a wide range of 
historical evidence and documents that have previously been neglected to explain the 
social, political and economic impact of AIOC existence on Iran as well as the 
Iranians.  
Based on a review of evidence of the empirical chapters, the history of the AIOC 
in Iran reveals a number of distinctive features. The first is the prevailing role the 
AIOC played in transmitting British attitudes of racial discrimination towards the 
Iranian employees. A second important feature is Iran‟s historical legacy and the 
dominant position held by the company in the economy which led to unfairness in 
the distribution of the proceeds of oil production to the Iranian government. Finally 
and perhaps most importantly, the AIOC management and financial reporting play a 
major role in improving the company‟s image as a socially conscious employer, 
reassuring various stakeholder groups and maintaining the share price to overcome 
the negative consequences of the nationalisation crisis.  
As discussed in the introduction, the discovery of oil in Iran and the formation of 
the AIOC have played a central role in shaping a model of development of political 
and social relations in Iran. Iran‟s location associated with its strategic oil reserves 
were influential factors that promoted the AIOC to get a share of what looked an 
incredible growth opportunity for the company. By the 1950s, the AIOC had 
consolidated its power as the world‟s major oil producing company because it was 
operating in an oil rich country, Iran, which had little political independence. The 
impact of AIOC‟s operation on Iran has been tremendous because of its social and 
economic domination and its deliberate involvement in the region which 
consequently had a major influence on the social, cultural and political life of the 
Iranians. While some scholars have argued that the AIOC contributed to the 
development of the Iranian economy, others have an alternative view, promulgated 
typically but not exclusively by Iranian historians, that the AIOC paid only lip 
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service to the Iranianisation process and the Iranian government‟s demands regarding 
the unfairness of profit distribution. So was it, as Abrahamian
734
 suggests, the 
company considered Iran as their own town and discriminated against the Iranians? 
As Keddie suggests, was the company‟s main objective until nationalisation to be 
“the largest single employer, the contributor of a significant royalty to the 
government, and an essentially untouchable foreign enclave within Iran”735. This 
thesis makes a contribution by addressing the social, economic and political impact 
of AIOC operations in Iran by identifying three detailed objectives. These objectives 
were defined to help this study meet its principal objective. 
1) Examine the CSR policies adopted by the AIOC in the period prior to 
nationalisation using new evidence on anti-Iranian discrimination (AIOC’s 
social impact) 
The first detailed objective was to determine the policies adopted by the AIOC 
during nationalisation and to re-examine the evidence on anti-Iranian discrimination 
through the use of contemporary evidence obtained from the press, secondary 
literature, archival records and also from the disclosures made in the company‟s 
financial statements. Clearly, the AIOC had a negative social impact on Iranian 
employees and anti-Iranian discrimination in the company‟s employment policies 
became an important question which requires an answer. In the light of the evidence 
of chapter 3, this thesis succeeded in investigating the relations among different 
governmental British authorities with the local communities and the Iranians to 
ascertain the policies of inequality and differentiation
736
. Whatever the AIOC‟s 
merits, it is perfectly possible to argue from the reviewed evidence of chapter 3 that 
the AIOC paid little attention to Iranianisation and the company‟s charge of 
discrimination against the Iranian employees was seen as a major precursor to the 
nationalisation of the AIOC‟s Iranian assets by Musaddiq government in 1951. 
Therefore, this research analysed the social attitude of AIOC towards the Iranian 
Government and Iranian employees illustrating how the politics of the company 
developed important consequences for British and US foreign policy culminating in 
the CIA backed coup of 1953.  
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Particular attention was given to the AIOC‟s alleged programme of CSR 
(Iranianisation) which was a crucial ingredient of the unsuccessful pre-
nationalisation negotiations. The AIOC resisted the full implications of Iranianisation 
because the redistribution of employment in favor of Iranians, including at senior 
level, threatened to compromise the control of the business. The Iranian government 
was seeking to implement this CSR programme aimed at giving Iranian employees 
increased status and access to the benefits of employment, housing and education 
with the aim that all posts in Iran except very top management ones should be held 
by Iranians. The AIOC, had taken steps to fulfil its CSR obligations to employees, 
but it did not pay much attention to the Iranianisation process, and its attitude fuelled 
the nationalisation crisis. AIOC‟s formation influenced Iran‟s geographic, social, 
political and economic existence because it managed to create its own culture in Iran 
which carried a negative political and social attitude towards the Iranian employees 
leaving them as mere cheap labour. AIOC discriminated against Iranians, reflecting a 
negative attitude to their technical potential as well as traditional colonial 
stereotyping. AIOC experienced a lot of the alleged liabilities of foreignness in Iran 
because it has been seen by the public that the company has captured many of the 
benefits of being insiders in the host country not only because of social and cultural 
connections to colonial regimes but also due to its close connections with the British 
government.  
As highlighted in chapter 3, the AIOC did not engage much with its social 
responsibilities under the terms of the 1933 Agreement. The company enjoyed 
incredible lobbying power in Iran in relation to the fair treatment of the Iranian 
labour force and in determinant of the company‟s performance to advocate for their 
existence and exploitation of Iranian resources. However, there was no concept of 
shared partnership because AIOC had the opportunity to direct employment and 
transmit its culture to Iran. AIOC had been a large employer of labour but expatriates 
held all the skilled and managerial posts because the company managed to hinder the 
ability of the Iranians to respond to their external challenges. AIOC‟s social and 
economic domination entailed inequality and violation of Iranian sovereignty 
because the company always looked to them as low-grade and not deserving to be 
treated like the British. The company treated the Iranian region as a reserve of 
unskilled labour and brought everyone else from the outside because the company 
had always a belief that the Iranian workers are inferior in skill and did not want to 
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provide them with training. In order to justify the operation of the company in Iran, it 
kept lobbying with its belief that the locals did not have the skills, talents, 
competence and the character to run their own affairs. Literally, the AIOC made the 
situation more difficult for the Iranian labour force by offering them lower salaries 
than the British workforce. 
Clearly, the company missed opportunities to offer better conditions, break down 
social barriers and mix more with the Iranians so there was no chance for Iranian and 
British solidarity because of class differentiation convention. The result was the 
creation of an enclave community. Johnson
737
 has pointed out that layers and 
hierarchies of corporate structure were manifest in the AIOC, where boundaries were 
formed for leadership and economic power by the prevailing distinction of race and 
nationality that existed through vertical segregation (local people could not progress 
higher than a certain grade) and horizontal segregation (they tended to be 
concentrated in particular low status areas or jobs). The AIOC succeeded in building 
company towns in the oil-producing areas which, amongst other things, segregated 
the European and Iranian populations. More pragmatically, the existence of 
segregation in the Iranian community was apparent inside and outside work which 
resulted in the lack of assimilation in the local culture. There was also discrimination 
in housing, wages and medical facilities which resulted in antipathy toward the 
AIOC. 
It is important to mention that the AIOC was positively implicated in imperial 
economic, political and social formation which was reflected in the backgrounds of 
its chairman and board of management. The AIOC director Fraser, was influenced by 
the Empire and therefore became an imperial element in the leadership of AIOC. 
Fraser‟s position was potentially difficult and the forces ranged against the AIOC 
were very powerful. To assess the extent the claim of anti-Iranian discrimination 
against the AIOC is upheld, Fraser‟s subsequent defence of the company‟s activities 
was more precisely evaluated in this research. In fact, Fraser lobbied with the claim 
of providing support to the Iranians because his main desire was to maintain 
stakeholders‟ confidence and defend himself against the Iranian claims. There was 
every incentive for Fraser to fight for control of Iranian oil without destroying the 
industry and by maintaining a flourishing and progressive picture of the AIOC 
                                                 
737
 Johnson, British multinationals, culture and empire in the early Twentieth century, 225. 
 189 
during nationalisation. Fraser was vigilant and influenced the lobbying process to 
counter the Iranian accusations and maintain various stakeholders‟ confidence by 
using the annual reports as a means of communication and a part of a wider 
propaganda battle. Fraser was successful by controlling his reference to the Iranians 
as “employees” in his statement to the public and replaced it with the word “staff” 
which had a less subversive connotation
738
. Obviously, Fraser was willing to avoid 
the wrath of stakeholders‟ to be seen as a key visible figure in AIOC with public 
statements and speeches that enable him to be a hero and to portray the company as 
fair in front of the public.  
2) Evaluate the Iranian accusations of unfairness in the distribution of profits 
from the oil production in Iran and the policy of dividend limitation (AIOC’s 
economic impact) 
In relation to the second detailed objective, this thesis builds a detailed picture of 
the key factors which have influenced the development of the Iranian economy and 
offers a deeper understanding of the Iranian government case over the renegotiation 
of the 1933 Concession Agreement. Furthermore, it addresses the tactics of the 
senior management of the AIOC in avoiding or limiting the impact of fresh terms 
and highlights how the AIOC accounts and financial reporting were used to sustain 
the political economy of the company. As discussed in chapter 4, AIOC was looking 
to put shareholders first ignoring the negative impact of their existence on the life of 
the Iranians. The 1933 concession and the Supplemental Agreement offered by the 
AIOC were not, however, sufficient to guarantee the Iranian government‟s 
satisfaction. The AIOC was not prepared to give up any of its control and share its 
power with Iran. This chaotic situation was worsened by the permanent political 
instability in the region. The Iranian proposals to revise the Concession Agreement 
of 1933 were set out in detail in Gidel‟s Memorandum which consisted of 25 points 
to require rectification in the Supplemental Agreement to be drafted for signature by 
the Majlis. The Memorandum therefore was concerned with attempting to identify 
the main conflicts between the AIOC and the Iranian government that might have 
been important in this respect. In reviewing this fundamental neglected document, 
the thesis assesses the justification of the claims made by both sides by comparing 
the assertions of the AIOC annual reports with the private views which were 
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reflected in private correspondence and minutes of meetings; thus giving supporting 
evidence about the motive and extent of the AIOC‟s adopted methods for profit 
distribution.  
Gidel‟s Memorandum indicated that Iranian accusations were numerous in 
regards to the unfairness and injustice of the AIOC. The Memorandum has pointed 
out that the AIOC was benefiting at the expense of the Iranians demonstrating how 
Iran had gone through perceived unfairness in terms of the share of oil wealth. As 
previously mentioned in chapter 4, the AIOC‟s preliminary statement was unhelpful 
because it disclosed neither trading profit nor the taxation provision for the year, 
ignoring a major Stock Exchange requirement. Thus this illustrates and reflects to a 
certain extent, the AIOC‟s anxiety to avoid disclosure. Furthermore, the AIOC 
developed various subsidiaries in different countries to increase the territories under 
its sway. The treatment of subsidiaries was one of the major bones of contention 
between Iran and the company because the exclusion of subsidiaries was an 
important element of arbitrariness in the realisation of profits.  
Other points of conflicts included the British Government‟s insistence on dividend 
limitations which by increasing AIOC‟s taxes decreased the company‟s net profits 
and reduced Iran‟s 20 percent share in dividends and general reserves. The Iranian 
government was largely confined to imposing taxation and carrying out minimal 
maintenance of order due to the influence of internal and external forces resulting 
from British imperialism. Iranians disliked the fact the company was making large 
profits from their oil industry in which they saw themselves as having no real share 
of adequate reward. The Iranian government tried to control the AIOC‟s excessive 
control of their economy and was attempting to monitor their manipulation for the 
tax and royalties figures. But the company contended that there were difficult 
accounting issues in arriving at an assessment of such profits which could not be 
calculated with absolute accuracy.  
In this respect, further evidence is gathered by analysis of AIOC annual reports 
and stock market data. Analysis of the annual reports includes the accounting 
analysis of the financial statements and content analysis of the narratives of the 
chairman statement. The AIOC‟s financial reports play a significant role in the cycle 
of accountability and are important in this research for a number of other reasons. 
Firstly, the annual reports are analysed by both sides as evidence for and against 
changes to the basis on which the AIOC was taxed, royalties were paid under the 
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concession. Secondly, other elements of the return made to Iran for AIOC‟s activity 
are calculated, thus providing a new level of detail and explanation in supporting 
AIOC‟s advocacy of its manipulating case.  
Annual reports were used by Fraser to respond to public pressure; thus persuading 
the readers of the statement of his views. Furthermore, Fraser used his statement in 
annual reports to defend the company‟s activities and to advance arguments in favour 
of his interests. Fraser was willing in an efficient manner to maintain shareholders‟ 
confidence to enhance the credibility of the AIOC. For example, Fraser was 
disclosing information about the strong returns that the company would make 
regardless of the nationalisation crisis. Also, Fraser was declaring the tendency of the 
company to pay the same rate of dividend on the ordinary stock for 1951 despite of 
the crisis; reflecting his understanding of the shareholder‟s position and their 
preference for having frequent dividends
739
. Meanwhile, a review of AIOC‟s internal 
papers makes it clear that the company‟s executives were aware that they enjoyed a 
very favourable deal, and they had no wish to do anything that might weaken their 
position. The evidence would seem to support Elm‟s view, that notwithstanding the 
economic and military importance of Iran, British politicians and the senior 
management of the AIOC displayed complacency and colonial arrogance
740
. 
 As shown in chapter 4, detailed financial analyses was conducted of the share of 
profits using data from the (1948 – 1950) AIOC Annual Report and Accounts to 
contrast the profit shares for these periods and re-examine the distribution of the 
firm‟s pre-tax profit during the company‟s nationalisation to three stakeholder 
groups: the Iranian Government, the British Government and other AIOC 
shareholders. In the context of the reviewed accounting evidence, the financial 
analysis of profit shares between stake-holders shows AIOC shareholders and the 
British Government to be increasingly benefiting and the Iranians doing increasingly 
badly. The AIOC had a weak case as far as the equity in allocation of oil production 
was concerned: the company was misleading the Iranians and giving them incorrect 
information. The Iranian government headed by different Iranian prime ministers 
including Ali Mansur, Razmara and Musaddiq have made a strong case in support of 
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their contention that the profit sharing element of their royalty has not in practice 
worked in the way they expected. As a consequence, the empirical evidence and the 
use of accounting information revealed the manipulations by the AIOC violating 
Iranian rights and maintaining control over their natural resources. Also, from the 
Iranian point of view, the lack of trust in AIOC accounting is a possible reason for 
ultimate nationalisation since either the AIOC had the wherewithal, or at least the 
Iranians believed it to be the case, that accounting profits could be manipulated 
within these ranges. Another possible reason is that the Iranians had a good 
understanding of their bargaining position. The 1933 Agreement was therefore of 
marginal benefit to the Iranian government, particularly given the British 
Government‟s ability to claw back royalties. Therefore, Iranian accusations against 
the AIOC of the limitations and drawbacks of the 1933 concession and unfairness in 
the distribution of profits from oil production can be upheld on the basis of the 
evidence reviewed here.  
There is evidence that the chairman‟s narrative was important and needs further 
investigation. As far as narrative and content analysis were concerned, an innovative 
methodology (DICTION software) has been used in chapters 3 and 4 to analyse the 
annual reports, which although used elsewhere in the social sciences, has not been 
extensively employed in historical studies generally nor in business and economic 
history in particular. The software has been utilised in evaluating semantics in a 
variety of social discourse areas such as politics and communication, strategic 
management research and business ethics research
741
. DICTION software was used 
in this research to analyse the content of the chairman statements of the AIOC. 
Fraser‟s response is analysed in detail using comparative textual analysis of his 
communications to shareholders revealing his enthusiasm and desire to maintain 
their confidence and thus retaining their investments in the company. 
 Fraser was alert to the reality that the company had an extremely good deal which 
they were willing to maintain so he used his statements as a tool to defend his 
position from the Iranian claims about the unfairness in profit distribution to the 
Iranians. In short, lack of confidence in the AIOC and monitoring of its profit 
                                                 
741
  See for example, Hart and Jarvis, Political Debate: Forms, Styles, and Media; Short and Palmer, 
The Application of DICTION to content analysis research in strategic management; Rogers, Dillard 
and Yuthas, The accounting profession: substantive change and/or image management; Yuthas, 
Rogers and Dillard, Communicative action and corporate annual reports. 
 193 
allocation between the company and the Iranian government was a major factor 
behind nationalisation.  
3) Examine the reaction of the AIOC share price to the nationalisation 
(AIOC’s political impact) 
In relation to the implications of the third detailed objective, the AIOC was not 
only dealing with nationalisation, but was also suffering from the devastating effects 
of the crisis on the company‟s stock prices. Thus, by 1951, conditions facing the 
AIOC investors had changed dramatically. AIOC stock prices were affected by the a 
new period of more problematic relations between the company and Iran that was 
communicated via diplomatic channels which intimidated the investors. Political 
conditions had changed considerably and new nationalisms started to emerge 
because the Iranian government wanted to develop policies with which the country 
could earn higher returns from its oil production. Nationalisation was a living 
illustration of the structural problems facing the British government and AIOC. 
Although the attempt to nationalise the AIOC in 1951 has been dissatisfied by the 
Iranians but there was a rising pressure from them and from the Iranian government 
for more control over their own resources and for more participation in the benefits 
of oil. The question we must ask of ourselves is this: was Musaddiq mistaken to 
ensure the long term success of the Iranian people and their political economy?  
The answer is that nationalisation is only a strategy for sovereignty and was a step 
towards the democratic transformation of Iranian society. It would have been 
impossible to carry out any serious reform prior to the settlement of the oil dispute to 
raise the Iranian‟s standard of living and maintain independence. From the point of 
view of the AIOC and its shareholders, nationalisation would appear to be explicitly 
bad news and thus implying a serious failure in the company‟s policy. As previously 
mentioned in chapter 5, using event study analysis, this research analyzes the AIOC 
stock prices reflecting the true value of the firm by incorporating all the relevant 
information to examine how nationalisation on 1st May 1951 and the publication of 
the AIOC annual report in 16
th
 November 1951 were perceived by London stock 
exchange for several reasons. The main reason is to examine Fraser‟s role in 
maintaining the confidence of AIOC shareholders during the nationalisation crisis. 
Second, to explain the delay in publication of the annual report highlighting the 
possibility of drafting a convincing response by the chairman to nationalisation 
consistent with representing shareholders as being protected by international law. 
 194 
Finally, to address the possibility of pricing shares by the market according to 
sources beyond those immediately communicated by the company and the financial 
press.  
In the context of stock market reaction, the AIOC‟s vulnerability to the 
nationalisation crisis was addressed by studying the economic impact of 
nationalisation on AIOC‟s security value, market efficiency and social welfare. The 
economic impact of nationalisation is assessed within a political context using 
financial data to examine the impact of nationalisation and management of 
information on the stock market. Such an assessment is of particular importance to 
shareholders who have an interest in identifying the performance of the company 
within which they invest their resources. As mentioned in chapter 5, examining 
managerial performance is important to investigate how successful they were in 
managing the shareholders‟ expectations during nationalisation which will give 
indications on the level of market efficiency and tests how good the market was at 
anticipating bad news. The AIOC share price was compared with the UK stock 
market index, the Financial Times Industrial Ordinary Shares index (FT30), over the 
period 1950 to 1951. Comparing the AIOC‟s Return Index (RI) with the FT30 
provides a clear picture about the performance of AIOC in relevance to the market 
which is very useful for assessing the AIOC‟s security prices reaction to 
nationalisation event.  
From the financial analysis illustrated in chapter 5, it was noted that the AIOC 
stock prices gradually decreased and reached their minimal value in May 1951 which 
explains that the rising pressure for oil nationalism had a negative impact on the 
AIOC stock prices.  Nonetheless, the events of 1951 were more dramatic, with the 
assassination of Razmara and the formalisation of the nationalisation legislation; the 
FT30 index shows an increase in its value on 1
st
 May 1951. Within the above 
context, the cumulative abnormal returns were negative throughout 1951 with a 
marked decrease in the values in March 1951 and in May 1951. This explains that 
nationalisation had a negative impact on investors in the AIOC. However, the 
reaction was far less than might have been expected. Also, it is important to note that 
the financial analysis revealed that the loss in market value was substantially less 
than the book value of the assets nationalised. Thus, this suggests that there is the 
possibility that the market priced shares according to sources beyond those 
immediately communicated by the company and the financial press and as a result 
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the market was ascribing greater value to other factors such as the value of private 
information. Those with a detailed knowledge of the company‟s operation and 
diplomatic situation might have concluded that the Musaddiq‟s position was very 
weak, notwithstanding the popular reaction in Iran to the nationalisation event itself. 
Furthermore, based on the empirical analysis illustrated in chapter 5, the mid 1951 
showed that oil nationalisation in Iran had a negative impact on the AIOC stock 
price. For instance, the market priced an abnormal return at t-1 of about 6.7 % as bad 
news prior to nationalisation which suggests semi-strong efficiency because stock 
prices responded to the announcement of nationalisation. Shareholders holding their 
investments until 1
st
 May 1951 would have suffered a negative cumulative return of 
10.25% which illustrates that nationalisation had a negative impact on the investors 
of AIOC as illustrated in their negative cumulative returns. AIOC stock prices were 
affected by the launch of a new period of more problematic relations between the 
company and Iran. With regards to the publication of the annual reports, the financial 
analysis conducted in chapter 5 revealed that the publication of the annual report in 
1951 was received positively and the market anticipated its contents; the results 
suggests that the market priced an abnormal return at t-1 of about 4.5% as good news 
prior to publication of AIOC annual reports which explains that there is information 
content in Fraser‟s announcement and semi-strong efficiency because stock prices 
reflected the publication of annual reports. Generally, investors respond to signals 
sent by the market about the profitability of their investments in the company by 
either responding correctly to the signal or by ignoring it. Inevitably, Fraser was 
successful and reduced the shareholders‟ incentive to switch their investments from 
AIOC to another company despite the negative consequences of the crisis. Thus, the 
above explains that the reaction by the stock market was far less than might have 
been predicted and that the AIOC survived during nationalisation by finding new 
channels for oil, by diversifying its activities during the crisis and also by becoming 
more aggressive in buying advertising space in the newspapers as a response to the 
nationalisation crisis to publicize its preferred policies and to maintain a flourishing 
picture in front of the public regardless of nationalisation. As a result the reaction by 
the stock market was far less than might have been predicted.  
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6.3 Reflections  
As the existence of the AIOC depended on power and control, the contrast of the 
powerful AIOC with weak Iranian government provides interesting evidence about 
the AIOC‟s industrial dominance in Iran. To illustrate the role of the „imperial‟ 
company operating outside the „formal Empire‟, this research evaluated the power 
balance between the AIOC and Iran to study the extent to which the company 
exploited and manifested Iranian rights during the Twentieth Century through social, 
economic, political domination and inequality in profit allocation in their own 
favour
742
. 
The above illustrations represent a brief outline of AIOC operations in Iran during 
nationalisation, with the purpose of presenting different dimensions of its social and 
economic impact which have previously been neglected in prior research; namely 
discrimination against Iranians, unfair profit distribution and AIOC‟s managing stock 
market reaction to events with reference to the relationship between AIOC managers 
and shareholders. Realised profitability and stock market analysis, the main 
empirical ingredient of earlier chapters, provide the means to examine the Iranian 
claims against the AIOC counter claims. Accounting profits and share prices sent to 
investors via the capital markets played a major role in determining the position of 
AIOC during the nationalisation crisis. The analysis of AIOC profitability and 
investigation of AIOC stock market reaction provided in previous chapters deemed 
to reflect the powerful position of AIOC in sustaining its situation in the market and 
in manipulating its accounts taking advantage of the international law. Clearly the 
AIOC management tried to hide the true nature of the political situation in Iran and 
defend themselves against the Iranian claims which contributed importantly to the 
company‟s financial robustness. AIOC was not vulnerable to the world market 
because it overcame the negative impact of nationalisation illustrating the failure of 
local nationalist elites in establishing national control over the AIOC.  
Considering Iran‟s position from a counterfactual point of view, if there had been 
no AIOC, would the country have been the same? This is difficult to assess and there 
has been little evidence that the AIOC have had any great appeal to the Iranian 
employees who were seeking to enjoy a better life in their country. However, the 
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review of evidence in this thesis for anti-Iranian discrimination suggests that the 
AIOC had a weak case as far as CSR was concerned and the accounting evidence of 
unfairness in profit allocation strengthened the political case further. Iran had 
significantly suffered from Britain‟s exploitation of their oil resources and had gone 
through perceived unfairness associated with the share of oil wealth. The relation 
between political power and capital accumulation was reflected in the exploitative 
relation between the AIOC and Iran where the oil sector was a major aspect in 
AIOC‟s capital finance. Clearly, there has long been a consensus about the 
importance of Iran to the existence of the AIOC and influence on the country‟s 
treasure resources but the AIOC failed to develop political and economic structures 
in Iran to maintain their dominance and unequal relations with local populations. 
Inevitably, Fraser played a major role and influenced the lobbying to counter the 
accusations of the Iranian nationalists
743
.  
Obviously, the AIOC was master of the environment in which it operated and was 
involved in matters which extended beyond narrow commercial activities. There was 
very little to help the Iranian government to control its resources. British actions in 
Iran reinforced Iranian preconceptions and anti-British sentiment because the 
Iranians viewed the ownership of national industries by foreign interests as an 
infringement of their country‟s sovereignty. The widespread resentment at the 
colonial treatment of the Iranians by the AIOC and its monopolistic propensity had 
been a feature of AIOC since originating in Iran and it was not until 1951 when the 
Iranian government brought a substantial shift in the distribution of oil income to the 
country‟s benefit. Through imperialism and manipulation, the AIOC became a 
deliberate dominant economic player in Iran and was seen as a symbol of British 
imperialistic presence. The British government and the AIOC did not always come 
together for a smooth relationship but it is worth noting that both of them gained an 
economic advantage for their operation in Iran. To sum up, this research has put 
considerable emphasis on illustrating the reasons for nationalist outbursts; labour 
discontent and unfairness in income distribution which have set Iran on a divergent 
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decolonising path. It seems that in Iran the politics might be of nationalisation but the 
invisible empire of oil remained.  
6.4 Usefulness of research methods  
A triangulation approach was adopted in this thesis to examine the events leading 
up to nationalisation and assess the performance of the company during the political 
crisis. This approach proved to be an appropriate method and convenient for the 
validation process because the weakness of one approach was complimented by the 
strength of another. Meanwhile, different qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods were adopted to examine the same dimension of a research problem.  
The main research methods used in this thesis were the financial analysis of the 
annual reports, content analysis of the narratives of the chairman statements and 
event analysis of the stock market data. Financial analyses of the annual reports 
proved to be useful for illustrating the split of profits between the British government 
and Iranian government which provided the researcher with the opportunity to 
measure different relationships and changes occurring among different numbers in 
the financial statements. Additionally, the analyses highlighted the inequality of 
treatment of Iran through the demonstration of the amount of taxes paid to both 
governments. Secondly, computerised content analysis using DICTION software 
provided a clear picture of the disclosures made by the chairman thus enabling the 
researcher to evaluate the results and identify disclosure patterns. Thirdly, the event 
analysis of the stock market data widened the scope of the evidence available for 
analysis of the AIOC‟s economic and political impact on Iran thus adding relevant 
empirical body of evidence. Finally, it is also worth noting that the secondary 
literature and archival data were invaluable tools because they provided abundant 
evidence by drawing new insights and assisted the researcher to perform further 
analysis and go beyond the existing literature.  
Having outlined the questions addressed, methodology used and conclusions 
reached, the next section of this chapter considers the limitations of the work done 
and the scope for further research.  
6.5 Limitations of this study 
Methodological limitations lie in the gaining of permission to use the archival 
collections and physical access. Despite advances in digitisation, I had to visit the 
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archives much of which are located in Warwick and other centres, where the 
collections are held. A second limitation is the possibility of missing papers where 
the creators of the documents are not available to supply them. Another limitation 
might be that the quality of disclosure is not assessed, although care was taken in the 
interpretation of the chairman statement disclosed in the annual report. For instance, 
conclusions drawn regarding the managerial motivations for disclosing information 
in the financial statements may be subjective because they are based on the historical 
context within which these announcements were made and management may 
deliberately not disclose information on a specific adverse situation while increasing 
the level of positive disclosures on related issues. However, the triangulation 
approach helps to alleviate some of these concerns because it helps in presenting a 
richer picture of the research topic by providing possible alternative explanations and 
interpretations. Also, the use of different research methods helps in overcoming the 
limitations of reliance on a single method and achieves a deeper understanding of 
accounting phenomena. 
6.6 Contribution to knowledge 
The AIOC oil concession in Iran had never been free of controversy. 
Nationalisation brought into sharp focus issues affecting key AIOC stakeholder 
groups, including Iranian employees, the Iranian government and UK investors 
which became the subject of claim and counter-claim from the AIOC board and 
Iranian nationalist opinion. Therefore, by using the AIOC as a historical case study 
and by using accounting and financial evidence, this thesis makes a contribution to 
the social, economic and political impact of AIOC operations in Iran. First, this study 
examines the extent to which the company engaged with the CSR agenda and in 
particular with regard to the treatment of its Iranian employees (Iranianisation). 
Second, this study investigates the actual sharing of oil revenues because there was a 
great deal of dispute about how profits generating from the AIOC were shared 
unevenly with the Iranian government. Furthermore, this research contributes to our 
knowledge by providing a valuable insight into the nature, and extent of the AIOC‟s 
managerial response during nationalisation and their motivation towards maintaining 
stakeholders‟ confidence. Finally, this study assesses the relative bargaining power 
of the AIOC‟s management and Musaddiq‟s government with reference to 
nationalisation and other major political events. In fact, this will be helpful in 
 200 
examining the influence of the AIOC on decolonisation and the success or failure of 
local nationalist élites in establishing national control over the AIOC.  
This research has shown through an investigation of political and diplomatic 
private correspondence that although the company was ready to make concessions on 
non-controversial aspects of Iranianisation, it was determined not to compromise on 
demands that threatened the control of the incumbent British management. By 
making concessions on certain aspects of Iranianisation such as housing the company 
could nonetheless use such initiatives to create the impression of progress in 
negotiations and create confidence amongst investors. Even in public documents 
however, traditional colonial attitudes were still revealed, in spite of the company‟s 
attempts to show that it was responding positively through the medium of the 
Chairman‟s statement. Although the company met certain requirements of 
Iranianisation, for example housing and health care, such developments were subject 
to control through spatial zoning and reinforcement of hierarchy. The company 
accordingly maintained and developed a readily available workforce with skills 
commensurate with specialized activities but which would not give the Iranians the 
capacity to run the industry independently of the British management. Segregation 
by skill grade fueled nationalist demands for control of the industry whilst reducing 
the Iranian capacity to manage the assets post-nationalisation. As the evidence 
suggests, there are interesting contrasts in the attitude of senior management, 
reflecting the context and mode of communication. If it is assumed that the private 
views of Fraser and other AIOC officials correspond more closely to the truth and 
that public pronouncements were intended to serve some purpose of benefiting the 
negotiating stance or underpinning stock market confidence, then the above evidence 
provides some useful insights into the utility of CSR for senior executives. CSR can 
be used productively to enhance negotiating and bargaining positions whilst 
promoting social control and norms of behavior, whilst its scope needs to be 
carefully defined and limited to prevent a more general loss of control. In short, this 
research provides a clear picture of the AIOC claims of tolerance and supportiveness 
to the Iranian workers and also deepens our understanding of the relations between 
the AIOC and the British government. 
If this was the policy of the AIOC in the events leading up to nationalisation in 
May 1951, it was one that was insufficient to prevent the crisis that followed and the 
loss of the large majority of the firm‟s overseas assets. Even so, it contributed to a 
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strong position in the confrontation with the Musaddiq government that followed. 
The Iranians lacked the capacity to manage the industry and the embargo was made 
all the more effective as a result. Of course many other factors were important in 
sparking the crisis and influenced its resolution. On the basis of the evidence 
presented here, the AIOC‟s CSR policy appeared to weaken Musaddiq‟s position, 
although the actual strength of the negotiating positions is a matter for further 
research. Furthermore, this research provides the opportunity to study other periods 
in the AIOC using the same methodology. For instance, DICTION software could be 
applied to the subsidiaries‟ corporate reports with the aim of analysing their 
responses to CSR and investigating their disclosure interests towards various 
stakeholder groups to compare it with the results of this study. Last but not least, this 
research also provides the potential to undertake research and study other companies 
in the same period of collapsing imperialism (e.g. Africa) to discover the success or 
failure of local nationalist élites in establishing national control over their resources. 
6.7 Suggestions for further research 
There are a number of suggestions for future research arising from this study. 
Firstly, the evidence in the empirical chapters suggest that accounting and financial 
analysis do merit further exploration in business history. A detailed study of the 
AIOC‟s subsidiaries could be conducted to identify their practices and allocate the 
profits generated from overseas operations. From this study, there will be a potential 
to discover any differences between the Iranian claims and AIOC counter claims 
regarding the motivations of AIOC in not consolidating the non-Iranian subsidiaries.  
Further research that is worthy of investigation might also include a consideration 
of the remaining points in the Gidel Memorandum (such as: agreement for sale to the 
British Navy and American companies, exports of crude, oil distribution 
establishments, sale of oil for export and prevention of the wastage of gas) which are 
not explored in this thesis. Among other possibilities, research could be conducted to 
study who were the shareholders that kept their investment in the AIOC during 
nationalisation. This might result in providing further insights on the perceptions and 
interests of shareholders who kept their investments in the company during this 
crisis. A final suggested direction for future research projects might include 
reappraising the history of AIOC in the years following nationalisation with the hope 
that there will be continuity and the dialectic of Iranian history will be well explored.  
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So does the history of AIOC explain the present? The past and the present are not 
exclusively one thing or another because they are related to each other. This research 
is meant to analyse the social, economic and political position of AIOC with 
understanding to bring out the implications of this tragic lesson for the present 
position and the future prospects of Iran. Generally, the history of oil nationalisation 
and the AIOC provide a deeper and richer understanding of the present by tracing the 
history of the company and by developing accounting evidence with reference to 
major key points and periods of crisis. Social and economic domination are crucial to 
our understanding of the progress of the AIOC which brought exploitation and had 
chairmen and board members who attempted to influence the lobbying process and 
news agenda to counter the accusations of the Iranian nationalists.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: AIOC Index values from 12/05/1950-16/11/1951 
Date 
AIOC Closing 
prices 
Dividends AIOC daily return 
12/05/1950 6.8750 0.0000   
15/05/1950 6.8750 0.0000 0.0000 
16/05/1950 6.8438 0.0000 -0.0045 
17/05/1950 6.8125 0.0000 -0.0046 
18/05/1950 6.8125 0.0000 0.0000 
19/05/1950 6.8750 0.0000 0.0092 
22/05/1950 7.0000 0.0000 0.0182 
23/05/1950 7.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
24/05/1950 6.9375 0.0000 -0.0089 
25/05/1950 7.0000 0.0000 0.0090 
26/05/1950 7.0625 0.0000 0.0089 
30/05/1950 7.2500 0.0000 0.0265 
31/05/1950 7.2500 0.0000 0.0000 
01/06/1950 7.2188 0.0000 -0.0043 
02/06/1950 7.1250 0.0000 -0.0130 
05/06/1950 7.0625 0.0000 -0.0088 
06/06/1950 7.0938 0.0000 0.0044 
07/06/1950 7.0938 0.0000 0.0000 
08/06/1950 7.0938 0.0000 0.0000 
09/06/1950 7.0938 0.0000 0.0000 
12/06/1950 7.1875 0.0000 0.0132 
13/06/1950 7.2500 0.0000 0.0087 
14/06/1950 7.2188 0.0000 -0.0043 
15/06/1950 7.1875 0.0000 -0.0043 
16/06/1950 7.1563 0.0000 -0.0043 
19/06/1950 7.0625 0.0000 -0.0131 
20/06/1950 7.0000 0.0000 -0.0088 
21/06/1950 6.8125 0.0000 -0.0268 
22/06/1950 6.9688 0.0000 0.0229 
23/06/1950 6.9688 0.0000 0.0000 
26/06/1950 6.9375 0.0000 -0.0045 
27/06/1950 6.7500 0.0000 -0.0270 
28/06/1950 6.5625 0.0000 -0.0278 
29/06/1950 6.6875 0.0000 0.0190 
30/06/1950 6.5625 0.0000 -0.0187 
03/07/1950 6.6250 0.0000 0.0095 
04/07/1950 6.4375 0.0000 -0.0283 
05/07/1950 6.3438 0.0000 -0.0146 
06/07/1950 6.3438 0.0000 0.0000 
07/07/1950 6.3438 0.0000 0.0000 
10/07/1950 6.3438 0.0000 0.0000 
11/07/1950 6.3125 0.0000 -0.0049 
12/07/1950 6.3125 0.0000 0.0000 
13/07/1950 6.2500 0.0000 -0.0099 
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Date 
AIOC Closing 
prices 
Dividends AIOC daily return 
14/07/1950 5.8438 0.0000 -0.0650 
17/07/1950 5.7813 0.0000 -0.0107 
18/07/1950 5.7500 0.0000 -0.0054 
19/07/1950 5.7500 0.0000 0.0000 
20/07/1950 5.8438 0.0000 0.0163 
21/07/1950 5.9375 0.0000 0.0160 
24/07/1950 5.9688 0.0000 0.0053 
25/07/1950 5.8125 0.0000 -0.0262 
26/07/1950 5.6250 0.0000 -0.0323 
27/07/1950 5.6250 0.0000 0.0000 
28/07/1950 5.6250 0.0000 0.0000 
31/07/1950 5.6563 0.2500 0.0500 
01/08/1950 5.5625 0.0000 -0.0166 
02/08/1950 5.6250 0.0000 0.0112 
03/08/1950 5.7188 0.0000 0.0167 
04/08/1950 5.8125 0.0000 0.0164 
08/08/1950 5.7813 0.0000 -0.0054 
09/08/1950 5.8438 0.0000 0.0108 
10/08/1950 5.7813 0.0000 -0.0107 
11/08/1950 5.9375 0.0000 0.0270 
14/08/1950 5.8750 0.0000 -0.0105 
15/08/1950 5.7500 0.0000 -0.0213 
16/08/1950 5.7500 0.0000 0.0000 
17/08/1950 5.6875 0.0000 -0.0109 
18/08/1950 5.7500 0.0000 0.0110 
21/08/1950 5.6875 0.0000 -0.0109 
22/08/1950 5.6875 0.0000 0.0000 
23/08/1950 5.6875 0.0000 0.0000 
24/08/1950 5.7813 0.0000 0.0165 
25/08/1950 5.8750 0.0000 0.0162 
28/08/1950 5.8750 0.0000 0.0000 
29/08/1950 5.8125 0.0000 -0.0106 
30/08/1950 5.8125 0.0000 0.0000 
31/08/1950 5.7813 0.0000 -0.0054 
01/09/1950 5.7813 0.0000 0.0000 
04/09/1950 5.7500 0.0000 -0.0054 
05/09/1950 5.7813 0.0000 0.0054 
06/09/1950 5.7813 0.0000 0.0000 
07/09/1950 5.7188 0.0000 -0.0108 
08/09/1950 5.6563 0.0000 -0.0109 
11/09/1950 5.7188 0.0000 0.0110 
12/09/1950 5.7500 0.0000 0.0055 
13/09/1950 5.7813 0.0000 0.0054 
14/09/1950 5.8125 0.0000 0.0054 
15/09/1950 6.0625 0.0000 0.0430 
18/09/1950 6.0000 0.0000 -0.0103 
19/09/1950 6.1250 0.0000 0.0208 
20/09/1950 6.5000 0.0000 0.0612 
21/09/1950 6.5938 0.0000 0.0144 
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Date 
AIOC Closing 
prices 
Dividends AIOC daily return 
22/09/1950 6.4688 0.0000 -0.0190 
25/09/1950 6.5000 0.0000 0.0048 
26/09/1950 6.8125 0.0000 0.0481 
27/09/1950 6.8125 0.0000 0.0000 
28/09/1950 6.7188 0.0000 -0.0138 
29/09/1950 6.6563 0.0000 -0.0093 
02/10/1950 6.5938 0.0000 -0.0094 
03/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 -0.0047 
04/10/1950 6.5000 0.0000 -0.0095 
05/10/1950 6.4375 0.0000 -0.0096 
06/10/1950 6.4688 0.0000 0.0049 
09/10/1950 6.5000 0.0000 0.0048 
10/10/1950 6.6250 0.0000 0.0192 
11/10/1950 6.6250 0.0000 0.0000 
12/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 -0.0094 
13/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 0.0000 
16/10/1950 6.6250 0.0000 0.0095 
17/10/1950 6.6250 0.0000 0.0000 
18/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 -0.0094 
19/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 0.0000 
20/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 0.0000 
23/10/1950 6.5625 0.0000 0.0000 
24/10/1950 6.5000 0.0000 -0.0095 
25/10/1950 6.4063 0.0000 -0.0144 
26/10/1950 6.3750 0.0000 -0.0049 
27/10/1950 6.3750 0.0000 0.0000 
30/10/1950 6.3750 0.0000 0.0000 
31/10/1950 6.3125 0.0000 -0.0098 
01/11/1950 6.2813 0.0000 -0.0050 
02/11/1950 6.2188 0.0000 -0.0100 
03/11/1950 6.2188 0.0000 0.0000 
06/11/1950 6.2188 0.0000 0.0000 
07/11/1950 6.1563 0.0000 -0.0101 
08/11/1950 6.1250 0.0000 -0.0051 
09/11/1950 6.2500 0.0000 0.0204 
10/11/1950 6.4375 0.0000 0.0300 
13/11/1950 6.3438 0.0000 -0.0146 
14/11/1950 6.2813 0.0000 -0.0099 
15/11/1950 6.2813 0.0000 0.0000 
16/11/1950 6.4063 0.0000 0.0199 
17/11/1950 6.5000 0.0000 0.0146 
20/11/1950 6.5313 0.0000 0.0048 
21/11/1950 6.5313 0.0000 0.0000 
22/11/1950 6.4063 0.0000 -0.0191 
23/11/1950 6.3125 0.0000 -0.0146 
24/11/1950 6.3438 0.0500 0.0129 
27/11/1950 6.3438 0.0000 0.0000 
28/11/1950 6.2813 0.0000 -0.0099 
29/11/1950 6.1875 0.0000 -0.0149 
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Date 
AIOC Closing 
prices 
Dividends AIOC daily return 
30/11/1950 5.6250 0.0000 -0.0909 
01/12/1950 5.8438 0.0000 0.0389 
04/12/1950 5.8438 0.0000 0.0000 
05/12/1950 5.8750 0.0000 0.0053 
06/12/1950 5.7500 0.0000 -0.0213 
07/12/1950 5.8750 0.0000 0.0217 
08/12/1950 5.8438 0.0000 -0.0053 
11/12/1950 5.8125 0.0000 -0.0053 
12/12/1950 5.8438 0.0000 0.0054 
13/12/1950 6.0000 0.0000 0.0267 
14/12/1950 6.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15/12/1950 6.1250 0.0000 0.0208 
18/12/1950 6.0000 0.0000 -0.0204 
19/12/1950 6.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20/12/1950 6.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
21/12/1950 6.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
22/12/1950 5.8125 0.0000 -0.0313 
27/12/1950 5.8125 0.0000 0.0000 
28/12/1950 5.6250 0.0000 -0.0323 
29/12/1950 5.5625 0.0000 -0.0111 
02/01/1951 5.5000 0.0000 -0.0112 
03/01/1951 5.6250 0.0000 0.0227 
04/01/1951 5.8438 0.0000 0.0389 
05/01/1951 5.7813 0.0000 -0.0107 
08/01/1951 5.7813 0.0000 0.0000 
09/01/1951 5.6563 0.0000 -0.0216 
10/01/1951 5.5000 0.0000 -0.0276 
11/01/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0000 
12/01/1951 5.5313 0.0000 0.0057 
15/01/1951 5.6250 0.0000 0.0169 
16/01/1951 5.5625 0.0000 -0.0111 
17/01/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0000 
18/01/1951 5.7188 0.0000 0.0281 
19/01/1951 5.6875 0.0000 -0.0055 
22/01/1951 5.6250 0.0000 -0.0110 
23/01/1951 5.7500 0.0000 0.0222 
24/01/1951 5.8125 0.0000 0.0109 
25/01/1951 5.8125 0.0000 0.0000 
26/01/1951 5.8125 0.0000 0.0000 
29/01/1951 5.7500 0.0000 -0.0108 
30/01/1951 5.6250 0.0000 -0.0217 
31/01/1951 5.6250 0.0000 0.0000 
01/02/1951 5.6563 0.0000 0.0056 
02/02/1951 5.7188 0.0000 0.0110 
05/02/1951 5.7188 0.0000 0.0000 
06/02/1951 5.6875 0.0000 -0.0055 
07/02/1951 5.6563 0.0000 -0.0055 
08/02/1951 5.6563 0.0000 0.0000 
09/02/1951 6.0625 0.0000 0.0718 
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AIOC Closing 
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Dividends AIOC daily return 
12/02/1951 6.0625 0.0000 0.0000 
13/02/1951 6.1875 0.0000 0.0206 
14/02/1951 6.1875 0.0000 0.0000 
15/02/1951 6.0625 0.0000 -0.0202 
16/02/1951 5.9375 0.0000 -0.0206 
19/02/1951 5.8750 0.0000 -0.0105 
20/02/1951 5.8125 0.0000 -0.0106 
21/02/1951 5.7500 0.0000 -0.0108 
22/02/1951 5.7500 0.0000 0.0000 
23/02/1951 5.8125 0.0000 0.0109 
26/02/1951 5.8438 0.0000 0.0054 
27/02/1951 6.0000 0.0000 0.0267 
28/02/1951 6.0625 0.0000 0.0104 
01/03/1951 6.1563 0.0000 0.0155 
02/03/1951 6.2813 0.0000 0.0203 
05/03/1951 6.3438 0.0000 0.0100 
06/03/1951 6.0938 0.0000 -0.0394 
07/03/1951 6.0625 0.0000 -0.0051 
08/03/1951 5.8750 0.0000 -0.0309 
09/03/1951 5.8125 0.0000 -0.0106 
12/03/1951 5.4375 0.0000 -0.0645 
13/03/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0115 
14/03/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0000 
15/03/1951 5.3438 0.0000 -0.0284 
16/03/1951 5.1875 0.0000 -0.0292 
19/03/1951 5.0625 0.0000 -0.0241 
20/03/1951 5.0385 0.0000 -0.0047 
21/03/1951 5.1875 0.0000 0.0296 
22/03/1951 5.1250 0.0000 -0.0120 
27/03/1951 5.1875 0.0000 0.0122 
28/03/1951 5.0625 0.0000 -0.0241 
29/03/1951 5.1250 0.0000 0.0123 
30/03/1951 5.1875 0.0000 0.0122 
02/04/1951 5.1250 0.0000 -0.0120 
03/04/1951 5.0625 0.0000 -0.0122 
04/04/1951 5.0313 0.0000 -0.0062 
05/04/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0435 
06/04/1951 5.1875 0.0000 -0.0119 
09/04/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0120 
10/04/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0000 
11/04/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0000 
12/04/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0000 
13/04/1951 5.1875 0.0000 -0.0119 
16/04/1951 5.1875 0.0000 0.0000 
17/04/1951 5.1250 0.0000 -0.0120 
18/04/1951 5.1250 0.0000 0.0000 
19/04/1951 5.4688 0.0000 0.0671 
20/04/1951 5.4375 0.0000 -0.0057 
23/04/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0000 
 208 
Date 
AIOC Closing 
prices 
Dividends AIOC daily return 
24/04/1951 5.3750 0.0000 -0.0115 
25/04/1951 5.3438 0.0000 -0.0058 
26/04/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0292 
27/04/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0114 
30/04/1951 5.2500 0.0000 -0.0562 
01/05/1951 5.0313 0.0000 -0.0417 
02/05/1951 5.0625 0.0000 0.0062 
03/05/1951 5.0313 0.0000 -0.0062 
04/05/1951 5.0625 0.0000 0.0062 
07/05/1951 5.1250 0.0000 0.0123 
08/05/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0244 
09/05/1951 5.3750 0.0000 0.0238 
10/05/1951 5.3750 0.0000 0.0000 
11/05/1951 5.3750 0.0000 0.0000 
15/05/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0116 
16/05/1951 5.1563 0.0000 -0.0294 
17/05/1951 5.1563 0.0000 0.0000 
18/05/1951 5.0625 0.0000 -0.0182 
21/05/1951 5.0000 0.0000 -0.0123 
22/05/1951 4.8750 0.0000 -0.0250 
23/05/1951 4.8750 0.0000 0.0000 
24/05/1951 5.0000 0.0000 0.0256 
25/05/1951 5.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
28/05/1951 5.0938 0.0000 0.0188 
29/05/1951 5.1250 0.0000 0.0061 
30/05/1951 5.1875 0.0000 0.0122 
31/05/1951 5.2500 0.0000 0.0120 
01/06/1951 5.3438 0.0000 0.0179 
04/06/1951 5.2500 0.0000 -0.0175 
05/06/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0357 
06/06/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0115 
07/06/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0114 
08/06/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0000 
11/06/1951 5.7188 0.0000 0.0281 
12/06/1951 5.5938 0.0000 -0.0219 
13/06/1951 5.5938 0.0000 0.0000 
14/06/1951 5.5000 0.0000 -0.0168 
15/06/1951 5.3750 0.0000 -0.0227 
18/06/1951 5.2500 0.0000 -0.0233 
19/06/1951 5.1250 0.0000 -0.0238 
20/06/1951 5.0313 0.0000 -0.0183 
21/06/1951 5.1250 0.0000 0.0186 
22/06/1951 5.2188 0.0000 0.0183 
25/06/1951 5.1250 0.0000 -0.0180 
26/06/1951 5.1250 0.0000 0.0000 
27/06/1951 5.0938 0.0000 -0.0061 
28/06/1951 5.1875 0.0000 0.0184 
29/06/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0602 
02/07/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0000 
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AIOC Closing 
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Dividends AIOC daily return 
03/07/1951 5.4688 0.0000 -0.0057 
04/07/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0057 
05/07/1951 5.4375 0.0000 -0.0114 
06/07/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0000 
09/07/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0057 
10/07/1951 5.2500 0.0000 -0.0289 
11/07/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0119 
12/07/1951 5.2813 0.0000 -0.0059 
13/07/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0296 
16/07/1951 5.3438 0.0000 -0.0172 
17/07/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0058 
18/07/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0000 
19/07/1951 5.2500 0.0000 -0.0118 
20/07/1951 5.1875 0.0000 -0.0119 
23/07/1951 5.0625 0.0000 -0.0241 
24/07/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0494 
25/07/1951 5.4063 0.0000 0.0176 
26/07/1951 5.4688 0.0000 0.0116 
27/07/1951 5.4688 0.0000 0.0000 
30/07/1951 5.4375 0.0000 -0.0057 
31/07/1951 5.4375 0.2500 0.0460 
01/08/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0230 
02/08/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0000 
03/08/1951 5.3438 0.0000 0.0059 
07/08/1951 5.3438 0.0000 0.0000 
08/08/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0058 
09/08/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0000 
10/08/1951 5.3750 0.0000 0.0118 
13/08/1951 5.5313 0.0000 0.0291 
14/08/1951 5.6563 0.0000 0.0226 
15/08/1951 5.6875 0.0000 0.0055 
16/08/1951 5.5938 0.0000 -0.0165 
17/08/1951 5.5938 0.0000 0.0000 
20/08/1951 5.5000 0.0000 -0.0168 
21/08/1951 5.4688 0.0000 -0.0057 
22/08/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0114 
23/08/1951 5.4063 0.0000 0.0000 
24/08/1951 5.2813 0.0000 -0.0231 
27/08/1951 5.2500 0.0000 -0.0059 
28/08/1951 5.2188 0.0000 -0.0060 
29/08/1951 5.3438 0.0000 0.0240 
30/08/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0292 
31/08/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0114 
03/09/1951 5.5313 0.0000 -0.0056 
04/09/1951 5.5000 0.0000 -0.0056 
05/09/1951 5.4688 0.0000 -0.0057 
06/09/1951 5.4688 0.0000 0.0000 
07/09/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0114 
10/09/1951 5.3750 0.0000 -0.0058 
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AIOC Closing 
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Dividends AIOC daily return 
11/09/1951 5.3750 0.0000 0.0000 
12/09/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0233 
13/09/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0000 
14/09/1951 5.4688 0.0000 -0.0057 
17/09/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0114 
18/09/1951 5.4063 0.0000 0.0000 
19/09/1951 5.3750 0.0000 -0.0058 
20/09/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0116 
21/09/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0235 
24/09/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0115 
25/09/1951 5.4375 0.0000 -0.0114 
26/09/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0057 
27/09/1951 5.3438 0.0000 -0.0116 
28/09/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0058 
01/10/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0000 
02/10/1951 5.2813 0.0000 -0.0059 
03/10/1951 5.2813 0.0000 0.0000 
04/10/1951 5.3125 0.0000 0.0059 
05/10/1951 5.4063 0.0000 0.0176 
08/10/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0289 
09/10/1951 5.6250 0.0000 0.0112 
10/10/1951 5.5938 0.0000 -0.0056 
11/10/1951 5.6250 0.0000 0.0056 
12/10/1951 5.5938 0.0000 -0.0056 
15/10/1951 5.5625 0.0000 -0.0056 
16/10/1951 5.5313 0.0000 -0.0056 
17/10/1951 5.4688 0.0000 -0.0113 
18/10/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0114 
19/10/1951 5.4063 0.0000 0.0000 
22/10/1951 5.4063 0.0000 0.0000 
23/10/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0058 
24/10/1951 5.4375 0.0000 0.0000 
25/10/1951 5.5313 0.0000 0.0172 
26/10/1951 5.7188 0.0000 0.0339 
29/10/1951 5.7188 0.0000 0.0000 
30/10/1951 5.7500 0.0000 0.0055 
31/10/1951 5.6875 0.0000 -0.0109 
01/11/1951 5.6250 0.0000 -0.0110 
02/11/1951 5.5000 0.0000 -0.0222 
05/11/1951 5.4063 0.0000 -0.0170 
06/11/1951 5.5000 0.0000 0.0173 
07/11/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0114 
08/11/1951 5.5313 0.0000 -0.0056 
09/11/1951 5.5313 0.0000 0.0000 
12/11/1951 5.4688 0.0000 -0.0113 
13/11/1951 5.3750 0.0000 -0.0171 
14/11/1951 5.3125 0.0000 -0.0116 
15/11/1951 5.3750 0.0000 0.0118 
16/11/1951 5.5625 0.0000 0.0349 
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Appendix 2: FT30 Index values from 12/05/1950-16/11/1951 
Date FT30 Index FT30 Daily return  
12/05/1950 107.4000   
15/05/1950 108.0000 0.0056 
16/05/1950 108.1000 0.0009 
17/05/1950 108.1000 0.0000 
18/05/1950 108.1000 0.0000 
19/05/1950 108.2000 0.0009 
22/05/1950 108.2000 0.0000 
23/05/1950 108.2000 0.0000 
24/05/1950 108.2000 0.0000 
25/05/1950 108.0000 -0.0018 
26/05/1950 108.0000 0.0000 
30/05/1950 108.3000 0.0028 
31/05/1950 108.8000 0.0046 
01/06/1950 109.1000 0.0028 
02/06/1950 109.5000 0.0037 
05/06/1950 109.6000 0.0009 
06/06/1950 110.4000 0.0073 
07/06/1950 111.5000 0.0100 
08/06/1950 112.8000 0.0117 
09/06/1950 113.3000 0.0044 
12/06/1950 113.2000 -0.0009 
13/06/1950 113.7000 0.0044 
14/06/1950 114.2000 0.0044 
15/06/1950 114.8000 0.0053 
16/06/1950 115.0000 0.0017 
19/06/1950 114.9000 -0.0009 
20/06/1950 115.0000 0.0009 
21/06/1950 115.1000 0.0009 
22/06/1950 114.6000 -0.0043 
23/06/1950 114.4000 -0.0017 
26/06/1950 114.3000 -0.0009 
27/06/1950 114.6000 0.0026 
28/06/1950 114.6000 0.0000 
29/06/1950 114.8000 0.0017 
30/06/1950 114.9000 0.0009 
03/07/1950 114.8000 -0.0009 
04/07/1950 113.2000 -0.0139 
05/07/1950 112.3000 -0.0080 
06/07/1950 112.7000 0.0036 
07/07/1950 112.7000 0.0000 
10/07/1950 111.9000 -0.0071 
11/07/1950 111.3000 -0.0054 
12/07/1950 111.5000 0.0018 
13/07/1950 111.1000 -0.0036 
14/07/1950 111.2000 0.0009 
17/07/1950 111.4000 0.0018 
18/07/1950 111.6000 0.0018 
19/07/1950 112.0000 0.0036 
20/07/1950 112.0000 0.0000 
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Date FT30 Index FT30 Daily return  
21/07/1950 111.2000 -0.0071 
24/07/1950 110.9000 -0.0027 
25/07/1950 110.6000 -0.0027 
26/07/1950 110.6000 0.0000 
27/07/1950 110.9000 0.0027 
28/07/1950 111.3000 0.0036 
31/07/1950 111.6000 0.0027 
01/08/1950 111.5000 -0.0009 
02/08/1950 111.1000 -0.0036 
03/08/1950 111.3000 0.0018 
04/08/1950 111.2000 -0.0009 
08/08/1950 111.4000 0.0018 
09/08/1950 111.4000 0.0000 
10/08/1950 111.1000 -0.0027 
11/08/1950 111.4000 0.0027 
14/08/1950 111.9000 0.0045 
15/08/1950 111.9000 0.0000 
16/08/1950 112.4000 0.0045 
17/08/1950 112.6000 0.0018 
18/08/1950 113.2000 0.0053 
21/08/1950 113.2000 0.0000 
22/08/1950 113.1000 -0.0009 
23/08/1950 112.8000 -0.0027 
24/08/1950 113.1000 0.0027 
25/08/1950 113.2000 0.0009 
28/08/1950 113.1000 -0.0009 
29/08/1950 113.3000 0.0018 
30/08/1950 113.7000 0.0035 
31/08/1950 113.7000 0.0000 
01/09/1950 113.9000 0.0018 
04/09/1950 113.7000 -0.0018 
05/09/1950 113.5000 -0.0018 
06/09/1950 113.4000 -0.0009 
07/09/1950 113.5000 0.0009 
08/09/1950 113.5000 0.0000 
11/09/1950 113.3000 -0.0018 
12/09/1950 113.7000 0.0035 
13/09/1950 113.6000 -0.0009 
14/09/1950 113.5000 -0.0009 
15/09/1950 113.6000 0.0009 
18/09/1950 113.6000 0.0000 
19/09/1950 113.9000 0.0026 
20/09/1950 114.1000 0.0018 
21/09/1950 114.5000 0.0035 
22/09/1950 115.4000 0.0079 
25/09/1950 115.8000 0.0035 
26/09/1950 115.9000 0.0009 
27/09/1950 116.6000 0.0060 
28/09/1950 117.7000 0.0094 
29/09/1950 118.0000 0.0025 
02/10/1950 118.2000 0.0017 
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Date FT30 Index FT30 Daily return  
03/10/1950 118.1000 -0.0008 
04/10/1950 118.0000 -0.0008 
05/10/1950 117.9000 -0.0008 
06/10/1950 117.9000 0.0000 
09/10/1950 117.9000 0.0000 
10/10/1950 117.8000 -0.0008 
11/10/1950 117.5000 -0.0025 
12/10/1950 116.7000 -0.0068 
13/10/1950 116.5000 -0.0017 
16/10/1950 116.4000 -0.0009 
17/10/1950 116.3000 -0.0009 
18/10/1950 116.3000 0.0000 
19/10/1950 116.3000 0.0000 
20/10/1950 116.2000 -0.0009 
23/10/1950 116.6000 0.0034 
24/10/1950 116.6000 0.0000 
25/10/1950 116.6000 0.0000 
26/10/1950 117.1000 0.0043 
27/10/1950 117.4000 0.0026 
30/10/1950 117.8000 0.0034 
31/10/1950 118.0000 0.0017 
01/11/1950 118.0000 0.0000 
02/11/1950 117.9000 -0.0008 
03/11/1950 117.8000 -0.0008 
06/11/1950 117.4000 -0.0034 
07/11/1950 116.8000 -0.0051 
08/11/1950 116.6000 -0.0017 
09/11/1950 116.5000 -0.0009 
10/11/1950 116.7000 0.0017 
13/11/1950 116.9000 0.0017 
14/11/1950 116.6000 -0.0026 
15/11/1950 116.5000 -0.0009 
16/11/1950 116.8000 0.0026 
17/11/1950 117.1000 0.0026 
20/11/1950 117.3000 0.0017 
21/11/1950 117.4000 0.0009 
22/11/1950 117.7000 0.0026 
23/11/1950 118.1000 0.0034 
24/11/1950 118.0000 -0.0008 
27/11/1950 118.1000 0.0008 
28/11/1950 118.2000 0.0008 
29/11/1950 118.1000 -0.0008 
30/11/1950 117.9000 -0.0017 
01/12/1950 117.9000 0.0000 
04/12/1950 117.9000 0.0000 
05/12/1950 117.8000 -0.0008 
06/12/1950 117.4000 -0.0034 
07/12/1950 114.8000 -0.0221 
08/12/1950 114.3000 -0.0044 
11/12/1950 114.4000 0.0009 
12/12/1950 114.1000 -0.0026 
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13/12/1950 113.4000 -0.0061 
14/12/1950 113.6000 0.0018 
15/12/1950 113.4000 -0.0018 
18/12/1950 113.2000 -0.0018 
19/12/1950 113.6000 0.0035 
20/12/1950 114.1000 0.0044 
21/12/1950 114.8000 0.0061 
22/12/1950 115.2000 0.0035 
27/12/1950 114.9000 -0.0026 
28/12/1950 114.9000 0.0000 
29/12/1950 115.2000 0.0026 
02/01/1951 115.4000 0.0017 
03/01/1951 115.6000 0.0017 
04/01/1951 115.8000 0.0017 
05/01/1951 116.2000 0.0035 
08/01/1951 115.7000 -0.0043 
09/01/1951 115.8000 0.0009 
10/01/1951 115.5000 -0.0026 
11/01/1951 116.3000 0.0069 
12/01/1951 116.7000 0.0034 
15/01/1951 117.7000 0.0086 
16/01/1951 118.0000 0.0025 
17/01/1951 118.1000 0.0008 
18/01/1951 118.0000 -0.0008 
19/01/1951 118.0000 0.0000 
22/01/1951 118.2000 0.0017 
23/01/1951 118.4000 0.0017 
24/01/1951 118.7000 0.0025 
25/01/1951 119.1000 0.0034 
26/01/1951 119.5000 0.0034 
29/01/1951 119.4000 -0.0008 
30/01/1951 119.5000 0.0008 
31/01/1951 119.9000 0.0033 
01/02/1951 119.9000 0.0000 
02/02/1951 120.3000 0.0033 
05/02/1951 120.3000 0.0000 
06/02/1951 120.4000 0.0008 
07/02/1951 120.3000 -0.0008 
08/02/1951 120.8000 0.0042 
09/02/1951 121.5000 0.0058 
12/02/1951 121.5000 0.0000 
13/02/1951 121.3000 -0.0016 
14/02/1951 121.7000 0.0033 
15/02/1951 121.6000 -0.0008 
16/02/1951 122.1000 0.0041 
19/02/1951 122.2000 0.0008 
20/02/1951 122.6000 0.0033 
21/02/1951 122.4000 -0.0016 
22/02/1951 122.3000 -0.0008 
23/02/1951 122.4000 0.0008 
26/02/1951 123.0000 0.0049 
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27/02/1951 123.1000 0.0008 
28/02/1951 122.1000 -0.0081 
01/03/1951 122.0000 -0.0008 
02/03/1951 121.5000 -0.0041 
05/03/1951 121.7000 0.0016 
06/03/1951 122.0000 0.0025 
07/03/1951 122.0000 0.0000 
08/03/1951 122.4000 0.0033 
09/03/1951 122.8000 0.0033 
12/03/1951 122.8000 0.0000 
13/03/1951 122.4000 -0.0033 
14/03/1951 121.1000 -0.0106 
15/03/1951 121.0000 -0.0008 
16/03/1951 121.2000 0.0017 
19/03/1951 121.2000 0.0000 
20/03/1951 121.0000 -0.0017 
21/03/1951 120.6000 -0.0033 
22/03/1951 119.9000 -0.0058 
27/03/1951 119.9000 0.0000 
28/03/1951 120.0000 0.0008 
29/03/1951 119.8000 -0.0017 
30/03/1951 119.7000 -0.0008 
02/04/1951 119.6000 -0.0008 
03/04/1951 119.9000 0.0025 
04/04/1951 119.9000 0.0000 
05/04/1951 120.2000 0.0025 
06/04/1951 120.5000 0.0025 
09/04/1951 120.9000 0.0033 
10/04/1951 121.3000 0.0033 
11/04/1951 121.9000 0.0049 
12/04/1951 121.9000 0.0000 
13/04/1951 122.0000 0.0008 
16/04/1951 122.5000 0.0041 
17/04/1951 122.7000 0.0016 
18/04/1951 122.6000 -0.0008 
19/04/1951 124.6000 0.0163 
20/04/1951 124.7000 0.0008 
23/04/1951 125.9000 0.0096 
24/04/1951 127.7000 0.0143 
25/04/1951 127.7000 0.0000 
26/04/1951 128.9000 0.0094 
27/04/1951 130.3000 0.0109 
30/04/1951 131.8000 0.0115 
01/05/1951 130.9000 -0.0068 
02/05/1951 131.2000 0.0023 
03/05/1951 131.1000 -0.0008 
04/05/1951 131.8000 0.0053 
07/05/1951 132.9000 0.0083 
08/05/1951 132.9000 0.0000 
09/05/1951 133.5000 0.0045 
10/05/1951 134.3000 0.0060 
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11/05/1951 135.5000 0.0089 
15/05/1951 136.8000 0.0096 
16/05/1951 137.1000 0.0022 
17/05/1951 136.3000 -0.0058 
18/05/1951 136.4000 0.0007 
21/05/1951 137.0000 0.0044 
22/05/1951 137.2000 0.0015 
23/05/1951 136.8000 -0.0029 
24/05/1951 136.2000 -0.0044 
25/05/1951 134.9000 -0.0095 
28/05/1951 135.0000 0.0007 
29/05/1951 134.6000 -0.0030 
30/05/1951 135.4000 0.0059 
31/05/1951 136.0000 0.0044 
01/06/1951 136.3000 0.0022 
04/06/1951 136.6000 0.0022 
05/06/1951 136.6000 0.0000 
06/06/1951 136.7000 0.0007 
07/06/1951 136.7000 0.0000 
08/06/1951 137.2000 0.0037 
11/06/1951 137.4000 0.0015 
12/06/1951 137.9000 0.0036 
13/06/1951 138.1000 0.0015 
14/06/1951 138.7000 0.0043 
15/06/1951 139.1000 0.0029 
18/06/1951 139.7000 0.0043 
19/06/1951 140.2000 0.0036 
20/06/1951 140.3000 0.0007 
21/06/1951 140.4000 0.0007 
22/06/1951 140.4000 0.0000 
25/06/1951 139.8000 -0.0043 
26/06/1951 138.7000 -0.0079 
27/06/1951 137.3000 -0.0101 
28/06/1951 136.3000 -0.0073 
29/06/1951 136.9000 0.0044 
02/07/1951 136.6000 -0.0022 
03/07/1951 136.6000 0.0000 
04/07/1951 135.8000 -0.0059 
05/07/1951 135.6000 -0.0015 
06/07/1951 135.7000 0.0007 
09/07/1951 135.8000 0.0007 
10/07/1951 135.8000 0.0000 
11/07/1951 135.9000 0.0007 
12/07/1951 135.8000 -0.0007 
13/07/1951 135.7000 -0.0007 
16/07/1951 135.8000 0.0007 
17/07/1951 135.7000 -0.0007 
18/07/1951 135.7000 0.0000 
19/07/1951 135.9000 0.0015 
20/07/1951 136.3000 0.0029 
23/07/1951 136.7000 0.0029 
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24/07/1951 136.8000 0.0007 
25/07/1951 136.8000 0.0000 
26/07/1951 136.2000 -0.0044 
27/07/1951 135.6000 -0.0044 
30/07/1951 133.9000 -0.0125 
31/07/1951 132.7000 -0.0090 
01/08/1951 132.7000 0.0000 
02/08/1951 132.7000 0.0000 
03/08/1951 132.9000 0.0015 
07/08/1951 128.3000 -0.0346 
08/08/1951 128.3000 0.0000 
09/08/1951 127.1000 -0.0094 
10/08/1951 127.1000 0.0000 
13/08/1951 127.7000 0.0047 
14/08/1951 129.9000 0.0172 
15/08/1951 130.7000 0.0062 
16/08/1951 130.8000 0.0008 
17/08/1951 131.9000 0.0084 
20/08/1951 132.3000 0.0030 
21/08/1951 132.6000 0.0023 
22/08/1951 133.0000 0.0030 
23/08/1951 133.6000 0.0045 
24/08/1951 133.6000 0.0000 
27/08/1951 133.1000 -0.0037 
28/08/1951 133.2000 0.0008 
29/08/1951 132.8000 -0.0030 
30/08/1951 132.6000 -0.0015 
31/08/1951 132.3000 -0.0023 
03/09/1951 131.9000 -0.0030 
04/09/1951 131.7000 -0.0015 
05/09/1951 132.2000 0.0038 
06/09/1951 132.4000 0.0015 
07/09/1951 133.0000 0.0045 
10/09/1951 133.0000 0.0000 
11/09/1951 133.0000 0.0000 
12/09/1951 132.9000 -0.0008 
13/09/1951 132.8000 -0.0008 
14/09/1951 132.8000 0.0000 
17/09/1951 132.9000 0.0008 
18/09/1951 132.8000 -0.0008 
19/09/1951 133.0000 0.0015 
20/09/1951 133.2000 0.0015 
21/09/1951 133.1000 -0.0008 
24/09/1951 133.2000 0.0008 
25/09/1951 133.7000 0.0038 
26/09/1951 133.6000 -0.0007 
27/09/1951 135.3000 0.0127 
28/09/1951 138.6000 0.0244 
01/10/1951 138.2000 -0.0029 
02/10/1951 137.4000 -0.0058 
03/10/1951 136.4000 -0.0073 
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04/10/1951 135.4000 -0.0073 
05/10/1951 134.8000 -0.0044 
08/10/1951 134.6000 -0.0015 
09/10/1951 134.5000 -0.0007 
10/10/1951 134.4000 -0.0007 
11/10/1951 135.5000 0.0082 
12/10/1951 135.8000 0.0022 
15/10/1951 135.8000 0.0000 
16/10/1951 136.2000 0.0029 
17/10/1951 136.8000 0.0044 
18/10/1951 137.5000 0.0051 
19/10/1951 137.9000 0.0029 
22/10/1951 137.4000 -0.0036 
23/10/1951 136.9000 -0.0036 
24/10/1951 136.3000 -0.0044 
25/10/1951 136.6000 0.0022 
26/10/1951 136.7000 0.0007 
29/10/1951 136.5000 -0.0015 
30/10/1951 137.1000 0.0044 
31/10/1951 137.4000 0.0022 
01/11/1951 138.1000 0.0051 
02/11/1951 138.3000 0.0014 
05/11/1951 138.2000 -0.0007 
06/11/1951 136.6000 -0.0116 
07/11/1951 135.1000 -0.0110 
08/11/1951 132.7000 -0.0178 
09/11/1951 132.2000 -0.0038 
12/11/1951 130.2000 -0.0151 
13/11/1951 130.7000 0.0038 
14/11/1951 131.7000 0.0077 
15/11/1951 131.4000 -0.0023 
16/11/1951 131.8000 0.0030 
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Appendix 3: Managing Directors and Major British, Iranian and 
American Figures 
 
Managing 
Directors & 
Major British 
Figures 
Vital 
Dates 
Dates of service in AIOC / 
Britain 
Background 
Basil Rawdon 
Jackson  
1892-1957 Managing Director, AIOC, 
1948; Deputy chairman, 
1950; Chairman, 1956-7. 
Joined APOC, 1921. Production 
Department, 1921-9; APOC/AIOC 
representative in USA, 1929-34 and 
1939-48. D‟Arcy Exploration 
Company, 1935-9. 
Edward H. O. 
Elkington 
1890-1964 General Manager, 
APOC/AIOC in Iran and 
Iraq, 1929-37; Deputy 
Director, Production 
Department, 1946; Director, 
1948-56. 
Indian Army, 1910-21. Joined the 
APOC, 1921. 
Ernest G.D 
Northcroft 
1896-1976 Chief representative of 
AIOC in Tehran, 1945-51. 
APOC/AIOC 1919-51. 
Francis Michie 
Shepherd  
1893-1962 British Ambassador in Iran, 
1950-2. 
British political representative, 
Finland, 1944-7. Consul-General, 
Netherlands East Indies; 1947-9. 
Ambassador, Poland, 1952-4. 
George 
Humphrey 
Middleton 
1910-1998 He was Chief Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf 
Residency and Charge 
d‟Affaires in Iran during the 
Abadan Crisis, 1951 and 
1952. 
He was a British diplomat. Foreign 
Office, 1943. Ambassador, Lebanon, 
1956-8. Political Resident, Persian 
Gulf, 1958-61. Ambassador, 
Argentina, 1961-4; United Arab 
Republic, 1964-6.  
Herbert Stanley 
Morrison 
1888-1965 Lord President of the 
Council and Leader of the 
House of Commons, 1945-
51. Foreign Secretary, 
March- October 1951. 
Leader of London County Council, 
1934-40. Home Secretary, 1940-5. 
James Alexander 
Jameson 
1885-1961 Deputy Director and General 
Manager of production, 
1927-39; Director, 1939-52. 
Joined APOC as engineer, 1910. 
General Manager in Iran, 1926-8. 
 John Cadman 1877-1941 Managing Director, 1923; 
Chairman of APOC/AIOC 
1927- 41. 
Assistant Inspector of Mines, 
Scotland. Chief Inspector of Mines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1904-8. 
Professor of Mining and Petroleum 
Technology, Birmingham University, 
1908-20. Admiralty Commission to 
Persia, 1913-14. Petroleum Adviser 
to the Colonial Office, 1916. Director 
of the newly created petroleum 
executive, 1917. Chairman of the 
Inter-Allied Petroleum council, 
1918.Imperial Policy Committee, 
1918. Technical Adviser to APOC, 
1921. 
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John Helier Le 
Rougetel 
1894-1975 British Ambassador in Iran, 
1946-50; Belgium, 1950-1. 
Foreign Office, 1920. High 
Commissioner, South Africa, 1951-5. 
Joseph Addison 1912-1994 Joined AIOC, Legal Branch 
of Concessions Department, 
1946. Transferred to 
Distribution Department, 
1950. Observer with Stokes 
mission to Tehran, August 
1951.  
Law graduate, 1933-6, Solicitor, 
1936-6. Army, 1939-45. Manager of 
Persian Department, 1954. Member 
of AIOC delegation to Tehran for the 
consortium negotiations, April-
September 1954. General Manager, 
Iranian Oil Participants Ltd, 1955-71. 
Awarded CBE. 
L.C. Rice  Company representative in 
London. 
Concession department and 
corresponds to Northcroft during 
Supplemental Agreement. 
Neville 
Archibald Gass  
1893-1965 Managing director, AIOC, 
1939, Deputy Chairman, 
1956; chairman 1957-60. 
After war service joined APOC, 
1919. APOC‟s managing agents, 
1919-23 and dealing with refinery 
and distribution affairs. Transferred 
to Abadan, 1923, and became the 
personal assistant to Jameson, the 
Joint General Manager. Deputy 
General Manager, 1930 and joined 
London Head office, 1934. 
Norman Richard 
Seddon 
1911-89 AIOC‟s chief representative 
in Tehran at the time of 
nationalisation in 1951. 
Joined APOC in 1933. Assistant 
General Manager in Abadan, 1948. 
Managing Director and Deputy 
chairman of BP Australia, 1957-67. 
Richard Rapier 
Stokes 
1897-1957 Leader of negotiations with 
the Iranian Government, 
August 1951. 
Minister of Works, 1950. Lord Privy 
Seal, 1951. 
Robert Anthony 
Eden  
1897-1977 Deputy Leader of 
Opposition, 1945-51. 
Foreign Secretary, 1951-5. 
Prime Minister, Britain, 
1955-7. 
British Conservative Politician. 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
Foreign Secretary, 1926-9. Under-
Secretary, Foreign Office, 1931-3. 
Lord Privy Seal, 1933-5. Foreign 
Secretary, 1935-8. Secretary of State 
of War, 1940. Foreign Secretary, 
1940-5.  
Thomas 
Lavington Jacks 
1884-1966 Joint General Manager, 
APOC, 1923-5; Resident 
Director in Iran, 1926-35. 
Oil Assistant in Strick, Scott & 
Company, Muhammara, 1909-13; 
Assistant Manager, 1917-20. 
Vladimir Robert 
Idelson 
d.1954 AIOC Representative PhD Berlin. International Lawyer in 
London, 1919-26. Called to English 
Bar, 1926. British subject, 1930. 
Took Silk, 1943. 
William Knox 
D‟Arcy 
1849-1917 1909-17 Lawyer. Held principal interest in 
Mount Morgan Mining Co, 
Australia. 
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William Milligan 
Fraser  
1888-1970 Deputy Chairman, 1928-41; 
chairman, 1941-56. 
Managing director, Pumpherston Oil 
Co. Ltd, 1913, managing director, 
Scottish Oils Ltd. Director, Burmah 
Oil Co, 1939-55. Chairman in the 
USA of the wartime Inter-Allied 
Petroleum Conference Specifications 
Commission, 1918. Managing 
Director of APOC/AIOC, 1923-56.  
Chairman of the Oil Supply Advisory 
Committee of Ministry of Fuel and 
Power, 1951-2.  
Winston Leonard 
Spencer 
Churchill 
1874-1965 First Lord of Admiralty, 
1939-40. Prime Minister, 
1940-5. Leader of 
opposition, 1945-51. Prime 
Minister, 1951-5. 
President, Board of Trade, 1908-10. 
Home secretary, 1910-11. First Lord 
of Admiralty, 1911-15. Secretary of 
State of War and Air, 1919-21. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
1921-2. Chancellor of Exchequer, 
1924-9.   
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Figures 
Vital 
Dates 
Dates of service in Iran Background 
Abbas Quli 
Golshayan 
1902 Finance Minister, Minister 
of National Economy. 
Mayor of Tehran. Senator in 
1949 when the Gass-
Golshayan Supplemental 
Agreement met with stiff 
opposition in the Majlis. 
Attorney-General, then Director-
General, Minister of Justice. 
Abdul Husayn 
Hazhir 
b.1895 Finance Minister in Iran. 
Minister of Court. Prime 
Minister, June-November, 
1948. 
Iranian Politician. Graduate of School 
of Political Science. Served in 
Foreign Ministry and joined Russian 
Embassy as an interpreter. Head of 
Industrial and Agriculture Bank. 
Minister of Commerce under 
Furughi. 
Ali Mansur b.1888 Prime Minister in Iran, 
March-June 1950. 
Iranian Politician. Graduate of school 
of Political Science. Under-Secretary, 
Foreign Ministry, 1919. Under-
Secretary, Ministry of Interior, 1920. 
Governor of Azerbaijan, 1926-31. 
Minister of Interior, 1931-3. Prime 
Minister, 1940-1. Subsequently 
Governor-General of Khurasan and 
then Azerbaijan. Head of Seven-Year 
Plan Organisation. 
Ali Razmara 1901-1951 He was a military leader and 
Prime Minister of Iran, June 
1950. Assassinated in office, 
7 March 1951. 
Military education in Iran. 
Commander of Kirmanshah mixed 
regiment, 1927. 
Fazlollah Zahedi 1890-1963 Minister of interior, 1951. 
Prime Minister in Iran, 
1953-5. Retired to 
Switzerland and appointed 
to represent Iran at UN, 
1958. 
Had various military posts under Riza 
Shah. Chief of police, 1949.  
Husayn Makki 1913 Held office under General 
Zahedi. 
Iranian politician. Resigned from the 
army after the Allied occupation and 
joined the Ministry of Roads, 1943. 
Several minor public posts until 
elected to Fifteenth Majlis. He 
opposed the Supplemental 
Agreement, supporting Musaddiq, 
but in the last term of Musaddiq‟s 
office began to oppose him and was 
an effective element in his downfall. 
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Husayn Pirnia 1914 Joined Finance Ministry and 
became Director-General, 
Department of Oil Affairs, 
then Under-Secretary, 1950. 
Elected to Seventeenth, 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Majlis. 
Iranian Politician. English degree in 
administration and oil refining. 
Professor, Tehran University. 
Principal, High School of 
Mathematics and Management, 
Karaj. 
Mirza Husayn 
Khan Ala  
1882-1964 Prime Minster in Iran, 
March-April 1951 and 1955-
7. Senator 1963-4. 
Iranian politician. Educated in 
Westminster School. Minister of 
Public Works and Agriculture in Iran, 
1918. Minister, USA, 1921-5; Paris, 
1929. Minister, London, 1934-6. 
Minister of Court, 1942, 1950-5, 
1957-63. Ambassador, USA, 1945-
50. Foreign Minister, 1950.  
Muhammad 
Musaddiq 
1882-1967 Iranian Prime Minister, 
1951-3 (except for 17-20 
July 1952). 
Supporter of Iranian Constitutional 
revolution in 1900s. Governor of 
Fars, 1920-1. Minister of Finance, 
1921. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
1923. Deputy in Majlis, 1924-8. 
Opposed Riza Shah‟s foundation of 
the Pahlavi dynasty. Exiled from 
politics and imprisoned for some of 
the time during Riza shah‟s rule. 
Returned to active politics after Riza 
shah‟s abdication in 1941. Elected to 
Majlis, 1944. Led National Front, 
formed in 1949. Deposed in US- and 
British-assisted coup, 1953, and 
sentenced to three years solitary 
confinement. After his release he 
retired to his country estate.  
Muhammad Sa‟ed 1883-1973 Prime Minister of Iran after 
the fall of Ali Soheili‟s 
cabinet, 1944, 1948-50. 
Born in Azerbaijan. He studied at 
University of Lausanne. Head of 
Russian Department in foreign 
Ministry, 1933. Ambassador of 
USSR, 1938. Foreign Minister under 
Qavam, 1942 and Suhaili, 1943. Iran-
Russia relations fell to low levels 
during his government. He banned 
the Tudeh Party during his 
premiership. 
Rezah Shah 
Pahlavi 
1878-1944 Minister for War and 
Commander in Chief of the 
army, 1921. Prime Minister, 
1923. Succeeded to Persian 
throne, December 1925. 
Joint Leader of bloodless coup d‟etat, 
February 1921. Abdicated 1941 and 
died in Johannesburg. 
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Dates of service in Iran Background 
Sa‟id Hassan 
Khan Taqizadeh 
1877-1970 Member First Majlis, 1906. 
Foreign Minister, 1926. 
Minister in London, 1929-
30, 1941-4; Ambassador, 
1944-7. Minister of Finance, 
1930-3. 
Minister, Paris, 1933-4. Deputy for 
Tabriz, 1947-9. Senator, 1949. 
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Major American 
Figures 
Vital 
Dates 
Dates of service in USA Background 
General Dwight 
David Eisenhower 
1890-1969 President of the USA, 1953-
61. 
During the Second World War, he 
served as Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Forces in Europe with 
responsibility for planning and 
supervising the successful invasion of 
France and Germany in 1944–45. 
Chief of Staff, US Army, 1945-8. 
George Crews 
McGhee 
1912-2005 Special Assistant to 
Secretary of State, 1949. 
Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern, South Asian and 
African affairs, 1949-51. 
He was a career diplomat in the 
United States foreign service. 
Geologist and independent oil 
producer from 1940. Ambassador, 
Turkey, 1951-3. Director, Middle 
East /institute, 1953-8. Ambassador, 
Germany, 1963-8. 
William Averell 
Harriman 
1891-1986 President Truman‟s special 
envoy to Iranian 
government, 1951. 
US government service, 1932. 
President Roosevelt‟s special 
representative, London, 1941. 
Ambassador, USSR, 1943-6; UK, 
1946. 
Sources: Compiled from Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, pp. 593-610. 
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